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Introduction 
 
The California Initiative Review (CIR) is a non-partisan, objective publication of 
independent analyses of California statewide ballot initiatives. The CIR is a publication of the 
Pacific McGeorge Capital Center for Public Law and Policy and is prepared before every 
statewide election. Each CIR covers all measures qualified for the next statewide ballot, and also 
contains reports on topics related to initiatives, elections, or campaigns. This edition covers the 
six statewide ballot measures that will appear on the November 4, 2014 ballot, as well as 
presents reports on Proposition 49, which was removed from the ballot, Measure L, a history of 
Three Strikes and the initiative process, and comparative initiative law. 
 
The CIR is written and edited by law students enrolled in the California Initiative 
Seminar course at University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. This fall, 20 students 
were enrolled in the seminar. In addition to distribution at our California Initiative Forum, the 
CIR is posted online as a public service to the voters of California. This issue and past issues of 
the CIR are housed online and can be accessed from the main Pacific McGeorge home page, 
www.mcgeorge.edu, or from the new Under the Dome: California Law, Politics, & Policy blog 
site: http://blogs.mcgeorge.edu/lawandpolicy.   
 
The student authors and I are grateful to the Capital Center for sponsoring the publication 
of the CIR and the California Initiative Forum. We hope that the information contained in these 
analyses will be helpful to you as you prepare to vote on the Propositions presented to the 
electorate this November.  
 
Happy Voting, 
 
 
Prof. Mary-Beth Moylan 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Proposition 1, the Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014, 
will authorize $7.5 billion in bond funding if approved by a majority of voters.1 The funds must 
be spent according to certain criteria and include projects designed to: increase water storage, 
watershed protection, and improvements to groundwater and flood protection.2 This bill replaces 
a similar water bond that was scheduled to appear on the November ballot that would have 
authorized $11.1 billion in bond spending for water related projects.3  
 
A YES vote means the state could sell $7.1 billion in general obligation bonds as well as 
redirect $425 million in unsold bonds previously approved by voters for various water related 
projects.4 
 
A NO vote means the state could not sell $7.1 billion in general billion in general 
obligation bonds and redirect $425 million in unsold bonds previously approved by voters for 
various water related projects.5 
 
II. THE LAW 
 
California has one of the most complex water systems in the entire world.6 It is 
responsible for delivering approximately 40,000,000 acre-feet of water throughout the state for a 
variety of interrelated purposes such as drinking water, agriculture, and floodshed protection.7  
State, federal, and local agencies all play a role in California’s water operation--in total, these 
agencies spend approximately $30 billion dollars annually for maintenance and operation.8  A 
majority of funding for this massive endeavor comes from the thousands of local entities 
(including private water utilities) throughout the state, accounting for 84 percent of total 
spending.9 The state comes in second by a wide margin at 12 percent, and the federal 
                                                 
1 See CAL. CONST., art. II, § 10 (providing that a statewide ballot measure can be approved by a majority 
vote of the people). 
2 California Proposition 1, Water Bond (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_1,_Water_Bond_(2014) (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) 
[“California Proposition 1, Water Bond (2014)”]. 
3 Id. 
4 Proposition 1 – Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-1-110414.pdf. 
5 Id. 
6 Andrew Maddocks, Paul Reig, & Francis Gassert, Drought Is Only One Explanation for California’s 
Water Crisis, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/03/drought-only-
one-explanation-california%E2%80%99s-water-crisis. 
7 MARION JENKINS ET AL, Optimization of California’s Water Supply System: Results and Insights, 271-
280, J. WATER RESOURCES PLANNING & MANAGEMENT. 
8 ELLEN HANAK ET AL, PAYING FOR WATER IN CALIFORNIA, 3 (Public Policy Institute of California, 
2014). 
9 Id. 
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government in last place at 4 percent.10 State financial support of water projects primarily comes 
in the form of bonds.11  
 
Since 2000, California voters have approved four bond measures that totaled $19.6 
billion in general obligation bond funding.12  Proposition 84(2006) was the largest of the four 
bonds and was passed in the wake of hurricane Katrina, it authorized $5.4 billion in general 
obligation bonds for water and flood control projects.13 Past water bonds did not prioritize 
funding for water supply or clean drinking water, instead about 75 percent of the funds were 
spent on flood protection, parks and public access, and flood protection.14 On the other hand, the 
proposed water bond allocates nearly 60 percent of the funds towards water supply and ensuring 
communities have clean drinking water.15 
 
A. Path to the Ballot 
 
In October of 2009, the Safe, Clean, and Reliable Drinking Water Supply Act of 2010 was 
introduced in the Senate.16 The bill was approved by the Legislature and the subsequent bond 
measure was scheduled to appear on the 2010 ballot as Proposition 18; it would have authorized 
$11.1 billion in bond funding for various statewide water projects.17 However, Governor 
Schwarzenegger raised concerns about referring the bond measure to the voters in the midst of 
the budget crisis and urged legislators to focus on, “[S]olving the deficit, reforming out-of-
control pension costs and fixing our broken budget system…."18 Ultimately, Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s concerns were heeded and the legislature voted to postpone the bond vote 
until 2012.19 
 
In January of 2012, Governor Brown raised similar concerns about the viability of 
passing the $11.1 billion water bond in the midst of a budget crisis.20 Governor Brown was 
particularly concerned with the water bond’s chance of passing on the same ballot as Proposition 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 UC Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, Beyond Bonds: Funding the governor’s Water Action Plan, 
CAL. WATERBLOG (June 5, 2014), http://californiawaterblog.com/2014/06/05/beyond-bonds-funding-the-
governors-water-action-plan/. 
13 Rodney Smith, Is Relying on the 2014 Water Bond To Help Fund California’s Bay Delta Conservation 
Plan a Good Bet?, HYDROWONK BLOG (Aug. 18, 2013), http://hydrowonk.com/blog/2013/08/08/is-
relying-on-the-2014-water-bond-to-help-fund-californias-bay-delta-conservation-plan-a-good-bet/. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 California Proposition 1, Water Bond (2014), supra note 2. 
17 Id. 
18 Lisa Lien-Mager, Schwarzenegger, Legislators Seek Delay on Water Bond, ASS’N CAL. WATER 
AGENCIES (June 30, 2010), http://www.acwa.com/news/water-supply-challenges/schwarzenegger-
legislators-seek-delay-water-bond. 
19 California Proposition 1, Water Bond (2014), supra note 2. 
20 Id. 
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30, a controversial measure that would increase taxes on high income earners.21 Senator Wolk 
echoed Brown’s concerns, saying, "It is critically important that we focus on the revenue 
measure [Proposition 30].  We are faced with a tax levy in November.  It would be disastrous to 
have [the borrowing] on the ballot."22 
 
Among public requests from Governor Brown to postpone the water bond and a lack of 
the bi-partisan support required, the Legislature voted to postpone the bond a second time, until 
2014.23 
 
In June of 2014, Governor Brown called on the legislature to replace the $11.1 billion 
bond with a “leaner” $6 billion bond.24 He called the previous water bond "a pork-laden water 
bond . . . with a price tag beyond what’s reasonable or affordable."25 The Legislature, 
specifically Central Valley Republicans, felt the $6 billion bond was inadequate to provide 
funding for much needed reservoirs and water storage.26 Working in conjunction with Governor 
Brown, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill (A.B.) —1471 a $7.5 billion measure that 
assuaged Republican desires for water storage projects that kept the bond size reasonable.27 In 
August of 2014 the legislature passed the water bond with almost unanimous support and it was 
signed by Governor Brown shortly thereafter.28   
 
Voters will have the opportunity to decide whether to invest in this bond measure against 
the backdrop of one of the states most severe droughts on record.29 Assembly Bill 1471, the 
Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014 will appear on the 
November ballot as Proposition 1.30 
 
// 
// 
// 
// 
                                                 
21 Anthony York, Jerry Brown says November water bond vote might need to be delayed, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20140808152200/http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-
politics/2012/01/jerry-brown-water-bond.html.   
22 Patrick McGreevy, California Legislature Pulls Water Bond Off Fall Ballot, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/06/local/la-me-water-bond-20120706. 
23 Id. 
24 Scott Detrow, Brown Wades Into Water Bond Debate, KQED NEWS (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2014/08/05/brown-wades-into-water-bond-debate. 
25 Id. 
26 Juliet Williams, California Water Bond Signals Historic Compromise, THE DESERT SUN, Aug. 14, 
2014, http://www.desertsun.com/story/news/nation/california/2014/08/15/california-state-water-
bond/14096953/. 
27 Id. 
28 California Proposition 1, Water Bond (2014), supra note 2. 
29 LATHAM & WATKINS, MASSIVE CALIFORNIA WATER BOND SLATED FOR NOVEMBER 4 GENERAL 
ELECTION AS PROPOSITION 1 (Sept. 4, 2014), available at http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-
california-water-bond-proposition-2014. 
30 Id. 
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B. Proposed Law 
 
1. Authorization of $7.5 Billion in Bond Funding 
 
The enactment of Proposition 1 would repeal the $11.14 billion bond and replace it with 
the Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014 (Water Bond).31  The 
Water Bond provides $7.5 billion in general obligation bond funding for various water-related 
programs.32 The majority would come from additional $7.1 billion bond funding while another 
$425 million from redirected bonds that were previously approved for water related projects, for 
a total of $7.5 billion.33  The funds must be dispersed according to the specific uses set forth in 
figure 1.34 
 
    
                                                 
31 Proposition 1 – Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-1-110414.pdf. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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2. Major Elements of Allocation 
 
a. Dams and Groundwater Storage 
 
The Water Bond would authorize $2.7 billion as a continuous appropriation for water 
storage by the California Water Commission(CWC).35  Continuous appropriations are not 
subject to the annual legislative budget process, they would bypass the Legislature and go 
directly to the CWC for eligible projects of their choosing.36 
 
The CWC is an existing commission that advises the Department of Water 
Resources(DWR), approves rules and regulations, and monitors and reports on the State Water 
Project.37 Members of the nine person commission are appointed by the governor, subject to 
senate confirmation.38  Two of the members of the CWC are chosen based on their general 
knowledge of the environment and the remaining seven are chosen based on “general expertise 
related to the control, storage, and beneficial use of water.”39  Each CWC member is paid $100 
per day when engaged in their duties.40 
 
The CWC has discretion to decide which projects to fund, however the projects are 
selected through a competitive public process and must include certain public benefit factors.41  
These public benefit factors are: ecosystem improvements, water quality improvements, flood 
control benefits, emergency response, and recreational purposes.42  
 
Though several projects will be considered, currently there are four major reservoir 
projects that are under review, any of which may or may not be selected by the commission.43   
 
• The Sites Reservoir in Colusa County, which will cost $3.8 billion and provide a 164,000 
acre-feet of water increase.44 
• The Temperance Flat Reservoir on the San Joaquin River, which will cost $2.5 billion 
and provide a 76,000 acre-feet of water increase.45 
• The raising of Shasta Dam to increase capacity, which will cost $1.2 billion and provide a 
75,000 acre-feet of water increase.46 
                                                 
35 Cal. Proposition 1 at § 79750 (2014). 
36 See DEPT. OF FIN., GLOSSARY OF BUDGET TERMS, available at 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/html/bud_docs/glossary.pdf. 
37 Home, CAL. WATER COMMISSION, https://cwc.ca.gov/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 CAL. WATER CODE § 157 (as added by Proposition 1). 
41 Proposition 1 – Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-1-110414.pdf. 
42 Id. 
43 Matt Weiser & Jeremy B. White, Should California Build Dams, Reservoirs to Deal With Future 
Drought? FRESNO BEE, June 1, 2014, http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/06/01/3956458_should-calif-add-
new-dams.html?rh=1. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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• The raising of Los Vaqueros Dam in Contra Coast County, which will cost $1 billion and 
provide a 20,000 acre-feet of water increase.47 
 
The projected increases in water supply are based off average year rainfall.48 The 
increased water supply is measured in acre-feet of water, roughly the size of a football field 
covered in one foot of water.49 California’s integrated water system manages over 40,000,000 
acre-feet of water per year; a typical family uses two acre-feet of water per year.50 
 
Prior to dispersing funds for a project, the CWC must hold a public meeting for comment 
and review, complete and file all feasibility reports related to the project, and submit their 
findings of the public benefit factors to the legislature.51 The Water Bond states that any state 
agency who receives funds under this bill is subject to random audit by the Department of 
Finance.52 Should the Department of Finance find any signs of “impropriety” in the agencies 
operations, the agency will be subject to a full and complete review.53 
 
Further, fund recipients(usually local governments) must match the total cost of the 
project by at least 50%.54 Local governments would likely pay these costs over time through 
revenue generated from ratepayers as reflected in their water and sewer bills.55 Fiscal 
implications on local governments who qualify for funds are detailed below.  
 
b. Watershed Protection and Restoration 
 
The Water Bond would allocate $1.5 billion for grants and loans for watershed56 
protection and restoration projects.57 The Legislature would approve the funding and then 
disperse it to various conservancies and state agencies for projects in accordance with that 
agency’s function.58 
 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 MARION W. JENKINS ET AL., OPTIMIZATION OF CALIFORNIA’S WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM: RESULTS AND 
INSIGHTS, 271–80 (2004). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 CAL. WATER CODE § 79755 (as added by Proposition 1). 
52 CAL. WATER CODE § 79708 (as added by Proposition 1). 
53 Id. 
54 Proposition 1 – Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-1-110414.pdf. 
55 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2014, at 2, available at 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/pdf/proposition-1-title-summary-analysis-v2.pdf  [“NOVEMBER 
2014 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
56 LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 29 (defining a watershed as an area or ridge of land that separates 
waters flowing to different rivers). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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Local conservancies throughout the state would receive an aggregate total of $327 
million in funding.59 Conservancies work with local government agencies and non-profits to 
accomplish projects that improve and protect local natural resources under their control.60 
Notably, the State Coastal Conservancy will receive $100 million in bond funds which is about 
twice its annual operating budget for their projects.61 In 2012, the State Coastal Conservancy 
used its budget on projects such as: construction of off-stream storage facilities to benefit 
salmon; improvements to hiking and biking trails; and purchases of undeveloped lots for scenic 
perseveration.62   
 
Various state agencies would receive funds to preserve and maintain marine life.63 The 
Wildlife Conservation board would receive $320 million in funding to enhance stream flows, 
protect urban creeks, and fund watershed projects.64 The Department of Fish and Wildlife would 
receive $87.5 million for projects relating to the delta and $285 million for non-delta watershed 
protection projects.65   
 
Significantly, the Natural Resources Agency would administer $475 million for projects 
that would support state funding obligations to the San Joaquin River Restoration Act and the 
Central Valley Project Improvement Act.66 The San Joaquin River Restoration Act aims to 
restore and maintain fish populations in the main stem of the San Joaquin River.67 The Central 
Valley Project Improvement Act strives to protect fish and wildlife in the Central Valley, 
increase water-related benefits to the State of California, and contribute to long term efforts to 
protect the San Joaquin Delta Estuary.68 
 
c. Groundwater Sustainability 
 
The Water Bond would authorize $900 million in grants and loans for projects that 
prevent or clean up groundwater contamination that serve as a source of drinking water.69  These 
funds are approved by the legislature and then directed to the State Water Resources Control 
Board for application to specific projects.70   
 
                                                 
59 Id. 
60 About the Conservancy, ST. CAL. COASTAL CONSERVANCY, http://scc.ca.gov/about/ (last visited Oct. 6, 
2014). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 29. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Home, SAN JOAQUIN RIVER RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.restoresjr.net/ (last updated Aug. 26, 
2014). 
68 Reclamation: Managing Water in the West, U.S. BUREAU RECLAMATION, 
http://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvpia/title_34/public_law_complete.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
69 Proposition 1 – Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-1-110414.pdf 
70 Id. 
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Projects would be prioritized based on specific criteria including: threat to groundwater, 
potential for the spreading of groundwater contamination, potential for enhanced water supply 
reliability, potential to recharge high-use ground water basis, and projects when responsible 
parties for past contamination have not been identified or are unable to pay for cleanup.71 
 
The Water Bond stipulates at 10% of these funds shall be allocated to severely 
disadvantaged communities. The Proposition considers communities with an annual median 
household income that is less than 80 percent of the statewide annual median household income 
to be severely disadvantaged.72 
    
d. Regional Water Reliability  
 
The Water Bond would allocate $810 million to grants and loans for projects that are 
included in an integrated regional water management plan.73 Generally, the Legislature would 
disperse money to state agencies during the budget process in order to fund qualified projects.74 
Projects already part of the integrated regional water management plan include, but are not 
limited to, promotion of water reuse and efficiency, underground water storage projects, regional 
conveyances, and water desalination projects.75 Applicants would be required to show how the 
project would address regional risks to water supply and water infrastructure arising from 
climate change.76 Applicants, excluding disadvantaged communities, would be required to fund 
50% of the total cost of the project.77 At least $81 million must be dispersed to disadvantaged 
communities.78  
 
e. Water Recycling 
 
The Water Bond would authorize $725 million in grants and loans for water recycling 
and advanced treatment technology projects.79 These projects include, but are not limited to: 
infrastructure and potable reuse pilot projects, research and development, and desalination.80  
 
Projects approved for water recycling would be subject to appropriation by the 
Legislature.81 In choosing which projects to fund, these criteria must be considered by the 
Legislature: water supply improvement, decreased reliance on the Delta, public health benefits, 
cost effectiveness, greenhouse gas emission impacts, and reasonable allocation to eligible 
                                                 
71 CAL. WATER CODE § 79702 (as added by Proposition 1). 
72 Id. 
73 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 55, at 7. 
74 Id. 
75 SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1471: WATER QUALITY, SUPPLY, AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2014 (Aug. 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_1451-
1500/ab_1471_cfa_20140813_192610_sen_floor.html. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 29. 
80 Id. 
81 CAL. WATER CODE § 79765 (as added by Proposition 1). 
10 
 
projects throughout the entire state.82 Like funding awarded for regional water reliability, 
applicants would be required to match 50% of the total cost of the project, but this requirement 
can be waived for disadvantaged communities.83 
 
f. Clean Drinking Water 
 
The Water Bond would allocate $520 million in grants and loans for projects to, “Ensure 
access to clean, safe, reliable, and affordable drinking water for California’s communities.”84 
Water districts and local agencies requesting funds for these projects are subject to appropriation 
from the legislature.85 Priority is given to projects that provide treatment for contamination, 
increase access to alternate drinking water sources, or provide water for disadvantaged 
communities whose drinking water is currently impaired by hazardous chemicals.86 
 
g. Flood Management 
 
The Water Bond would authorize $395 million in grants and loans for statewide flood 
management projects that provide public safety benefits as well as enhance fish and wildlife 
habitats.87 The CVFPB was created in 1911 and granted certain regulatory authority to reduce 
the risk of flooding within California’s Central Valley.88 The board is comprised of seven 
members that are appointed by the Governor and subject to senate confirmation.89 Their 
jurisdiction spans the entirety of California’s Central Valley and they work in conjunction with 
the Department of Water Resources and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.90   
 
The Central Valley Flood Protection Board(CVFPB) would be instructed to coordinate a 
sizeable amount of money ($4.8 billion) from previous propositions related to flood control for 
projects under this classification.91 The delta region would receive exclusive access to $295 
million of these funds, which will go to projects that reduce the risk of levee failure and 
flooding.92 Eligible projects under this classification would include levee maintenance and 
improvements, emergency repair and response, and special flood protection projects.93 
 
 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Proposition 1 – Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-1-110414.pdf 
85 CAL. WATER CODE § 79720 (as added by Proposition 1). 
86 Id. 
87 Proposition 1 – Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-1-110414.pdf. 
88 STRATEGIC PLAN 2013–2017, CAL. CENT. VALLEY FLOOD PROT. BD.  (2013), available at 
http://www.cvfpb.ca.gov/strategicplan/2013/9012013_CVFPB_Strategic_Plan.pdf. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 CAL. WATER CODE § 79780 (as added by Proposition 1). 
92 LATHAM AND WATKINS, supra note 29.  
93 Id. 
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3. Fiscal Effects 
 
At the state level, Proposition 1 would allow $7.1 billion in borrowing by selling general 
obligation bonds to investors, who would be repaid with interest from the state’s general tax 
revenues.94  The cost to taxpayers would average about $360 million annually over the next 40 
years.95 This estimate assumes that the interest for the bonds would be slightly over 5%, that they 
would be sold over the next 10 years, and they would be repaid over a 30-year period.96  For 
perspective, this amount is roughly one-third of one percent of the state’s current General Fund 
budget, totaling $14.4 billion over 40 years.97  
 
Local government savings related to water projects are likely to average a couple hundred 
million dollars annually over the next few decades.98  However, effects at the local level are 
harder to predict due to the various ways local governments might use their savings.99  In some 
cases, the availability of state bonds could reduce local spending because it would replace money 
the local government would have spent anyways.100  However in other cases, state bonds could 
motivate local agencies to build substantially larger projects than they would otherwise.101  
These projects would be create higher maintenance and operating costs that are not covered by 
the bond measure.102 
 
III. DRAFTING ISSUES 
 
There do not appear to be drafting issues concerning Proposition 1 because the bond 
measure will fund existing programs and agencies that have already been operating. 
 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS 
 
A bond is a debt investment by an investor who loans money to a corporation or 
government to finance various projects.  If the Water Bond passes, the government would have 
the authority to enter the marketplace and sell bonds that will be paid back over time and with 
interest from the General Fund.103 The California Constitution requires the Legislature to pass a 
bond act by a two-thirds vote in each legislative chamber.104 Once the bond act passes the 
Legislature it is referred to the voters who must pass it by a majority vote. 
                                                 
94 Proposition 1 – Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (Aug. 22, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-1-110414.pdf 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1471: WATER QUALITY, SUPPLY, AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2014, at 7 (Aug. 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_1451-
1500/ab_1471_cfa_20140813_192610_sen_floor.html. 
104 CAL. CONST., art. XVI, § 1. 
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V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
  
A. Proponents Main Arguments  
 
There are three large scale organizations (among others) that have been very vocal in 
their support of Proposition 1. They are the Association of California Water Agencies (ACWA), 
California Alliance for Jobs, and Western Growers.   
 
1. Mitigation of Economic and Social Impacts of Future Droughts 
 
The water bond allocates $810 million to respond to climate change and contribute to 
regional water security.105 Proponents believe the bond will provide critical funds as the state 
continues to struggle with one of the most severe droughts in its history.106 A 2014, University of 
California Davis study tallied the financial hardships of the drought and included $810 million 
from crop revenue loss, $203 million from the loss of livestock and dairy revenue, and $454 
million to pump groundwater in order to maintain production levels.107 The study also found the 
drought will result in a 6.6 million acre-feet reduction in surface water available to agriculture 
and groundwater pumping will have to replace some of this loss.108 In addition to the economic 
loss, the drought has lead to the loss of 17,100 seasonal and part-time jobs.109Proponents believe 
the construction of new dams as well as improvements to existing water storage will provide the 
necessary water storage to mitigate the impact of severe droughts.110 Timothy Quinn Executive 
Director of the ACWA, commented on the critical need to invest in a comprehensive plan to 
secure the state’s water future: 
 
“The bond will provide investments where we need them—in new surface and 
 groundwater storage projects, regional water reliability, sustainable groundwater   
 management and cleanup, water recycling, water conservation, watershed 
 protection and safe drinking water.”111 
 
Proponents claim Proposition 1 represents an important step toward preparing California for our 
current and future water needs.112 
 
 
                                                 
105 Cal. Proposition 1 at § 79740 (2014). 
106 Pamela Martineau, ACWA Hails Legislative Approval of Historic 2014 Water Bond, ASS’N CAL. 
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2. Makes High-Priority Investments in Water Infrastructure 
 
The Water Bond makes $260 million available in grants and loans for public water 
system infrastructure improvements and related actions to meet safe drinking water standards.113 
A 2013 drinking water infrastructure needs survey and assessment by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), determined that California needs an estimated $26.7 billion to 
improve drinking water transmission, $8.4 billion for water treatment, and $6.4 billion for water 
storage.114 Proponents note that California’s water delivery system was built in the mid-20th 
century and the state’s water infrastructure is struggling to keep up with population growth.115 
An example of this concern is the aging water main that burst flooding the University of 
California Los Angeles campus, losing millions   of gallons of water.116 
 
Speaking in favor of the Water Bond, the California Alliance for Jobs, Executive 
Director, James Earp, highlighted that the Water Bond makes smart, high-priority investments in 
a water delivery system that was built to serve less than half the number of people it struggles to 
support now.117 He went on to state that approval of the plan will add water storage above and 
below ground, clean water supplies, and provide funding for critical projects. The water bond 
provides incentives for water agencies throughout California to collaborate in managing the 
region’s water resources and setting regional priorities for water infrastructure improving 
regional water self reliance.118 Proponents believe this will enable regions to gain self-
sufficiency and increase competition between alternative supply systems and drinking water 
treatment techniques.119 
 
3. Helps Disadvantaged Communities   
 
The Water Bond dictates that $510 million shall be dispersed to various hydrological 
regions as identified in the California Water Plan.120  It also specifies that the DWR shall use no 
less than 10% of the funds on disadvantaged communities.121 Throughout California, there are 
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thousands of small rural communities whose residents are economically disadvantaged without 
reliable access to clean drinking water. 122 The systems in these rural communities are unable to 
afford technical expertise; pay for upgrades to meet regulatory changes; retain qualified 
operators; meet the demands for long-term operations and maintenance of an aging or inadequate 
infrastructure; and lack access to capital necessary to fix problems.  
 
For instance, a 2006 study conducted by the State Water Resources Control Board 
(SWRCB) in Tulare County, CA, found a significant number of wells were found to contained 
coliform bacteria, fecal coliform bacteria, and nitrates in excess of community drinking water 
standards.123 The rate based system used in larger metropolitan areas provides additional revenue 
to generate the funds needed supply systems and water quality control. However, disadvantaged 
and rural communities do not generate the additional funding necessary improve their 
infrastructure. Proponents claim the water bond will help resolve this problem by providing the 
funding rural communities need to update their water systems and meet water quality 
standards.124 
 
B. Opponents Main Arguments  
 
Opponents believe the Water Bond represents a grave and insidious threat to core 
environmental values and other principles established to protect fisheries and the environment as 
a whole. 125 A large number of opponents to the Water Bond have joined in opposition against 
the bond. The opposition’s statement contains fourteen reasons to vote against the water bond, 
three of which are discussed below. 
 
1. Ushers In a New Era of Big Dams 
 
The water bond allocates $2.7 billion continuous appropriation funding to water storage 
projects.126 This is the largest appropriation for new dams in the state’s history.127The funds will 
be considered for the construction of dams in Temperance Flat and the Sites Reservoir, and to 
elevate Shasta Dam.128 The $2.7 billion dollars is only a down payment, the rest of the money is 
dispersed by the CWC, and is not subject to legislative approval.129 Opponents also point out a 
number of dam projects (including one on Bear River) have been abandoned because of low 
water yield and financial in-feasibility, are being resurrected due the injection of billions of 
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2013), 
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dollars for dams.130 Opponents believe if Proposition 1 is passed they will spend decades 
fighting proposed dams on rivers throughout the state, wasting even more taxpayers dollars.131 
 
Kathryn Phillips the director of Sierra Club California, said, “The world is much different 
today than during the dam-building heyday in the 20th century. Climate disruption has begun 
and precipitation patterns are already changing. New dams won’t respond to that.”132 Rather than 
see new dams built, opponents would like the state to develop new 21st century methods for 
water storage and conservation.133 
 
2. Incorporates Environmentally Damaging Hidden Promises 
 
Opponents to the Water Bond claim there are numerous environmentally damaging 
sidebar promises included in the bond.134 For example, they note the promise the Governor made 
to northern San Joaquin Valley legislators that he would use his influence to keep the State 
Water Board from implementing the flow increases on the San Joaquin River the Board 
identified as necessary to protect public trust resources.135 The State Water Board is looking to 
increase the unimpaired flow on the river out to the delta by 40%, a move that would require 
farmers to rely more heavily on pumping groundwater.136 The Board as states the river is 
currently so over-tapped that it runs completely dry in stretches. This threatens the quality of 
communities' water, endangers fish and wildlife, and creates uncertainty for farmers, leaving 
communities vulnerable in the face of more frequent and severe droughts.137 Opponents also 
claim they have learned supporters of specific dam projects have been promised the projects they 
support will receive prioritized funding, including sites at Temperance Flat, Sites Reservoir, and 
elevating Shasta Dam.138  
 
Raising Shasta Dam would flood sacred sites of the Winnemem Wintu people, flood part 
of the Wild & Scenic McCloud River (which has some of the best fly fishing in the state), and 
provide almost no benefits for salmon or other fisheries.139 Opponents have used these two 
examples to show not only the environmental concerns surrounding the Water Bond need to be 
taken into account but also the cultural concern. If these concerns are not address California will 
suffer environmentally and culturally, opponents claim.  
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3. Crowds Out Other Critical Investments  
 
The Water Bond imposes hidden costs by using the General Fund revenues to pay the 
accumulating interest, crowding out investment money for public schools, roads, and public 
safety and health.140 The water bond would add over $7 billion in taxpayer indebtedness not 
including the interest.141 California is $777 billion in debt, with $128 billion already approved to 
be taken from the General Fund to repay bonds to taxpayers.142 Barbara Barrigan-Parrilla, 
Director of Vote NO on proposition 1, said, “Proposition 1 is a corporate money grab aimed at 
bankrolling special interests with taxpayer dollars while providing tragically inadequate funding 
for projects that provide safe, clean water for the people of California.”143 Opponents argue the 
taxpayer dollars that will be spent on finishing the proposed dam projects; Temperance Flat 
project would cost nearly $2.5 billion and raising Shasta Dam project would cost $1 billion.144 
The stored water will go to agribusinesses like Paramount Farms, of Kern County, that already 
receives subsidies for the water they buy.145 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Proposition 1, a compromise measure from the 2009 Water Bond, represents the 
culmination of  bi-partisan effort to invest in the state’s water infrastructure. If passed, 
Proposition 1 will allow the government to sell bonds in order to fund the various projects 
designed to restore and clean up the state’s water systems.  The water bond will authorize $7.54 
billion to be allocated for the following purposes: $4.2 billion for water supply, $1.4 billion for 
watershed protection and restoration, $1.4 billion to improvements to groundwater and surface 
water quality, and $395 million for flood protection.146 
 
Proponents claim Proposition 1 ensures a reliable water supply for farms and businesses 
protecting both the economy and the environment during this severe drought. Among the 
proponents are many governmental agencies, corporations, and farmers associations. The main 
thrust of their argument is to avoid further economic and social impact from the drought the state 
must invest heavily in the water infrastructure so the water needs of everyone can be meet. They 
believe the best way to accomplish this is by increasing aboveground and belowground water 
storage, recycling water, and protecting watersheds.  
 
Opponents believe Proposition 1 contains a few worthy projects but they do not justify 
abandoning important environmental principles and fiscal responsibility. Among the list of 
opponents are many environmental organizations, who believe Proposition 1 is an outdated 
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answer to the relatively new problem of climate change. They argue rather than funding the 
special interest projects of corporations, like new water storage schemes and a new era of dam 
building, the state should invest in developing new methods to survive in an ever changing 
climate. 
 
 If the Water Bond passes, the government would have the authority to enter the 
marketplace and sell bonds that will be paid back over time and with interest from the General 
Fund. 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Proposition 2 is a legislatively referred constitutional amendment that would impact 
California’s debts as well as both the State’s and school districts’ monetary reserves.1 The 
proposition was originally titled Proposition 44, but was renamed by Senate Bill (S.B.) 867 on 
August 11, 2014.2 Proposition 2 would amend the State constitution in three ways.3 
 
First, Proposition 2 would mandate that the State, subject to budget emergencies, deposit 
specified funds into the State’s Budget Stabilization Account (B.S.A.), which functions as a 
rainy-day fund for the State during difficult economic times.4 Additionally, it would increase the 
maximum size of the B.S.A. and would make it more difficult for the State to withdraw funds 
from or deposit less than the statutorily prescribed amount of funds into the B.S.A.5 Second, for 
the next fifteen fiscal years, Proposition 2 would require the State, subject to budget 
emergencies, to spend General Fund revenue to reduce State debts owed to pensions, retiree 
health benefits, local governments, and other state accounts.6 Third, Proposition 2 would create a 
State reserve account for the benefit of public schools and community colleges and its passage 
would trigger a stipulation in a separate legislative act, S.B. 858, which would require school 
districts to reduce their reserve accounts to a specified level.7 
 
A “yes” vote would likely lead the State to increase State budget reserves, decrease State 
debt faster than it would otherwise, and reduce the amount of funds school districts may keep in 
local reserve accounts.8 
 
A “no” vote would leave the rules related to State budget reserves, repayment of State 
debts, and public school district budget reserves unchanged.9   
 
II. ROAD TO THE BALLOT 
 
Proposition 2 is a legislatively referred constitutional amendment, which is a bill from the 
Legislature proposing to amend the State constitution. 10  It was originally introduced by 
                                                 
1 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2014, at 12, available at 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf#page=74  [“NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER 
GUIDE”]. 
2 S.B. 867 (2013–14), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0851-
0900/sb_867_bill_20140811_chaptered.pdf.  
3 Infra Part III(B). 
4 Infra Part III(B)(1). 
5 Id. 
6 Infra Part III(B)(2). 
7 Infra Part III(B)(3). 
8 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 2, 1 (July 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-2-110414.pdf [“L.A.O. ANALYSIS”]. 
9 Id. 
10 Both the California State Legislature and the people of California must approve amendments to the 
California constitution. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4.  
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Assembly Member Gatto (Democratic Party, Assembly District 43, Los Angeles) during the 
2009–2010 legislative session.11 The bill received the requisite two-thirds vote from each 
chamber of the State Legislature and the Governor approved it on October 13, 2010.12 Under 
prior law, the Secretary of State was required to submit the constitutional amendment, then 
known as Assembly Constitutional Amendment (A.C.A.) 4, to the first general or statewide 
special election to occur within 131 days of the amendment’s qualification for the ballot.13 
However, in 2011, Senator Hancock (Democratic Party, Senate District 9, Berkeley) authored 
S.B. 202 that explicitly required the Secretary of State to place A.C.A. 4 on the November 4, 
2014, statewide general election ballot and all subsequent constitutional amendments only on 
ballots during general elections occurring in even-numbered years.14 
 
On April 16, 2014, Governor Edmund G. Brown called an extraordinary session of the 
California State Legislature to alter A.C.A. 4 to more “adequately address [the State’s] debts and 
liabilities.”15 In particular, the Governor sought for the new version of the amendment to: “(1) 
[i]ncrease deposits when the state experiences spikes in capital gains revenues, the state's most 
volatile tax revenue; (2) [a]llow supplemental payments to accelerate the state's payoff of its 
debts and liabilities; (3) [c]reate a Proposition 98 reserve to smooth school spending and avoid 
future cuts;  (4) [r]aise the maximum size of the Rainy Day Fund to 10 percent of General Fund 
revenues; (5) [and] [l]imit withdrawals to ensure the state does not overly rely on the fund at the 
start of a downturn.”16 During the extraordinary session, the State Legislature adopted A.C.A. 1, 
which integrated the Governor’s requested changes and required the Secretary of State to replace 
A.C.A. 4 with A.C.A. 1 on the November 4, 2014, ballot under the designation “Proposition 
44.”17 
 
Following the extraordinary session and the adoption of A.C.A. 1, S.B. 867 was enacted, 
changing the ballot designation of the constitutional amendment from “Proposition 44” to 
“Proposition 2,” and required the Secretary of State and county election officials to revise all 
voting materials to reflect this new designation.18 Pundits explain that the renumbering of both 
                                                 
11 See A.C.A. 4 (2009–10), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0001-
0050/aca_4_bill_20101013_chaptered.pdf.  
12 Complete Bill History, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-
10/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/aca_4_bill_20101013_history.html (last visited September 2, 2014). 
While the Governor approved the amendment, the Governor’s approval is not necessary to the 
amendment’s viability. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4. 
13 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9040. 
14 S.B. 202 (Hancock) at § 1 (2011–12), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_202_bill_20111007_chaptered.pdf.  
15 Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Calls Special Session to 
Strengthen Rainy Day Fund (Apr. 16, 2014), available at http://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18482.  
16 Id. 
17 A.C.A. 1 (Second Extraordinary Session, 2013–14), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-
14/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/acax2_1_bill_20140516_chaptered.pdf.  
18 S.B. 867 (2013–14), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0851-
0900/sb_867_bill_20140811_chaptered.pdf. “Commencing with the November 3, 1998, general 
election, all State measures in all elections at which State measures are submitted to a vote of the voters 
shall be numbered in a continuous sequence, commencing with the number “1” and continuing in 
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Proposition 44 and the water bond measure, now known as Proposition 1, “symbolically linked” 
the measures at the top of the ballot.19 This may increase support for Proposition 1 by linking it 
to the “almost universally lauded” Proposition 2 and distinguishing the two measures from the 
other measures on the ballot.20 
 
III. THE LAW 
 
A. Existing Law 
 
Under current law, the State may deposit funds into the existing B.S.A.; however, the 
Governor may choose to put less than the prescribed three percent of General Fund revenues or 
nothing at all into the account at his or her discretion.21 Although State law requires that half of 
the money deposited into the B.S.A. be used to pay off certain specified debts, this year’s State 
budget is expected to fully repay those obligations.22 As a result, after this year, there will no 
longer be any statutory requirements for the State to expend additional revenue to reduce the 
State’s substantial debt.23 Additionally, the State is required to spend a constitutionally 
prescribed amount on public schools and community colleges each year.24 While current law 
does not mandate a State-controlled reserve account exclusively benefitting public schools or 
community colleges, local school districts are required to maintain their own reserve accounts.25 
 
1. State Reserves 
 
The amount that the State may spend each year is based on the amount of taxes the State 
receives and available reserve funds.26 When the economy is struggling, it causes tax revenue to 
drop, usually requiring the State to reduce spending or raise taxes.27 To avoid spending decreases 
or tax increases, governments often create budget reserve accounts that they contribute to during 
economic booms and then use to mitigate the effects of volatile tax revenue streams in times of 
recession.28 As the Legislative Analyst’s Office (“L.A.O.”) succinctly stated, “[I]f a government 
                                                                                                                                                             
numerical sequence for a period of ten years from the year of commencement.” CAL. ELEC. CODE § 
13117(a). At the conclusion of the ten-year period, the numbering of the ballot measures restarts at “1.” 
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13117(b). However, as evidenced in this case, the Legislature may renumber 
propositions appearing on ballots. See, e.g., S.B. 867 (2013–14), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0851-
0900/sb_867_bill_20140811_chaptered.pdf.  
19 John Myers, New Ballot Numbers for November’s Water, Budget  Propositions, KQED NEWS (Aug. 12, 
2014), http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2014/08/12/new-ballot-numbers-for-November-water-and-
budget-propositions/.  
20 Id. 
21 See generally CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20. 
22 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 16. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 14. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 12. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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saves more in reserves when the economy is doing well, it spends less during that time and has 
more money to spend when the economy is doing poorly.”29 
 
California has had the B.S.A. since 2004 when voters passed Proposition 58, a prior 
constitutional amendment.30 Proposition 58 empowered the Governor, through executive order, 
to determine each year whether the state Controller would deposit three percent or less of 
General Fund revenues into the B.S.A. reserve.31 Currently, three percent of General Fund 
revenue is roughly equivalent to three billion dollars.32 The State Treasurer must spend half of 
the funds deposited into the B.S.A., up to five billion dollars, to pay off deficit recovery bonds, 
which are likely to be fully repaid in this year’s budget.33 By statute, the maximum amount the 
B.S.A. may reach is $8 billion or five percent of General Fund revenue, whichever is greater.34 
The State may withdraw any or all funds from the B.S.A. through a majority vote by the 
Legislature.35 Since the B.S.A. was created, the State has only deposited funds into the account 
in the 2006–2007 and 2007–2008 fiscal years and it currently has a zero balance, although this 
year the Governor has decided to deposit funds into the B.S.A.36 
 
2. State Debts 
 
Currently California is roughly $300 billion, or about three times the State’s annual 
budget, in debt.37 This substantial debt has contributed to the reduction of California’s credit 
rating to one of the lowest state ratings in the country, although its creditworthiness has 
improved in recent years.38 The debt includes about $150 billion in already earned pension and 
retiree health care benefits owed to public employees and “several billion dollars” owed to local 
governments, including school districts.39 After the deficit recovery bonds issued in 2004 to 
overcome California’s immense deficit are fully repaid this year, which will cost the state 
                                                 
29 Id. at 12–13. 
30 See generally CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20. 
31 Id. at § 20(e). 
32 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 13. 
33 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(f)(1). The State issued these deficit recovery bonds to relieve the State of 
its substantial budget deficit in 2004. See id. at § 1.3. 
34 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 13; CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(c). 
35 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 14. 
36 Id. at 13. 
37 Id. at 14–15. However, reports about California’s actual amount of debt varies widely. For instance, the 
California Public Policy Center estimates that California’s combined outstanding debts may be $848.4 
billion. Calculating California’s Total State and Local Government Debt, CAL. PUB. POL’Y CENTER 
(Apr. 26, 2013), http://californiapolicycenter.org/calculating-californias-total-state-and-local-
government-debt/. But see Autumn Carter, Unsustainable California, CAL. COMMON SENSE (June 11, 
2014), http://cacs.org/research/unsustainable-california-the-top-10-issues-facing-the-golden-state-
wall-of-debt/ (“California’s actual wall of debt is $443 billion.”). 
38 Moody’s Lifts View on California Debt to Highest in 13  Years, CNBC (June 25, 2014, 6:46 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101789976 (“Of the 47 states rated by Moody's, just two—Illinois and New 
Jersey—have lower ratings, while 42 have higher ratings.”). 
39 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
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approximately $6 billion, there will be no existing statutory requirements for the state to expend 
extra funds to repay State debt faster than each individual debt would otherwise require.40 
 
3. School Reserves 
 
Under the current California Constitution, the State is required to spend about forty 
percent of the State’s budget to fund public schools and community colleges.41 As the vast 
majority of the funding for public schools and community colleges comes from the State, any 
changes in tax revenue levels dramatically affects the size of the State’s budget and causes 
erratic changes to public school funding that significantly affects the services schools may 
offer.42 To mitigate the impact of volatile funding, State law requires school districts to keep 
minimum amounts of funds in reserve accounts.43 While State law requires school districts to 
keep between one and five percent of their annual budget in reserve, many districts keep much 
more than that in their reserve accounts.44 Reserve funds serve a multitude of purposes and can 
allow districts to make large infrequent expenses or to mitigate the impact of decreased State 
funding in low tax revenue years.45 
 
B. Proposed Law 
 
Proposition 2 would mandate that the State deposit funds into the B.S.A. and use funds to 
reduce State debt, except during a budget emergency.46 Additionally, the proposition would 
create a State reserve account for public schools and impose caps on the amount of funds school 
districts may keep in their own reserve accounts.47 
 
1. State Reserves 
 
Proposition 2 would change how the State determines how much money is deposited into 
the B.S.A., the maximum size of the B.S.A., and when the State may withdraw funds from the 
B.S.A.48 For the first fifteen fiscal years following the approval of Proposition 2, the State would 
be required to deposit 0.75 percent of General Fund revenues into the B.S.A.,49 while using an 
additional 0.75 percent of General Fund revenues to pay down specified debts.50 After 
Proposition 2’s requirement to pay down those debts expires in the 2030–2031 fiscal year, the 
                                                 
40 Id. at 16. 
41 Id. at 14; see CITY COLLEGE OF S.F., PROPOSITION 98—HOW DOES IT WORK?  1, available at 
http://www.ccsf.edu/dam/Organizational_Assets/About_CCSF/Admin/Governmental_Relations/
Proposition98_TheTests.pdf.  
42 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 14. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Infra Part III(A)(1)–(2). 
47 Infra Part III(A)(3). 
48 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 15. 
49 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(c)(1) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 8. 
50 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(c)(1) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 8; see 
infra Part III(b)(2). 
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State would be required to deposit the entire 1.5 percent of General Fund revenues previously 
allocated by Proposition 2 into the B.S.A.51 Thus, based on Legislative Analyst’s Office 
estimates, for the first fifteen years of Proposition 2 being in effect it would require the State to 
deposit between $800 million and $2 billion dollars into the B.S.A. and twice that afterwards.52  
 
However, the State may put less than the required amount into the B.S.A. or suspend 
deposits altogether under two exceptions.53 Both exceptions require the Governor to call a 
“budget emergency” with the support of the Legislature by a majority vote.54 Under Proposition 
2, the Governor may only declare a budget emergency in the event of an emergency, as defined 
by the California Constitution,55 or if available funds are insufficient to maintain “General Fund 
spending at and not exceeding the highest level of [any of] the past three years.”56 
 
Proposition 2 would increase the maximum size of the B.S.A. to about57 ten percent of 
General Fund revenues, which would currently be $11 billion.58 If this maximum were reached, 
Proposition 2 would instead require that the State use excess funds to maintain infrastructure, as 
currently defined in California’s Government Code.59 
 
Under Proposition 2, the State may only take funds out of the B.S.A. if the Governor 
declares a budget emergency and the Legislature, by majority vote, authorizes the State to 
remove funds either to address an emergency or to maintain spending at the highest level of any 
of the past three years.60 In the first year of a budget emergency, the Legislature may not 
                                                 
51 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(c)(1) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 8. The 
additional 0.75% of General Fund revenue will become available as a result of Proposition 2’s additional 
mandate that 0.75% of General Fund revenue be used to pay off State debt will expire after 2029–2030. 
CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(c)(1) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 8. 
52 L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 8. 
53 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 22(b) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 9. 
54 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 22(a) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 9. 
55 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 22(b)(1) (added by Proposition 2). “‘[E]mergency’ means the 
existence, as declared by the Governor, of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety 
of persons and property within the State, or parts thereof, caused by such conditions as attack or 
probable or imminent attack by an enemy of the United States, fire, flood, drought, storm, civil 
disorder, earthquake, or volcanic eruption.” CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 3(c)(2). 
56 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 22(b)(2) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 9. 
Historically General Fund spending is adjusted for State population and the cost of living. CAL. CONST. 
art. XVI, § 22(b)(2)(A) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 9. 
57 Because amounts used for paying off prescribed debts and deposited into the B.S.A. are based on 
Department of Finance estimates, Proposition 2 can only provide that the B.S.A. will not exceed ten 
percent of the Department of Finance’s estimate of General Fund revenues, which cannot be expected to 
be perfect each year. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(e) (added by Proposition 2). 
58 L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 9–10. 
59 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(e) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 10. 
“[I]nfrastructure” means real property, including land and improvements to the land, structures and 
equipment integral to the operation of structures, easements, rights-of-way and other forms of interest in 
property, roadways, and water conveyances. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 13101. 
60 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 22(a) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 9. 
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authorize the State to withdraw more than half of the B.S.A. funds.61 Only in a second 
consecutive year of a budget emergency may the Legislature authorize the State to liquidate the 
B.S.A.62 
 
2. State Debts  
 
Proposition 2 would mandate that the State use additional funds each year to reduce the 
debt owed to “pension and retiree health benefits” and for “specified debts to local governments 
and other State accounts.”63 From the 2015–2016 fiscal year through the 2029–2030 fiscal year, 
Proposition 2 would require that the State use 0.75 percent of General Fund revenues64 to pay 
down these specified debts.65 Under current General Fund revenue estimates the proposition 
would require the State to pay about $800 million this year towards those debts.66 Beginning in 
the 2030–2031 fiscal year, the proposition would no longer require that the State use 0.75 
percent of General Fund revenue to reduce those debts and would instead require the State to 
deposit those funds into the B.S.A.67  
 
Furthermore, Proposition 2 would require the State to spend additional funds to reduce 
the debt “when state tax revenue from capital gains are higher than average.”68 Capital gains tax 
revenue69 varies widely from year-to-year based on fluctuations in the economy, making the 
effect of this requirement difficult to predict.70 For example, if Proposition 2 were in place over 
the last thirteen fiscal years, capital gains tax revenues would only have been high enough to 
trigger additional debt funding about half of the time.71 However, the Legislative Analyst’s 
                                                 
61 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 22(a)(2)(B) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 9. 
62 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 22(a)(2)(B) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 9. 
63 L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 7; accord CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(c)(1)(B) (added by 
Proposition 2). 
64 For the purposes of Proposition 2, the Director of Finance will estimate General Fund revenues and 
expenditures for the upcoming four fiscal years within ten days of the enactment of the budget bill. CAL. 
CONST. art. IV, § 12.5 (added by Proposition 2).  
65 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(c)(1) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 8. 
Proposition 2 requires the State to use the 0.75% of General Fund revenues set aside to reduce State debt 
related to: (1) unfunded General Fund obligations to schools under Proposition 98 that existed on July 1, 
2014; (2) budgetary loans  to the General Fund from non-General Fund State funds that existed on July 1, 
2014; (3) costs imposed on local programs occurring before the 2004–2005 fiscal year that the State must 
reimburse the local programs for and that the State may, as prescribed by law, repay over a term of years; 
and (4) “[u]nfunded liabilities for State-level pension plans and prefunding other postemployment 
benefits”  in excess of the amounts already required. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(c)(1)(B)(2) (added by 
Proposition 2). 
66 L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 8. 
67 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 20(c)(2)(A) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 8. 
68 L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 8. 
69 Capital Gains Tax, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capital_gains_tax.asp (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2014) (The capital gains tax is “[a] type of tax levied on capital gains incurred by 
individuals and corporations. Capital gains are the profits that an investor realizes when he or she sells the 
capital asset for a price that is higher than the purchase price.”). 
70 See L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 8. 
71 Id. 
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Office notes that when capital gains tax revenues are particularly high, Proposition 2 could 
trigger up to an additional $2 billion in spending towards the repayment of State debts per year.72 
 
3. School Reserves 
 
Proposition 2 would also create a new school State reserve account  known as the 
“Proposition 98 Reserve” or Public School System Stabilization Account (P.S.S.S.A.).73 When 
the Legislature deposits funds into the P.S.S.S.A. it would trigger a stipulation in S.B. 858 that 
would set a cap on the reserve accounts school districts control.74 However, the implementation 
of these changes would not go into effect until after school funding is restored to the levels it was 
prior to the latest recession.75 In years when tax revenue from capital gains is above average and 
other specified conditions are met, Proposition 2 would direct some of these additional funds into 
the P.S.S.S.A., which may not exceed “ten percent of the total allocations to school districts and 
community college districts . . . .”76 The State could then spend funds from this new reserve 
account to moderate the sometimes-harsh effects of volatile budgets on schools and community 
colleges by stabilizing the funding they receive.77 However, in order to allocate funds from the 
P.S.S.S.A., the Governor, with the support of the Legislature, would have to declare a budget 
emergency.78 While Proposition 2 would alter when the State spends funds on schools by 
holding some funds in the State reserve account, the total amount the State spends on schools 
under Proposition 2 would, over time, be identical to the amount spent in its absence.79 
 
Furthermore, if Proposition 2 is passed and school funding is restored, a section in S.B. 
858 would set a cap on the amount of funds school districts can keep in their own reserves in any 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 21(a) (added by Proposition 2). 
74 CAL. EDUC. CODE §  42127.01 (as added by S.B. 858 (2013–2014)); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 
10; California Proposition 2, Rainy Day Budget Stabilization Fund Act (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_2,_Rainy_Day_Budget_Stabilization_Fund_Act_(2
014), (last visited Sept. 3, 2014); see CAL. EDUC. CODE §  42127.01 (as added by S.B. 858 (2013–2014)) 
(capping the reserve funds a school district may preserve only if Proposition 2 is adopted by the people in 
the November 4, 2014, general election). 
75 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 21(f) (added by Proposition 2); Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. 
Brown Jr., Governor Brown, Legislative Leaders Announce Rainy Day Fund Agreement (May 8, 2014), 
available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18517 (“[T]he Proposition 98 reserve would not begin 
until school funding is fully restored following cuts made during the Great Recession.”) [Press Release]. 
76 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 21(h) (added by Proposition 2); accord L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 10. 
77 See L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 10 (“Before money would go into this reserve, the State would 
have to make sure that the amount spent on schools and community colleges grows along with the 
number of students and the cost of living. The State could spend money out of this reserve to lessen the 
impact of difficult budgetary situations on schools and community colleges.”). 
78 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 22(a)(4) (added by Proposition 2). 
79 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 21(j), (k) (added by Proposition 2); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 10 
(“Though Proposition 2 changes when the State would spend money on schools and community colleges, 
it does not directly change the total amount of State spending for schools and community colleges over 
the long run.”); Press Release, supra note 75 (Proposition 2 would “[c]reate a Proposition 98 reserve to 
smooth school spending and avoid future cuts. This reserve for schools makes no changes to the 
guaranteed level of funding dedicated to schools under Proposition 98.”). 
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year after the State deposits funds into the P.S.S.S.A.80 For the most part, S.B. 858 would require 
school districts to keep their reserves below a certain threshold in years after the State deposited 
funds into the P.S.S.S.A.81  Depending on the size of the district, the cap will be set between 
three percent and ten percent of the district’s annual budget.82 When school districts face 
“extraordinary fiscal circumstances, including, but not limited to, multiyear infrastructure or 
technology projects,” county education officials may exempt school districts from these caps on 
their reserves.83 Because the cap on school district reserves is the creation of S.B. 858, which is 
contingent on Proposition 2 passing, future Legislatures could change the law regarding the cap 
on school district reserves by majority vote.84 
 
IV. DRAFTING ISSUES 
 
The Legislative Analyst’s Office (L.A.O.) has noted that Proposition 2 may further 
reduce the public’s already limited understanding of the budget process and relies on uncertain 
revenue estimates, which may lead to unintended consequences.85 Formula-driven ballot 
measures have already complicated California’s budget process.86 For example, Proposition 98 
employs several constitutional budget formulas that have created a process for determining 
annual school funding that “is understood by a small number of insiders.”87 Additionally, the 
L.A.O. notes that the Gann limit, the progeny of Proposition 111, includes estimates relevant to 
the budget that “are difficult to fathom.”88 The L.A.O. cautions that the creation of additional 
constitutional budget formulas through Proposition 2 could adversely affect the public’s 
understanding of the budget process.89  
 
Second, the L.A.O. notes that the implementation of Proposition 2 would require reliance 
on data that is uncertain, currently unknown, and subject to interpretation.90 For example, 
Proposition 2 would require a certain percentage of General Fund revenue to be deposited into 
different accounts each year, but as the L.A.O. notes, when the Governor and Legislature finalize 
the amount to be deposited under the proposition’s formulas, they would be relying on uncertain, 
                                                 
80 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42127.01 (as added by S.B. 858 (2013–2014)); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 
10. This restriction would not affect community colleges. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42127.01 (as added by S.B. 
858 (2013–2014)); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 10. 
81 L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 10; see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42127.01 (as added by S.B. 858 (2013–
2014)). 
82 L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 10; see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42127.01 (as added by S.B. 858 (2013–
2014)). 
83 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42127.01(b) (as added by S.B. 858 (2013–2014)); L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, 
at 10. In failing to explicitly define “extraordinary fiscal circumstances” the Legislature would leave 
county superintendents of schools significant leeway to grant districts exceptions to the reserve cap.  
84 L.A.O. ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 10–11. 
85 MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2014–2015 BUDGET: OVERVIEW OF THE 
GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 20–21 (2014), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/budget/overview/budget-overview-2014.pdf.  
86 Id. at 20. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 21. 
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imperfect, unreliable data concerning capital gains taxes, among other things.91 Since 
Proposition 2’s deposit and withdrawal mechanisms for the B.S.A. and P.S.S.S.A. are contingent 
on exact percentages, a difference of even one percent between estimated amounts and actual 
amounts could determine whether the Legislature deposits funds into the B.S.A. and P.S.S.S.A.92  
 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
Propositions can violate the California Constitution by violating the Single Subject 
Rule.93 The Single Subject Rule requires that all parts of an initiative be “reasonably germane” to 
each other and the general purpose of the initiative.94 Proposition 2 generally concerns legislative 
reserve fund deposits and expenditures.95 Section 27 of S.B. 858, which only becomes operative 
if Proposition 2 is enacted, contains a provision capping local school district reserves.96 
Although Section 27 of S.B. 858 is inextricably linked to Proposition 2, S.B. 858 is the result of 
distinct legislative action separate from Proposition 2; as a result, the Single Subject Rule would 
not require the topics of Proposition 2 and S.B. 858 to be reasonably germane.97 Therefore, 
Proposition 2 does not appear vulnerable to a challenge under the Single Subject Rule.98 
 
A proposition can also violate the constitution if it fails to comply with the procedural 
rules governing the initiative process.99 In analyzing whether a proposition unconstitutionally 
fails to comply with procedural rules, the court determines the substantive purpose of the rule 
and will only find the proposition unconstitutional if the substantive purpose of the rule is 
violated.100 “The main purpose of the title and summary requirements is to avoid misleading the 
public with inaccurate information.”101 By failing to discuss S.B. 858’s contingent provisions, 
the Attorney General’s official summary may mislead the public with inaccurate information, 
violating the essential purpose of the summary or Section 9051 of the Election Code requiring 
the summary be “true.”102 Courts have not analyzed whether failing to describe contingent 
provisions, like those in S.B. 858, makes a summary unconstitutionally deficient; however, as a 
summary is only required to describe the “chief principals and points” of the initiative and 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 See NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 15–17. 
93 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). 
94 Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 38–39 (1979). 
95 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 12.   
96  CAL. EDUC. CODE §  42127.01 (as added by S.B. 858 (2013–2014)). 
97 See Zaremberg v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 4th 111, 118 (2004) (“‘[T]he title and summary 
prepared by the Attorney General are presumed accurate, and substantial compliance with the ‘chief 
purpose and points' provision is sufficient.’ While the Act also contains numerous ‘auxiliary and 
subsidiary’ matters not mentioned in the summary, it is not unreasonable to conclude, as referendum 
proponents argue, that failure to mention the tax credit contingency does not alter the chief purpose nor 
render the summary fatally defective. As we have previously explained ‘a statement of the major 
objectives . . . of the measure is satisfactory’” (citations omitted).). 
98 Id. 
99 Assembly of the State of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d. 638, 649 (1982). 
100 Id. at 648–50. 
101 Zaremberg, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 116. 
102 Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 243–44 
(1978); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9051.  
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Proposition 2’s summary describes the B.S.A. and P.S.S.S.A. reserves the court could reasonably 
find that Proposition 2’s summary is not “fatally defective.”103 Furthermore, invalidating a voter-
approved initiative is likely an inappropriate remedy for a procedural violation that may be 
remedied by a lawsuit prior to the election.104 Even if the court were willing to invalidate a 
proposition, SB 858 is not part of the official language of Proposition 2, so there is a strong 
argument that the Attorney General’s summary is true as applied to Proposition 2.  
 
VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Proposition 2 received unanimous support in the Legislature and is strongly supported by 
the Governor, thus unsurprisingly the proposition has received minimal debate in the Legislature 
and the media.105 For the most part, Proposition 2’s provisions creating more robust State reserve 
requirements and requiring the paying down of State debts more quickly have received 
widespread support.106 However, in creating a State school reserve  account the funding of which 
would satisfy Proposition 98’s spending requirements and by triggering S.B. 858’s limit on local 
school reserve accounts, Proposition 2 has faced opposition from education interest groups.107 
 
A. State Reserves 
 
The official arguments registered with the Secretary of State in support of Proposition 2 
emphasizes that the creation of the B.S.A. will help stabilize California’s volatile budget process, 
encourage the Legislature to live within their means, and pay down existing debt.108 According 
to Speaker Emeritus Perez, Proposition 2 would “establish a better approach for California’s 
budget that saves the spiking revenues we take in during good years, and saves it for those tough 
years where revenues are scarce.” Spiking revenue largely results from changes in capital gains 
tax revenue, which varies widely from year to year.109 Since capital gains are the profits a person 
or company makes from investments, capital gains tax revenue fluctuates with the stock 
market.110 The Governor has emphasized the need for California legislators to “avoid the 
mistakes of the past . . . and . . . establish a solid rainy day fund, locked into the constitution . . . 
.”111 By imposing more rigid requirements for depositing and withdrawing funds from the 
                                                 
103 Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 22 Cal. 3d at 243–44. 
104 No pre-election lawsuit alleging that the Title or Summary were defective has been brought. 
105 Complete Bill History: ACAX2-1, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-
14/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/acax2_1_bill_20140516_history.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
106 Infra Part IV(A)–(B). 
107 Infra Part IV(C). 
108 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 12.    
109 See id. at 14.    
110 Michael B. Marois, California Law Makers Pass Rainy Day Fund Ballot Measure, BLOOMBERG (May 
15, 2014, 11:07 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-15/california-lawmakers-pass-
rainy-day-fund-ballot-measure.html.  
111 Sharon Bernstein, California Governor Brown Urges Continued Fiscal Restraint, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-usa-california-governor-
idUSBREA0K1LJ20140123.  
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B.S.A., Proposition 2 would help to ensure the State is financially prepared to mitigate future 
downturns in the economy.112  
 
B. State Debts 
 
The Governor, in particular, has supported Proposition 2 as a way to address California’s 
debt.113 In his official press release calling for the special session that led to the adoption of the 
current form of the proposition, Governor Brown stated, “We simply must prevent the massive 
deficits of the last decade and we can only do that by paying down our debts and creating a solid 
rainy day fund.”114 Credit ranking companies, such as Standard and Poor’s, have also criticized 
California for failing to save money when the economy is doing well and for relying too heavily 
on volatile revenue sources like capital gains taxes.115 
      
Reliance on volatile revenue sources to fund as much as two-thirds of the State’s 
budget,116 which includes several long-term funding obligations like public employee pensions, 
has been a major source of California’s “Wall of Debt.”117 When Governor Brown first proposed 
his changes to the proposition, the California Chamber of Commerce quickly endorsed his 
effort.118 Other groups like California Forward and the California Business Roundtable, in 
addition to tax-payer groups, have also lent their support, noting that the “Wall of Debt” makes 
California a risky investment to investors and job creators.119 Past attempts to address the State’s 
debts and continuing obligations came at the cost of cuts to education spending, which 
Proposition 2 does not, in the long-run, decrease.120 While California will continue to face 
significant debt problems in the future, Proposition 2’s mandate that the State use, at minimum, 
                                                 
112 Supra Part III(B)(1). 
113 Governor Calls Special Session on Rainy Day Fund, CBS L.A. (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2014/04/16/governor-calls-special-session-on-rainy-day-fund/.  
114 Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor Brown, Governor Brown Calls 
Special Session to Try to Strengthen Rainy Day Fund (April 16, 2014), available at 
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18481.  
115 Marois, supra note 110. 
116 Id. 
117 Jessica Calefati, State Budget: Governor Brown Proposes Paying Down Wall of Debt, Continues to 
Call for Restraint, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 8, 2014, 
http://www.mercurynews.com/california/ci_24874278/state-budget-gov-jerry-brown-proposes-
paying-down.  
118 Press Release, Cal Chamber, Governor Brown, Governor Calls Special Session on Rainy Day Reserve 
(Apr. 17, 2014), available at http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/pages/04172014-governor-
calls-special-session-on-rainy-day-reserve.aspx.  
119 Christopher Nelson, Bolstered Rainy Day Fund Would Benefit California Business Community, CAL. 
FORWARD (Aug. 7, 2014), www.cafwd.org/reporting/entry/bolstered-rainy-day-fund-would-
benefit-california-business-community; SAN DIEGO TAX PAYER’S ASS’N, ASSEMBLY 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 1 (July 2014), available at 
http://www.sdcta.org/Uploads/Documents/Board%20Approved%20SDCTA%20Position%20Pap
er%20ACA%201%207-25-14,%20SK%20FINAL.pdf.  
120 Tami Luhby, Big Taxes + Big Spending Cuts = California Budget Surplus, CNN MONEY (Jan. 3, 
2014), http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/07/news/economy/california-budget/.  
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0.75% of General Fund revenue to reduce the debt, which will amount to between $800 million 
and $2 billion depending on capital gains tax revenues, makes an important step towards the 
reduction of the State’s debt.121 
 
C. School Reserves 
 
Opposition to Proposition 2 stems from the proposition’s creation of the P.S.S.S.A., a 
State school reserve fund. The passage of the proposition would trigger a conditional section of 
S.B. 858 setting a cap on the amount of funds local school districts may keep in their own 
reserve accounts. Although only 2BadForKids and Educate Our State are registered as 
opposition to Proposition 2, the California Association of School Business Officials (School 
Business Officials) and the Association of California School Administrators (School 
Administrators) additionally oppose the proposition.122 
 
1. Creation of a State School Reserve 
 
Since the P.S.S.S.A. is a budget reserve account like the B.S.A., many of the benefits 
ascribed to the B.S.A. are similarly extended to the P.S.S.S.A.123 Like the B.S.A., the P.S.S.S.A. 
may help to “end the cycle of boom and bust spending” by ensuring funds are available to 
stabilize education spending when General Fund revenues fall by diverting some funds away 
from schools and into the P.S.S.S.A. when the economy is doing well.124 By stabilizing funding 
levels, the State may enable schools to better and more accurately plan for future years and 
implement long-term programs that depend on State revenues. Furthermore, the P.S.S.S.A. and 
B.S.A. align with best-practices recommendations from the National Association of State Budget 
Officers.125 
 
Opposition groups support the idea of a State reserve fund for schools, but oppose 
Proposition 2 because it may lead to fewer increases in aggregate education spending, it has the 
potential to inhibit the implementation of the recent Local Funding Formula, and it may lead the 
public to incorrectly believe school funding is adequate.126  
                                                 
121 Supra Part III(B)(2). 
122 Interview with Catherine Welsh, Treasurer, Educate Our State, in Sacramento, CA (August 2014) 
(noting that some opponents to the proposition failed to meet the deadline for registering as official 
opponents). 
123 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, BUDGET RESERVE PROPOSALS 6–7 (Apr. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/state_admin/2014/Budget-Reserve-Proposals-042814.pdf 
[L.A.O. PROPOSALS]. 
124 Press Release, Toni G. Atkins Speaker of the Assembly, Legislature Unanimously Passes Rainy Day 
Fund (May 15, 2014), available at http://asmdc.org/speaker/news-room/press-releases/legislature-
unanimously-passes-rainy-day-fund.  
125 NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE BUDGETING AND THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN (Summer 2013), available at 
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/State%20Budgeting%20and%20Lessons%20Learned%2
0from%20the%20Economic%20Downturn-final.pdf.   
126 Letter from Jeffrey A. Vaca, Deputy Exec. Dir. of Public Relations, Cal. Ass’n of Sch. Bus. Officials, 
to John A. Perez, Speaker of the Assembly, Cal. Legislature (Apr. 28, 2014), available at 
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The School Business Officials oppose Proposition 2 because it would allow the State to 
count any funds transferred to the P.S.S.S.A. towards the minimum education-spending 
guarantee, which Proposition 98 imposed, for the fiscal year when the deposit is made.127 This 
would allow the State, in strong economic years, to avoid increasing the amount of education 
spending that reaches schools.128 As Jennifer Bestor of Educate our State explained, “Since 
budget emergencies seem to get called every five years . . . it's not hard to imagine a really good 
year . . . putting a little into the P.S.S.S.A., followed by a bad year when, instead of topping up 
school spending, anything in the P.S.S.S.A. gets used for base spending to relieve pressure on the 
General Fund.”129 Additionally, 2BadForKids notes that California is currently ranked fiftieth in 
the nation in adjusted per-pupil expenditures and that placing revenue in the reserve instead of 
increasing funding for education makes long-term increases to aggregate education spending 
unlikely.130 This course will keep California among the lowest in the nation for per-pupil 
expenditures.131 However, as Proposition 98 requires that, at minimum, a certain percentage of 
General Fund revenue is annually used for education, aggregate education spending will grow 
with General Fund revenues over time. 
 
Additionally, the School Business Officials believe the P.S.S.S.A. will significantly delay 
full implementation of the Local Control Funding Formula.132 The Local Control Funding 
Formula is a recent change to the education funding formula that became operative in 2013.133 
Its objective was to transfer an assortment of current prior funding streams to three new grant 
programs to increase local control.134 These three grant programs are based on the student 
populations the schools serve and allow school districts to decide how the money is spent.135 
However, the Local Control Funding Formula will not be fully implemented for eight years.136 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1158826/statebud-24-25-rainydayfund-
casboopposes042814.pdf [Vaca Letter]. 
127 Kimberly Beltran, School Leaders Oppose Brown’s Rainy Day Measure, CABINET REPORT (Aug. 13, 
2014), https://cabinetreport.com/politics-education/school-leaders-oppose-browns-rainy-day-
measure.  
128 Id. 
129 Email conversation with Jennifer Burton. 
130 Prop 2: Fact vs. Fiction, 2BADFORKIDS, http://www.2badforkids.org/fact_vs_fiction (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2014) [“Prop 2: Fact vs. Fiction”]; see also  John Fensterwald, Latest—But Outdated—Ed Week 
Survey Ranks California 50th in Per Pupil Spending, EDSOURCE (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://edsource.org/2014/latest-but-outdated-ed-week-survey-ranks-california-50th-in-per-pupil-
spending/56196#.VBZJwBYXNEM. 
131 Id. 
132 LCFF Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. DEPT. OF EDU., 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/aa/lc/lcfffaq.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
133 Local Control Funding Formula, CAL. TEACHERS ASS’N, http://www.cta.org/Issues-and-
Action/School-Funding/Local-Control-Funding-Formula.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
134 Id. 
135 Local Control Funding Formula, CAL. DEPT. OF EDU., 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/nr/el/le/yr13ltr0807.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). 
136 Local Control Funding Formula Overview, CAL. DEPT. OF EDU., 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/aa/lc/lcffoverview.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).  
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Thus, Proposition 2 may be antithetical to the Local Control Funding Formula’s objective of 
increasing local control as Proposition 2 may divert funds into State reserves instead of toward 
the grant programs.137 The School Administrators share the School Business Officials concerns 
and further question the wisdom of having three reserve funds: the P.S.S.S.A., the B.S.A., and 
local school district reserves.138 The opposition believes that local school districts are in the best 
position to assess how large a reserve is needed and to decide how it ought to be spent.139    
 
The School Business Officials also believe that creating a rainy day fund will suggest to 
the public that the school system is adequately funded, which is not the case.140 According to 
School Business Officials the State still owes 7.9 billion to pay down the “maintenance factor,” 
which is the State’s obligation under Proposition 98 to backfill education funding levels when 
the State decreases funding from the previous year.141 Thus, the public may be misled by 
Proposition 2 to believe that the creation of a State school reserve fund is the result of a surplus 
of funds.142 
 
2. Creation of a Local School Reserve Cap 
      
S.B. 858 is the education omnibus trailer bill that contains the provisions implementing 
local school district reserve caps and would become operative in December 2014 with the 
passage of Proposition 2.143 The California Teachers Association (CTA) supports the cap on 
local school district reserves because “taxpayer dollars need to be spent in our classrooms and on 
our children not sitting in bank accounts.”144 The CTA notes that the average local school 
reserve was 30.34% for the 2012–2013 fiscal years, with about 73% of districts having more 
than 15% in reserve.145 During a Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee hearing, a 
lobbyist from the California School Employees Association argued that if Proposition 2 passes 
without some reserve cap, districts will tend to deposit more money into their reserves, 
regardless of need, whenever the Legislature does so.146 The lobbyist asserted that school 
districts would see the Legislature reinforce their rainy day fund and assume they ought to follow 
                                                 
137 Press Release, Ass’n of Cal. Sch. Administrators, Proposed Rainy Day Fund is Bad for Schools (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.acsa.org/FunctionalMenuCategories/Media/NewsReleases/Rainyday.aspx.  
138 ASS’N OF CAL. SCH. ADMINISTRATORS, PROPOSITION 2—BUDGET STABILIZATION ACCOUNT 
TALKING POINTS 1 (last visited Oct. 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.acsa.org/MainMenuCategories/Advocacy/Issues-and-
Actions/PositionsonLegislation_1/Prop2TalkingPoints.aspx [“TALKING POINTS”]. 
139 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 1, at 16. 
140 Vaca Letter, supra  note 126; L.A.O. PROPOSALS, supra note 123, at 2. 
141 L.A.O. PROPOSALS, supra note 123, at 2. 
142 Vaca Letter, supra  note 126. 
143 CAL. EDUC. CODE §  42127.01 (as added by S.B. 858 (2013–2014)). 
144 Local Budget Transparency and Cap on School District Reserves, CAL. TEACHER’S ASS’N (June 12, 
2014), http://www.cta.org/Blog/2014/June/Local-Budget-Transparency-and-Cap-on-School-
District-Reserves.aspx.  
145 Id. 
146 John Fensterwald, Cap on District Reserves Passes Despite Lawmaker’s Reservations, EDSOURCE, 
(June 16, 2014) http://edsource.org/2014/cap-on-district-reserves-passes-despite-lawmakers-
reservations/63258#.VAdiCmMXOSo.  
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suit in preparation for a lean funding year.147 This would, according to supporters, take 
additional funds out of the classroom as administrators move allocated funds into their local 
school district reserves.148  
 
Other interested parties at the hearing noted that because the State must satisfy several 
factors before it can deposit any funds into the P.S.S.S.A.,149 it would be at least seven years 
before the local reserve cap would go into effect, giving the Legislature sufficient time to study 
and assess the effects of local reserve caps.150 The CTA further emphasized that S.B. 858, as a 
legislatively enacted law, can be amended or appealed later.151 The hurdles to depositing funds 
into the P.S.S.S.A. and the Legislature’s ability to amend any potential issues later diminish the 
potential harm S.B. 858 may cause.152  
      
The local reserve cap is opposed by several groups, including Educate Our State,153 the 
School Business Officials,154 School Boards,155 and the School Administrators,156 who focus on 
both the process by which S.B. 858 was passed and its effects on local school budgets. Senate 
Bill 858 was passed through the legislative process as a trailer bill to the State’s education budget 
bill, Assembly Bill 86, without any vetting through the legislative process and was not part of 
Governor Brown’s original proposed budget in June or any of his revisions in May.157 Editorials 
in SF Gate and the San Jose Mercury News suggest that the proposal was pushed through to 
satisfy labor unions who want the reserve funds available for raises.158   
                                                 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF A.C.A. 1X2 (May 5, 2014), available 
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_0001-
0050/acax2_1_cfa_20140515_093413_sen_floor.html (Deposits will not be made into the P.S.S.S.A. until 
the State “has met total school funding requirements . . . , has repaid and allocated the current Proposition 
98 maintenance factor . . . , and, has not suspended Proposition 98 in the year of the transfer.”). 
150 Id. 
151 Fensterwald, supra note 146.  
152 Id. 
153 EDUCATE OUR STATE!, http://www.educateourstate.org/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
154 Jeff Vaca & Sara C, Bachez, CASBO Adopts “Oppose” Positions on Propositions 44 and 46, CAL. 
ASS’N OF SCH. BUS. OFFICIALS, 
http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs109/1113248925076/archive/1118113471224.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
155 Bill to Restore School District Reserve Authority Announced at Capitol Press Conference, C.S.B.A. 
(Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://csba.org/Newsroom/CSBANewsletters/2014/August/ElectronicOnly/AB146PressConferen
ce.aspx?p=1.  
156 Plan to Cap Reserves Still a Vexing Issue, CAL. ASS’N OF SCH. ADMINISTRATORS, 
http://www.acsa.org/FunctionalMenuCategories/Media/EdCalNewspaper/EdCal-
2014/July28/Reserves.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) [“Plan to Cap Reserves Still a Vexing Issue”]. 
157 Id. 
158 Editorial, Legislature Allows Big Holes in Rainy Day Fund, SFGATE (June 18, 2014), available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/editorials/article/Legislature-allows-big-holes-in-rainy-day-fund-
5562956.php; Editorial, Yes on Proposition 44’s Rainy Day Fund, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 25 
2014, http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_26215888/mercury-news-editorial.  
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Large local reserves, which would disappear if local reserve caps are put in place, allow 
districts to adapt to unexpected financial changes. Educate Our State notes that caps may harm 
local school district’s credit ratings.159 Standard and Poor’s explained, “Very strong reserve 
levels contribute to a district's fiscal capacity to absorb episodes of unanticipated fiscal strain 
and, thus, affect its rating level.”160 A good credit rating allows school districts to borrow 
additional funds during economic downturns.161 The School Board Association echoed concerns 
about local school districts, especially smaller districts, to meet unexpected expenses that arise in 
the typical course of operating a school.162 These caps may amount to only weeks’ worth of 
salary for most districts.163 Such “one-size-fits-all” reserve caps, critics argue, are fiscally 
irresponsible in practice since schools have different financial concerns and require different 
sized budget reserves.164  
      
Proposition 2 and S.B. 858 may create an ironic situation wherein the Legislature is 
required to build up its reserves while prudent districts are barred from doing the same.165 This 
may also be contrary to the Governor’s own emphasis on local control.166 The creation of a local 
reserve cap runs contrary to the unique position local school districts are in to assess the 
educational needs of their districts.167  
      
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Proposition 2 would likely reduce State debt over time, increase the likelihood that the 
State would annually deposit funds into the B.S.A., and create a reserve fund for public schools 
and community colleges known as the P.S.S.S.A. Additionally, the passage of Proposition 2 
would trigger a stipulation in S.B. 858 that would, upon the State making a deposit into the 
P.S.S.S.A., place a cap on the amount of funds school districts may have in their reserve 
accounts.  
 
                                                 
159 S & P Ratings Service PDF, 2BADFORKIDS, http://www.2badforkids.org/s_p_ratings_service_pdf 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2014).  
160 Id. 
161 Prop 2: Fact vs. Fiction, supra note 130. 
162 Letter from Dennis Meyers, Assistant Exec. Dir., Governmental Relations, Cal. Sch. Boards Ass’n, to 
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor, State of Cal. (June 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.csba.org/Advocacy/LegislativeNews/~/media/CSBA/Files/Advocacy/LegislativeAdv
ocacy/2014_0619_SB858budgetlettertoGovernor.ashx (“For example, if a roof or HVAC system 
fails … a small district needs to draw upon reserves . . . . Some are so small that if one family moves … 
the reduction in funds is a recognizable hit . . . .”). 
163 Id. 
164 TALKING POINTS, supra note 138. 
165 Plan to Cap Reserves Still a Vexing Issue, supra note 156. 
166 Id. 
167 ACSA: Restore Adequate School District Reserves, ASS’N OF CAL. SCH. ADMINISTRATORS, 
http://www.acsa.org/FunctionalMenuCategories/Media/NewsReleases/Reserve.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2014). 
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The legislation putting Proposition 2 on the ballot received unanimous support from the 
Legislature and the approval of the Governor. Additionally, there is opposition to the Proposition 
from school administrators and other education advocates. 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Proposition 45, the Insurance Rate Public Justification and Accountability Act,1 is a 
California initiative statute concerning the regulation of health insurance premiums in the 
“individual” and “small group” markets.2 
 
Structurally, Proposition 45 is modeled on Proposition 103, a 1988 ballot initiative that 
regulated home and auto insurance.3  Proposition 45 seeks to extend the Proposition 103 
regulatory scheme to health insurance.4 Under the Proposition 103 framework, individual and 
small group insurers would be required to file with and justify their premium rates to the 
California Department of Insurance under penalty of perjury, the Insurance Commissioner would 
have veto power over proposed rate changes, and Proposition 45 would also add an “intervenor” 
process by which members of the public can challenge rate proposals.5   
 
The measure, proposed by Jamie Court and Consumer Watchdog, was written in 2011 
and initially advanced for the November 2012 ballot; however, when the measure failed to 
qualify in time for the 2012 election, it was placed on the 2014 ballot with the language as 
approved in 2012.6  The plain text of the measure provides an effective date of November 6, 
2012, which, if the measure is approved, will have a retroactive effect on rates in effect on, or 
approved after, that date.7 
 
To further complicate the issue, from the time the measure was drafted, the petitions were 
circulated, and signatures were gathered, to the time when California voters will actually cast 
their ballots, three years will have passed.  Within those three years, the major provisions of the 
federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “ACA” or “Obamacare”) will have been 
implemented,8 drastically changing the health insurance marketplace.9    
                                                 
1 Cal. Proposition 45 at § 1 (2014). 
2 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2014, at 20, available at 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/pdf/complete-vigr1.pdf [“NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE”].   
Individual coverage is a form of health insurance designed to cover just one person (and often immediate 
family members), as opposed to someone covered by a group plan. Group health coverage is when small 
and large employers, unions, and retirees cover their employees and members under one insurance 
contract. “Small group” policies are for employers with less than 50 employees. Common Health 
Insurance Terms, CAL. DEPARTMENT INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/110-health/10-
basics/terms.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
3 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 22. 
4 Cal. Proposition 45 at § 2 (2014).  
5 Id. 
6 California Proposition 45, Public Notice Required for Insurance Company Rates Initiative (2014), 
BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_45,_Public_Notice_Required_for_Insurance_Company_Rat
es_Initiative_(2014) (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) [“Prop 45 Ballotpedia”]. 
7 Cal. Proposition 45 at § 2 (2014). 
8 Key Features of the Affordable Care Act By Year, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline/timeline-text.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) [“DHHS Key 
Features”]. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
 
In order to place Proposition 45 in its proper context, the story must begin with Harvey 
Rosenfield, Consumer Watchdog, and Proposition 103. 
 
A. Harvey Rosenfield and Consumer Watchdog 
 
 In the early 1980’s, after working for Ralph Nader at a Washington D.C. citizen 
advocacy group, Harvey Rosenfield moved to California to organize and direct the California 
Public Interest Research Group (CalPIRG).10  In 1985, Rosenfield resigned from CalPIRG and 
founded the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights (now known as “Consumer 
Watchdog”). 11  In 1987, Rosenfield began to write a ballot measure initiative regarding the 
home and auto insurance markets and formed a campaign to sponsor it called “Voter Revolt.”12 
The proposal turned into what was Proposition 103 on California’s November 1988 ballot, and 
was narrowly approved by voters 51% to 49%.13  Jamie Court took over as Consumer 
Watchdog’s President and Chairman of the Board in 1994.14 
 
B. Proposition 103 
 
The passing of Proposition 103 and its subsequent regulations imposed three overarching 
and enduring changes to the home and auto insurance markets.  First, Proposition 103 made the 
California Insurance Commissioner an elected, rather than appointed, official who has the sole 
responsibility to approve or reject changes to home or auto insurance premiums before they take 
effect.  Second, it requires insurance rates to be determined based on a number of factors 
including those that have a substantial relationship to the risk of loss and generally requires that 
rates not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.  Finally, Proposition 103 
established a complex system of public participation and judicial review, within which interested 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Health Reform Implementation Timeline, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
http://kff.org/interactive/implementation-timeline/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) [“Kaiser Timeline”]. 
10 Home, HARVEY ROSENFIELD CONSUMER ADVOCATE, http://www.harveyrosenfield.com/wp/ (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2014); About, HARVEY ROSENFIELD CONSUMER ADVOCATE, 
http://www.harveyrosenfield.com/wp/current-work/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014); Our Team, CONSUMER 
WATCHDOG, http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/about/our-team (last visited Oct. 9, 2014); About, 
CONSUMER WATCHDOG, http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/about (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
11 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Consumer Watchdog Business Filings, 
https://businessfilings.sos.ca.gov/frmDetail.asp?CorpID=01349849&qrystring=CONSUMER+WATCHD
OG&qrynumber=NULL (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).  
12 Harvey Rosenfield, Proposition 103: The Consumer’s Viewpoint, SOCIETY OF CPCU at 109, available 
at http://www.harveyrosenfield.com/uploads/pdfs/opeds/CPCU%20article.pdf. 
13 California Proposition 103 (1988), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_103,_Insurance_Rates_and_Regulation_(1988) (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2014). 
14 Our Team, CONSUMER WATCHDOG, http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/about/our-team (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2014). 
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parties can intervene in proceedings conducted by the Department of Insurance in order to 
challenge a proposed or existing rate and collect fees in connection with their efforts.15 
 
The impacts of Proposition 103, like all reform, are speculative and subject to debate.  
However, according to a November 2013 study published by the Consumer Federation of 
America, in consultation with the former Executive Director of Consumer Watchdog, 
Proposition 103 saved consumers upwards of $90 billion through 2010.16 It should also be noted 
that, pursuant to the intervenor fee provisions, Consumer Watchdog has collected over $14 
million in fees in connection with their efforts.17  
 
C. From 2011 to Present  
 
1. Proposition 45’s Path to the Ballot 
 
In California, Proponents of ballot measure initiative statutes have to write out the text of 
the proposed law and then submit a draft to the Attorney General for her official title and 
summary.18  From the official summary date, Proponents are allowed a maximum of 150 days to 
circulate petitions and collect the signatures of at least 504,760 registered voters.19  Once the 
requisite number of signatures has been collected, they must be filed with the appropriate county 
elections officials for the signatures to be counted and verified.  A random sample is taken of 500 
signatures or 3% of the total, whichever is greater.20  If the total number of signatures is less than 
95% of the required amount, the initiative does not qualify for the ballot;21 if the total is more 
than 110% of the required amount the initiative is deemed qualified for the ballot.22  Where the 
total number of signatures is between 95% and 110%, a “full check” on every signature must be 
conducted.23 This process must be completed at least 131 days before the election at which it is 
to be submitted to the voters.24 
  
                                                 
15 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 
8, 1988 at 98–101, available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1988g.pdf . 
16 J. ROBERT HUNTER, TOM FELTNER & DOUGLAS HELLER, CONSUMER FED’N OF CAL., WHAT WORKS: 
A REVIEW OF AUTO INSURANCE RATE REGULATION IN AMERICA AND HOW BEST PRACTICES SAVE 
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS (November 2013), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/whatworks-
report_nov2013_hunter-feltner-heller.pdf. 
17, Proposition 103 Consumer Intervenor Process, CAL. DEPARTMENT INS., 
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/150-other-prog/01-intervenor/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 
2014); Informational Report on the CDI Intervenor Program, CAL. DEPARTMENT INS., 
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/150-other-prog/01-intervenor/report-on-intervenor-
program.cfm#2014 (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
18 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9001(a). 
19 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9014; CAL. CONST. art. II § 8(b); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9035. 
20 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9030(d). 
21 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9030(f). 
22 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9030(g). 
23 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9031(a). 
24 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9016; CAL. CONST. art. II § 8(c). 
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In late 2011, Jamie Court and Consumer Watchdog first drafted this initiative in an 
attempt to get it on the November 2012 ballot.25  The Attorney General issued the official title 
and summary and approved the measure for circulation in January of 2012.26  Consumer 
Watchdog sponsored the signature gathering effort with major funding from the Consumer 
Attorneys of California.27  In May 2012, 800,000 voter signatures were submitted;28 however, 
when Los Angeles County reported that only 66.6% of the signatures from the county were valid 
(69% of the collected signatures were needed to reach the 110% threshold), the initiative was 
forced in to a full check which prevented it from being able to qualify in time for the November 
2012 election.  As such, it was held over for the November 2014 ballot.29   
 
2. Intervening Changes in the Health Insurance Marketplace 
 
The three year time frame between the drafting and signature-gathering of the initiative 
and its appearance on the ballot holds significant relevance. During those three years, major 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act were implemented,30 and on October 1, 2013, Covered 
California opened to begin carrying out the State’s responsibilities under the Act.31  
 
a. The Affordable Care Act 
 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (the “Affordable Care Act” or ACA) into law.32  The ACA established a series of uniform 
requirements and regulations, imposing new duties on the individual consumer, the health 
insurance industry, and state governments.33 
                                                 
25 Prop 45 Ballotpedia, supra note 6. 
26 Id.  
27 Cal Access: Late and $5,000+ Contributions Received by Consumer Watchdog, CAL. SECRETARY ST., 
http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1343944&session=2011&view=late1 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
28 Deborah Crowe, Signatures Submitted for Health Insurance Rate Initiative, L.A. BUS. J., May 18, 2012, 
http://www.labusinessjournal.com/news/2012/may/18/signatures-submitted-health-insurance-rate-initiat/. 
29 Laurel Rosenhall, Initiative on Health Insurance Rates Won’t Make November Ballot, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, June 28, 2012, http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2012/06/california-initiative-to-limit-
health-insurance-rates-doesnt-make-nov-ballot.html. 
30 CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY STUDIES & VIVEK RAJASEKHAR, HERITAGE FOUND. YOUNG LEADERS 
PROGRAM, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF OBAMACARE: THE TIMELINE, available at 
http://fleming.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hc_timeline.pdf. 
31 JOHN KINGSDALE, WAKELY CONSULTING GROUP, POTENTIAL IMPACT OF A 2014 BALLOT INITIATIVE 
ON IMPLEMENTATION OF COVERED CALIFORNIA AND HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, at 14 
(May 2014), available at http://stophighercosts.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Kingsdale-Report-May-
2014.pdf [“Kingsdale Report”].  
32 Although the ACA was effective in 2010, it was written so that most major provisions were to be 
phased in by January 2014.  DHHS Key Features, supra note 8; Kaiser Timeline, supra note 9; Public 
Law 111-114: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFF., 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/PLAW-111publ148/PLAW-111publ148/content-detail.html (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
33 New Health Reform Database, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/new-
health-reform-database.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
42 
 
 
Relevant to the consumer, most all U.S. citizens must now be insured or pay a penalty 
(also known as the “Individual Mandate”).34 In order to help offset the cost of coverage, lower-
income families and individuals, and small group employers (small businesses with up to 50 
employees), are eligible to receive premium credits, cost-sharing subsidies, or tax credits.35   
 
As to the industry, insurance companies must now provide a comprehensive set of 
covered services (known as the “essential benefits package”) while standardizing prices and 
extending coverage to all applicants despite preexisting conditions.36  Further, they are now 
required to disclose information relevant to their premium rates and are required to report the 
proportion of premium dollars spent on patient services in comparison to the amount retained for 
administrative costs or company profits.37  This “medical-loss ratio” must be at least 85% for 
plans in the large group market and 80% for plans in the individual and small group markets, 
subject to rebate to the consumers.38   
 
Finally, among other things, the government is required to expand their oversight of the 
health care industry by (i) annually reviewing health insurance premiums for unreasonable 
increases39 and (ii) maintaining health benefit exchanges (“Exchange” or “Exchanges”).40  
 
i. Annual Review of Premiums 
 
Pursuant to the annual review requirement, health insurers have to submit to the State, 
and “prominently post” on their website, information justifying a premium increase prior to its 
implementation.41 With this information, States are to monitor premium increases of health 
insurance coverage offered both on and outside of their Exchange, provide the federal 
government with information about trends in premium increases in health insurance coverage, 
and make recommendations about whether particular health insurance issuers should be excluded 
from participation in the Exchange based on a pattern or practice of excessive or unjustified 
premium increases. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, The Requirement to Buy Coverage Under the Affordable Care 
Act, http://kff.org/infographic/the-requirement-to-buy-coverage-under-the-affordable-care-act/ (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
35 Summary of the Affordable Care Act, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND, http://kff.org/health-
reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-the-affordable-care-act/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) [“Kaiser Summary”]. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Medical Loss Ratio, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/apps/mlr/mlr-search.aspx#/?state=CA&reporting_year=2011 (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2014) 
39 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 18031 et seq. 
41 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94. 
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ii. Health Benefit Exchanges 
 
An Exchange is a marketplace through which individuals, families, and small-business 
owners (“Enrollees”) can purchase health care coverage and use their subsidies.42 Under the 
ACA, an Exchange must provide certain minimum services to enrollees and prospective 
enrollees, including certifying health plans as “qualified health plans” (or “QHPs”).43 All health 
plans seeking certification as a QHP must submit to the Exchange, and make the following 
available to the public: 
 
- Claims payment policies and practices; 
- Periodic financial disclosures; and 
- Data on enrollment, rating practices, cost-sharing premiums, and out-of-pocket 
expenses to consumers.44 
 
The Exchange takes the information submitted for certification and annual reviews into 
consideration when determining whether to make a health plan available through the Exchange. 
The Exchange must take into account any excess of premium growth outside the Exchange as 
compared to the rate of growth inside the Exchange.45 
 
b. Covered California 
 
In 2010, California was the first state in the nation to enact legislation to implement the 
provisions of the ACA by creating an Exchange, now known as “Covered California.”46  
Covered California is, by statute, an independent state agency with a five-member governing 
board including the Secretary of the California Department of Health and Human Services, two 
gubernatorial appointees, and one appointee each by the Speaker of the Assembly and the 
Chairman of the Committee on Senate Rules.47  All of the members must be California residents 
with a demonstrated expertise in health care, and all are subject to strict conflict of interest 
guidelines.48   
 
Covered California was created as an “active purchaser,” responsible for negotiating with 
health plans to achieve a triple aim of lowering costs, improving quality, and improving health 
                                                 
42 Kaiser Summary, supra note 35. 
43 42 U.S.C. § 18031. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Assembly Bill No. 1602, California Health Benefit Exchange, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200920100AB1602 (last visited Oct. 9, 
2014); Senate Bill No. 900 California Health Benefit Exchange, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200920100SB900 (last visited Oct. 9, 
2014). 
47 NAT’L CONF. LEGISLATURES, HEALTH INSURANCES EXCHANGES OR MARKETPLACES: STATE 
PROFILES AND ACTIONS (Oct. 22, 2014), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Health/Health_Insurance_Exchanges_State_Profiles.pdf; CAL. 
GOV'T CODE § 100500. 
48 NAT’L CONF. LEGISLATURES, ESTABLISHING THE CALIFORNIA HEALTH BENEFITS EXCHANGE: AB 
1602 AND SB 900, available at http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/health/CAHBE.pdf. 
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outcomes, while assuring a good choice of plans for consumers in compliance with the 
provisions of the ACA as described above.49  In October 2013, after three years of planning and 
negotiating, Covered California began California’s first open enrollment period under the ACA, 
enrolling 1.3 million citizens for coverage in 2014.50 
 
 
 
Because of the nature of ballot measure initiatives, Proposition 45’s three-year path to the 
ballot, and all of the intervening changes in the health care marketplace, the language of 
Proposition 45 does not account for the state of California health care law today.   
 
III. HEALTH COVERAGE IN CALIFORNIA 
 
A. Types of Health Coverage 
 
 There are two separate and relatively distinct types of health coverage in California – 
indemnity health insurance, based on fee-for-service provider payments, and prepaid managed 
health care plans, providing specific services for a fixed monthly fee.51  From this distinction, 
California law makers gave rise to two Departments charged with the regulation and oversight of 
their respective type of health coverage: the California Department of Insurance (CDI) and the 
California Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC).52  CDI’s jurisdiction is limited by 
statute to traditional indemnity health insurance plans while DMHC oversees most all managed 
health care plans including all Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and non-indemnity 
based Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and 
Exclusive Provides Organizations (EPOs).53   
 
B. Sources of Health Coverage54 
 
 Californians obtain health coverage from 
four main sources: through their “large group” 
employer, from a government program, through 
                                                 
49 PETER V. LEE, COVERED CALIFORNIA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR’S REPORT (Aug. 21, 2014), available at 
http://board.coveredca.com/meetings/2014/8-21/PDFs/PPT%20-
%20Executive%20Director's%20Report_August%2021,%202014.pdf. 
50 About, COVERED CAL., https://www.coveredca.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
51 DEBRA L. ROTH & DEBORAH REIDY KELCH, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., MAKING SENSE OF 
MANAGED CARE REGULATION IN CALIFORNIA 6 (November 2001), available at 
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/M/PDF%20MakingSenseManagedC
areRegulation.pdf. 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 21. 
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their “small group” employer, or on their own via individual insurance.55  While the majority of 
the population is insured by way of a large group or governmentally provided plan, Proposition 
45 only applies to small group or individually acquired coverage – which includes approximately 
six million Californians, or 16% of the population.56   
 
As individual and small group coverage can come in the form of indemnity or non-
indemnity HMOs, PPOs, and EPOs, both CDI and DMHC split jurisdiction over licensure, 
oversight, and ongoing monitoring of carriers providing individual and small group health 
coverage in California – and both would be affected by Proposition 45.57 
 
Individuals, families, and small-business owners can purchase individual or small group 
coverage on the Exchange, through Covered California, or off of the Exchange, directly through 
the insurer or from a licensed insurance agent.  
 
C. Current Regulation and Oversight 
 
 Currently, all health coverage products sold in California must be approved by their 
applicable regulatory body, either CDI or DMHC, before being offered to the public.58  This 
includes products certified and sold by Covered California.59  Both regulators must ensure the 
products meet state and federal requirements (including the ACA) by providing basic benefits to 
enrollees – such as physician visits, hospitalizations, and prescription drugs – and both review a 
health plan’s rates, policy forms, financial adequacy, network adequacy (number of physicians 
available), and timely access standards.      
     60 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 45 APPROVAL OF HEALTHCARE INSURANCE 
RATE CHANGES (July 17, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-45-110414.pdf.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Kingsdale Report, supra note 31, at 14-15. 
60 CAL. LEGISLATURE (SENATE HEALTH COMMITTEE & ASSEMBLY HEALTH COMMITTEE), JOINT 
HEARING ON PROPOSITION 45 (July 2, 2014), available at 
http://ahea.assembly.ca.gov/sites/ahea.assembly.ca.gov/files/Joint%20background%20revised.pdf [Joint 
Hearing Analysis”]. 
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D. How Proposition 45 Would Change the System 
 
Under Proposition 45, the Commissioner is granted the powers necessary to carry out the 
provisions of this section, including any and all authority for health care service plan rate review 
previously granted to the Department of Managed Health Care.61 While the bifurcated system 
would essentially remain the same and the DMHC would retain all of their previously granted 
powers to review the products under their purview, the initiative would grant the Commissioner 
authority to approve or reject products already reviewed by DMHC thus creating a duplicative 
layer of review on upwards of 4 million plans beginning in 2015.62  
 
 
 
 
 
IV. PROPOSITION 45  
  
A. The Elements of the Proposition 
 
 From a plain reading of the initiative, Proposition 45 involves four predominant 
elements: (1) the powers and duties granted to the Commissioner in connection with health 
insurance rate regulation; (2) the contents of each rate change application; (3) the various 
methods of review for each application; and (4) the penalties and fees each regulated company 
would be required to pay.63 
 
1. Powers and Duties of the Commissioner 
 
 Proposition 45 would grant the Commissioner the power to review and approve or reject 
all rates and charges associated with individual and small group health coverage, including 
benefits, premiums, copayments, and deductibles that were in effect on, or proposed after, 
                                                 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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November 6, 2012.64 With that, the Commissioner would have the power to audit rates that were 
in effect between November 6, 2012, and November 4, 2014.  If, in the process of this audit, the 
Commissioner found any of the rates to be excessive, he would require the insurers to issue 
rebates to their consumers.65  
 
2. Contents of the Rate Change Application 
 
Under Proposition 45, when a health insurer desires to change a rate, they must file an 
application with the Commissioner,66 under penalty of perjury.67 This application would include 
data on premiums, claims, expenses, net losses and investment gains,68 as well as complaints 
filed by consumers against the company. 69 
 
3. Reviewing the Rates 
 
In addition to the review by the Commissioner and his authority to reject rates, the 
initiative would make health care insurance rate actions subject to the intervenor provisions of 
Proposition 103 as follows: 
 
a. Hearings 
 
Under the Proposition 103 framework, the Commissioner may elect to hold a hearing 
within the 60 day period following the rate filing, or an intervenor may request a hearing to 
challenge a rate action within 45 days of the rate filing.70 Proposition 45 incorporates Insurance 
Code section 1861.08, which states that public hearings held under Proposition 45 shall be 
conducted pursuant to the guidelines and requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act 
(APA71).  The APA prescribes fundamental due process and public policy protections for all 
parties involved in formal administrative hearings.72  These requirements – including adequate 
notice and the right to pre-hearing discovery of evidence – further extend the time it would take 
to review and finalize any plan for which there was a public hearing.73   
 
 
                                                 
64 Cal. Proposition 45 at § 2 (2014). 
65 Id. 
66 Cal. Proposition 45 at § 2 (2014); Cal. Ins. Code § 1861.05(b). 
67 Cal. Proposition 45 at § 2 (2014). 
68 Id.; CAL. INS. CODE § 1857.7. 
69 Cal. Proposition 45 at § 2 (2014).  
70 CAL. HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE, INSURANCE RATE PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
ACT: POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES AND QUESTIONS 2 (June 17, 2014), available at 
http://board.coveredca.com/meetings/2014/6-
19/PDFs/Insurance%20Rate%20Public%20Justification%20and%20Accountability%20Act%20-
%20Operational%20Questions%20Outline.pdf  
71 The Administrative Procedure Act is contained in California Government Code sections 11370 through 
11529. 
72 CAL. GOV. CODE § 11500, et seq. 
73 Kingsdale Report, supra note 31, at 14. 
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b. Consumer Participation (Intervenors) 
 
Proposition 45 would also expand the intervenor process, as established in Proposition 
103, to include health insurance rate changes.  This means that, in addition to requesting a rate 
review hearing, members of the public can challenge any rates that have been proposed.  If the 
intervention is successful, the Department of Insurance can “award reasonable advocacy and 
witness fees and expenses to any person who demonstrates (1) the person represents the interests 
of the consumers, and, (2) he or she has made a substantial contribution to the adoption of any 
order, regulation, or decision by the Commissioner or a court.”74 By its language, there is an 
ambiguity over when a contribution can be reimbursed through an award, and what is a 
“substantial contribution.”  
 
In 2006, the Department of Insurance made amendments to the regulations responsible 
for the implementation of Proposition 103 that permitted awards to be paid out even when there 
was no formal rate hearing.75 The amendment was challenged by insurance companies, who 
fought all the way to the California Court of Appeals.76 The Second District upheld the 
amendment, holding that the amended regulation were consistent with Proposition 103 and valid, 
and that consumer participation could begin starting with “the submission of a petition for a 
hearing or the Commissioner’s notice of a hearing, even if there is no public rate hearing.”  
Based on the Second District’s decision, and since the language of Proposition 45 specifically 
incorporates the intervenor section of Proposition 103, any participation in the rate-challenging 
process is eligible for an award from the Department of Insurance.77  
 
As for what constitutes a “substantial contribution,” the Department of Insurance requires 
the information contributed be not already provided, specifically, “substantially contributing to 
the proceedings in presenting relevant issues, evidence or arguments which are separate and 
distinct from those of the California Department of Insurance.78 
 
c. Judicial Review 
 
Finally, under Proposition 45, final decisions reached by the Commissioner would be 
subject to review by the courts of the State.79  In such proceedings on review, the court is 
authorized and directed to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and unless the 
weight of the evidence supports the findings, determination, rule, ruling or order of the 
                                                 
74 CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10. 
75 Association of California Insurance Companies v. Poizner, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1029, 1034 (2d Dist. 
2009). 
76 Id. at 1034. 
77 Cal. Proposition 45 § 2 (2014). 
78 How to Participate in the Intervenor Compensation Program, CAL. DEPARTMENT INS., 
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/150-other-prog/01-intervenor/participate.cfm (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2014) [“CDI How to Participate”]. 
79 Id. 
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Commissioner, the same shall be annulled.80 Final decisions include the decision to not hold a 
hearing.81  
 
4. Penalties and Fees 
 
Every regulated company will be required to pay fees, according to a schedule 
established by the Commissioner, to offset the administrative and operational costs arising out of 
these rate regulation provisions.82 If, however, the Commissioner finds a company’s rate to be 
excessive, that company will also be required to issue refunds to the consumer, with interest.83  
And, if a company fails to comply with these provisions, it is liable to the State for up to 
$50,000; $250,000 if the failure is willful.84  
 
B. Current Law, Potential Changes, and Public Policy Considerations 
 
 From a substantive point of view, there are three main categories for comparison between 
the law as it is currently written and the potential changes if Proposition 45 is enacted:  
(1) governmental review of rate changes; (2) transparency provided in the rate review process; 
and (3) public participation in rate regulation. 
 
1. Governmental Review of Rate Changes 
 
a. Current Law 
 
Currently, California has what is called a “file-and-use” rate review process that was 
established by statute in 2010.85  All health plans and insurance companies must file information 
on proposed rates for all individual and small group health insurance with either CDI or DMHC 
before those rates can go into effect.86  Both CDI and DMHC review the rate information and 
say whether the rate increases are reasonable or not. When evaluating the reasonableness of 
health insurance rates, CDI and DMHC may consider a variety of factors, such as: (1) which 
medical benefits are covered, (2) what portion of the costs enrollees pay through copayments and 
deductibles, and (3) whether a company’s administrative costs are reasonable.87  If the data 
submitted by the health plan does not support the proposed rate change, the regulator may 
request additional information or request that the health plan modify the proposed rate.88 
 
If the regulator has found the rate filing unreasonable or unjustified, and the health plan 
has not agreed to a rate reduction, the regulator will publicly declare the rate unreasonable or 
                                                 
80 CAL. INS. CODE § 1858.6. 
81 CDI How to Participate, supra note 78. 
82 Cal. Proposition 45 at § 2 (2014). 
83 Id. 
84 Id.; CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.14; CAL. INS. CODE § 1859.1. 
85 Joint Hearing Analysis, supra note 60. 
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
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unjustified, as appropriate.89  If the health plan agrees to a reduction in the proposed rate, the 
health plan must notify policyholders of the new rate. If the new rate has already taken effect, the 
regulator may require the health plan to send a refund to affected policyholders or issue a credit 
toward future premiums.90  While the regulators can request that the insurer amend the rate 
change or make an official determination that the proposed rate change is unreasonable, they do 
not have the authority to reject or approve the rates before they take effect.91 
 
b. Potential Changes 
 
Under Proposition 45, both CDI and DMHC would continue to regulate their separate 
types of health insurance.  CDI and DMHC would continue to have the authority to review 
certain health insurance rates.  However, the Commissioner would have the new, and sole, 
authority to approve the rates. 
  
c. Public Policy Considerations 
 
The Proponents of this measure allege health insurance premiums for California families 
rose 185% between 2002 and 2013, more than five times the rate of inflation, and Proposition 45 
could “put the brakes on rates” and provide potential cost savings of up to $1 billion per year to 
Californians.92  However, the arguments in opposition to this element of the initiative are 
threefold: (1) this measure puts too much power in the hands of an elected Commissioner who 
can take campaign donations from special interests; (2) the definition of rates is overly broad and 
allows the Commissioner regulatory power over what benefits could be covered by a health care 
plan;93 and (3) there is uncertainty as to how the law can and will be retroactively applied.94  
 
2. Transparency in Rate Review 
 
a. Current Law 
 
Due in large part to California’s implementation of the Affordable Care Act, several of 
the provisions in Proposition 45 regarding the contents, disclosure, and transparency of the Rate 
Change Application are already established in California law.  Health plans and insurers are 
required by law to provide significant financial disclosures and actuarial justifications for any 
proposed rate changes, including 25 specified types of rate information, at least 60 days prior to 
                                                 
89 Review of Premium Rates, CAL. DEPARTMENT OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, 
http://www.dmhc.ca.gov/HealthCareLawsRights/ReviewofPremiumRates.aspx#.VDNJGvldWS (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2014); Rate Filings and Review, CAL. DEPARTMENT INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-
consumers/110-health/70-rates/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2014) [“DMHC and CDI Rate Review”]. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.  
92 Issues: Rate Regulation, YES ON 45, http://www.yeson45.org/rate-regulation (last visited Oct. 9, 2014); 
Press Release, Yes on 45, Prop 45 Could Save Californians As Much As $1 Billion Annually On Health 
Insurance (Aug. 6, 2014), available at http://www.yeson45.org/newsrelease/prop-45-could-save-
californians-much-1-billion-annually-health-insurance. 
93 Kingsdale Report, supra note 31, at 11. 
94 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 24–25. 
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implementing any rate change with the relevant State regulator.  They are also required to notify 
their policyholders.95  The disclosures must include a detailed certification by an independent 
actuary or actuarial firm that the rate increase is reasonable and that the justification for the 
increase is based on accurate and sound actuarial assumptions and methodologies.96   
 
CDI and DMHC, in turn, are required to make all rate filing information, other than 
contracted rates between a health plan/insurer and a provider, readily available to the public on 
their websites, in plain language and in a manner and format specified by the regulators.97  
Consumers and interested parties may review the information and submit comments to the 
regulator regarding the proposed rate changes, and the comments are then posted to the 
regulator’s website for public viewing.98   
 
b. Potential Changes  
 
The Proposition, like current law, also incorporates 60 day public notice but instead of 
notice through the departmental websites, notification is required by way of distribution to the 
news media and to any member of the public who requests placement on a mailing list for that 
purpose.99  Further, the proposition reiterates the agencies’ obligation to make this kind of 
information available to the public without necessarily invoking the California Public Records 
Act.100  Finally, the proposition provides that all applications for health insurance rates shall be 
accompanied by a statement, sworn under penalty of perjury by the chief executive of the 
company, declaring that the contents are accurate and comply in all respects with California 
law.101  This sworn statement is substantially similar to the certification that is already required, 
as noted above.   
 
All things considered, there is little to no substantive change toward the aim of public 
disclosure and justification that would come from the proposition. 
 
3. Public Participation in Rate Regulation 
 
a. Current Law 
 
 Under the statutes and regulations governing CDI and DMHC, the public is entitled to 
general “notice and comment” provisions regarding rate changes.102  Notice and comment 
generally consists of the relevant State regulator posting the health plan’s proposed rate change 
to its website and allowing for the public to submit comments regarding the proposed rate 
changes.  The regulator then posts the comments to its website for public viewing.103 
                                                 
95 DMHC and CDI Rate Review, supra note 89.  
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.06. 
100 CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.07. 
101 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 24-25. 
102 DMHC and CDI Rate Review, supra note 89. 
103 Id. 
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b. Potential Changes 
 
In addition to the standard notice and comment provisions, Proposition 45 would provide 
consumers and the public in general with the right to intervene in the rate review process as 
described in detail in Part IV., A., 3., above.   
 
c. Public Policy Considerations 
 
Proponents advance the intervenor process as the public’s right to participate and as a 
check on the power of the Commissioner.104 Proponents argue that by allowing the public the 
ability to make challenges to rates, health insurance companies will be deterred from even 
proposing rates that would be deemed excessive.105 
 
Opponents claim the intervenor process is nothing more than the proponent’s inserting an 
opportunity to bring frivolous lawsuits in their own self-interest, citing the $14 million Consumer 
Watchdog has been paid from their Proposition 103 based intervenor suits.106 
 
4. Covered California 
 
a. Current Law 
 
 As discussed above, Covered California certifies new QHPs based on a broad set of 
criteria, including network adequacy, rates, coverage of essential health benefits, compliance 
with cost-sharing formulae, and standards for reporting, transparency, and quality improvement.  
Under the current framework, after Covered California completes its review, the QHPs file their 
benefits, cost-sharing, premiums, and provider networks with DMHC (or CDI for the QHPs that 
it licenses). DMHC (or CDI) then has 60 days to review these filings, and find the rates 
reasonable or not.107  
 
b. Potential Changes 
 
 Under the Proposition 45 framework, Covered California would continue to negotiate 
with the QHPs and submit the finalized rate information to their relevant State regulator.  
Proposition 45 would add the additional review from CDI, and the option to reject the agreed 
upon rates and benefit packages.108  Should the Commissioner reject a QHPs proposal, Covered 
California would have to either eliminate the plan from the Exchange or attempt to renegotiate 
within strict time frames before open enrollment.109  
                                                 
104 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 24, 25. 
105 Public Participation, YES ON 45, http://www.yeson45.org/public-participation-transparency (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
106, Get the Facts, CALIFORNIANS AGAINST HIGHER HEALTH CARE COSTS, http://stophighercosts.org/get-
the-facts/#specialinterests (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
107 Kingsdale Report, supra note 31, at 15–16. 
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c. Public Policy Considerations 
 
According to a report commissioned by the Opponents, Proposition 45 would bring 
regulatory and judicial delays in approving premiums as well as conflicting strategies between 
CDI’s price setting and Covered California’s managed competition. It would reduce competition 
among health plans and might even drive some out of the market.110  In response to these 
concerns, Harvey Rosenfield scoffed “the more likely threat to the Exchange is an asteroid 
hitting their building rather than these conspiracy theories.”111  Insurance Commissioner Dave 
Jones said the concerns are exaggerated and that big insurers hold too much market power for 
Covered California alone to protect consumers from excessive premiums.112   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Due to the complex nature of health care and the inherent differences between health 
insurance and home and auto insurance, it is impossible to directly translate the benefits or 
shortcomings felt by consumers from Proposition 103 to Proposition 45.   
 
What is certain is that the passing of Proposition 45 would give the Commissioner the 
power of “prior approval” over any changes to the charges assessed for health insurance in the 
State of California, including benefit options, retroactive to November 6, 2012.  The “prior 
approval” system would require health insurance companies to submit documents and 
information substantiating their proposed rate changes, in addition to the reporting requirements 
and transparency efforts currently established under California law and the Affordable Care Act.  
For purposes of this review and approval, the Commissioner would have authority over both the 
California Department of Insurance and the Department of Managed Health Care creating 
another layer of review over what was an intentionally bifurcated system.  
 
Additionally, Proposition 45 would expand the intervenor process, as set forth in 
Proposition 103, to allow members of the public to challenge proposed health insurance rate 
changes and collect a fee for their efforts. While rate regulation may have been anticipated by the 
ACA and 35 other states have implemented some variation thereof, none of the states have an 
intervenor process in place and the potential effects that Proposition 45 would have on the ACA 
and Covered California are uncertain. 
 
Finally, there are still uncertainties as to how, if passed, Proposition 45 would be 
implemented.  However, once it is passed, the only way to make any changes would be through 
the voter initiative process or a legislative amendment that is “in furtherance of the purposes of 
Proposition 45” and passed by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature. 
                                                 
110 Kingsdale Report, supra note 31, at 28. 
111 Chad Terhune, Regulating state's health premiums could hurt exchange, report says, L.A. TIMES, May 
8, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-insurance-rate-fight-20140508-story.html.  
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Proposition 46, the Troy and Alana Pack Patient Safety Act of 2014 (“Patient Safety 
Act”), is an attempt to protect the safety of patients, including regulating doctor1 conduct and 
adjusting damage awards for persons in medical malpractice lawsuits.2 Specifically, Proposition 
46 has three key provisions: (1) to increase the $250,000 cap on pain and suffering damages in 
medical negligence lawsuits to adjust for inflation, (2) to require alcohol and drug testing and 
reporting of doctors, and (3) to require doctors to check the State prescription drug history 
database before prescribing certain controlled drugs.3 
 
A “yes” vote would increase the cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice 
lawsuits from $250,000 to $1.1 million.4 It would also require hospitals to do random alcohol 
and drug testing on physicians.5 Additionally, it would require doctors to check the electronic 
database, known as the Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System 
(“CURES”) before prescribing certain drugs.6 
 
A “no” vote would add no new requirements for health care providers, and the 
noneconomic damages cap in medical negligence lawsuits would remain at $250,000, where it 
has been since 1975.7 
 
II. THE LAW 
 
A. Existing Law 
 
1. The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act 
 
In 1975, the Legislature enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act 
(“MICRA”) to reduce and stabilize medical malpractice costs, and to increase access to health 
care for Californians.8 MICRA made several changes intended to limit medical malpractice 
liability, two of which are relevant to Proposition 46.9 First, MICRA limited malpractice liability 
by establishing a $250,000 cap on the noneconomic damages that may be awarded to an injured 
person.10 Second, MICRA established a cap on fees going to the attorneys representing injured 
                                                 
1 “Doctor” is used interchangeably with the term “health care provider” in a broad sense to include 
physicians, surgeons, and pharmacists. 
2 See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2014, at 26–33, 68–70, available at 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf [“NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
3 See id. 
4 Id. at 29. 
5 Id. at 28. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 27; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (2014). 
8 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 27; MICRA: A Brief History, CAL. MEDICAL ASS’N 
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.cmanet.org/issues-and-advocacy/cmas-top-issues/micra/micra-a-brief-
history/ [“MICRA: A Brief History”]. 
9 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 27. 
10 Id.; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b). 
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persons in medical malpractice cases.11 The fee structure was made dependent upon the amount 
of damages awarded.12 The percentage declines as the amount of the award grows.13 
Specifically, attorneys cannot receive more than 40 percent of the first $50,000 recovered; 33.33 
percent of the amount recovered between $50,000 and $100,000; 25 percent of the amount 
recovered between $100,000 and $600,000; or more than 15 percent of any amount recovered 
greater than $600,000.14 
 
2. The Medical Board of California Regulates Physician Conduct 
 
The Medical Board of California15 (“Board”) currently licenses and regulates physicians, 
surgeons, and certain other health care professionals.16 The Board is also responsible for 
investigating complaints and disciplining physicians and certain other health professionals who 
violate the laws that apply to the practice of medicine.17 Violations include failure to follow an 
appropriate standard of care, illegally prescribing drugs, and drug abuse.18 There are currently no 
requirements for hospitals to test doctors for alcohol or drugs.19 
 
3. Health Care Providers Required to Register for, but not Check, CURES 
Beginning in 2016 
 
Currently, the State Department of Justice (“DOJ”) administers CURES.20 Pharmacies 
are required to provide specified information to DOJ on patients and the type of prescription 
drugs dispensed to be included in the CURES database.21 The information is used to reduce drug 
abuse and to identify potential “doctor shoppers” – persons who obtain prescriptions from 
various physicians with the intent to abuse or resell the drugs for profit.22 Generally, the 
prescription drugs that have a higher potential for abuse, like OxyContin, Vicodin, and Adderall, 
are subject to the reporting.23  
 
To register, physicians and pharmacists must first submit an application form 
electronically.24 Beginning April 1, 2014, an annual fee of $6 is charged to licensed prescribers 
                                                 
11 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 27. 
12 Id.  
13 Id.; see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146. 
14 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 24; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a). 
15 “Medical Board of California” is used interchangeable with “Medical Board” and “Board” to mean the 
Medical Board of California. 
16 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 28. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 28, 32. 
20 Id. at 28. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 28, 70. 
24 CURES / PDMP, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. – OFF. ATT’Y GEN., http://oag.ca.gov/cures-pdmp (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2014) [“CURES”].  
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and licensed pharmacists.25 The registration must be followed up by a notarized application and 
copies of validating documentation which includes: Drug Enforcement Administration 
Registration, State Medical License or State Pharmacy License, and a government-issued 
identification.26 The notarized application and validating documents may be submitted by email 
or standard U.S. mail to the DOJ.27  
 
The DOJ limits access and dissemination of the information in CURES “to licensed 
prescribers, licensed pharmacists, law enforcement personnel, and regulatory board personnel 
strictly for patient care or official investigatory/regulatory purposes.”28 Furthermore, “DOJ 
pursues regulatory and/or criminal sanctions for misuse [of patient] information.”29 
 
Currently, health care provider registration for CURES is optional, and there is no 
requirement that physicians consult with the CURES database before prescribing drugs. Health 
care providers will be required to register for CURES beginning on January 1, 2016.30 Even 
when registration is required, physicians will not be required to check the database before 
prescribing or dispensing drugs.31  
 
B. Proposed Law 
 
Proposition 46, the Troy and Alana Pack Patient Safety Act of 2014 (“Patient Safety 
Act”), is intended to improve patient safety by (i) adjusting the cap on noneconomic recovery to 
reflect inflation and to ensure those who are injured by negligent doctors are made whole for 
their loss;32 (ii) regulating doctor conduct to prevent medical errors; and (iii) preventing abuse of 
prescription drugs.33 
 
1. Adjusting the $250,000 Cap on Noneconomic Damages  
 
Proposition 46 would amend Section 3333.2 of the Civil Code, which currently sets the 
cap on noneconomic recovery for medical malpractice at $250,000.34 Proposition 46 would 
adjust the cap to reflect the increases in inflation since the cap was established in 1975 – 
effectively raising the cap from $250,000 to $1.1 million starting on January 1, 2015.35 The 
noneconomic damages award cap has remained the same since the Legislature enacted MICRA 
in 1975.36 Under Proposition 46, any case that “has not been resolved … as of January 1, 2015” 
                                                 
25 SB 809 (Steinberg and DaSaulnier) at § 2 (2013-2014), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-
14/bill/sen/sb_0801-0850/sb_809_cfa_20130812_113851_asm_comm.html; approved and codified into 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 208 (a) (2014). 
26 CURES, supra note 24. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 28. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 68.  
33 Id. 
34 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2. 
35 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 28. 
36 Id. at 32; MICRA: A Brief History, supra note 8.  
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would apply the new adjusted noneconomic damages award.37 Furthermore, the cap would be 
adjusted annually thereafter to reflect any increase in inflation.38 
 
The sliding scale for attorneys’ fees established under MICRA, however, would remain 
and attorneys in medical malpractice litigation would continue to be limited to 15 percent on 
recoveries over $600,000.39 
 
2. Regulating Doctor Conduct by Required Alcohol and Drug Testing  
 
Proposition 46 would add Article 14, the “Physician and Surgeon Alcohol or Drug 
Impairment Prevention,” to Chapter 5 of Division 2 of the Business and Profession Code.40 
Article 14 details four main requirements related to the alcohol and drug testing.41  
 
a. Random and Specific Alcohol and Drug Testing 
 
This provision requires hospitals to test physicians for alcohol and drugs randomly and in 
three specific instances: (1) when a patient under the care and treatment of the physician suffers 
an adverse event;42 (2) when the physician is reported for possible alcohol or drug use while on 
duty; or (3) when the physician failed to follow the appropriate standard of care as determined by 
the hospital or the Medical Board.43 Article 14 also requires hospitals to report verified positive 
test results, or the willful failure or refusal of a physician to submit to a test, to the Board.44 
 
b. Required Discipline of Impaired Physicians  
 
Proposition 46 would require the Medical Board to discipline physicians who violate the 
alcohol and drug provisions.45 The Board is currently tasked with licensing and regulating 
physicians, surgeons, and certain other health care professionals.46 In addition, the Board is 
responsible for investigating complaints and disciplining physicians and certain other health 
professionals who violate the laws that apply to the practice of medicine.47 Proposition 46 would 
specifically require the Board to discipline physicians found to be impaired by alcohol or drugs 
while on duty or during an adverse event, or if a physician refused or failed to comply with a 
drug and alcohol testing.48 
 
                                                 
37 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 69. 
38 Id. at 28, 69. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 69. 
41 Id. at 69. 
42 Adverse events include mistakes made during surgery, injuries associated with medical errors, or any 
event that causes the death or serious disability of a patient. See id at 29.  
43 Id. at 29, 69. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 29. 
46 Id. at 28. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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c. Required Reporting of Suspected Physician Misconduct  
 
The measure also requires physicians to report other physicians to the Board if they 
suspect physician misconduct.49 Individual physicians are currently not required to report this 
information.50 The new reporting requirement could increase the number of doctors reported for 
misconduct. If the reporting system is effective in ensuring that doctors follow proper procedures 
to minimize medical errors, then patient safety may be improved because doctors are likely in the 
best position to recognize misconduct in their respective areas of practice. 
 
d. Presumption of Professional Negligence 
 
Proposition 46 would also add Section 1714.85 to the Civil Code.51 Section 1714.85 
would allow a presumption of professional negligence by the doctor in medical malpractice 
lawsuits in the following circumstances: (1) when the doctor tested positive for drug or alcohol 
giving rise to the suit; (2) when the doctor does not comply with the testing requirements after 
the adverse event occurred and the lawsuit arises as a result; or (3) when the doctor failed to 
check the electronic drug database system52 and the lawsuit arises from the doctor’s failure to 
comply.53 If this measure is passed, when the doctor in a medical malpractice suit meets any of 
the above circumstances, then the law would assume that the doctor has committed a medical 
error unless she or he can prove otherwise.54 This shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to 
the defendant doctor where one of the above conditions that create the presumption exists. 
 
3. Preventing Prescription Drug Abuse with Mandate to Check CURES  
 
Proposition 46 would add Section 11165.4 to the Health and Safety Code, which requires 
doctors to check the existing statewide drug monitoring program, known as the Controlled 
Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (“CURES”).55  
 
Health care providers are required to register for CURES beginning on January 1, 2016, 
but the electronic system does not have the capacity to handle the higher level of use yet.56 The 
system is currently in the process of updating, which is expected to be complete in summer of 
2015.57 The system recently received funding for the upgrades.58 
 
                                                 
49 Id. at 29, 69. 
50 Id. at 29. 
51 Id. at 70. 
52 Known as Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (“CURES”). See id at 28. 
53 Id. 
54 See id at 70. 
55 Id. at 28, 70. 
56 Id. at 28 (upgrades to the system expected to be complete in the summer of 2015). 
57 Id. 
58 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 208 (a) (where an annual fee of $6 is charged on doctors to offset the 
cost associated with the maintenance of CURES). 
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Although doctors are required to register for CURES beginning January 1, 2016, they are 
not yet required to check the database prior to prescribing or dispensing drugs.59 If Proposition 
46 becomes law, doctors would be required not only to register for CURES, but also required to 
check the electronic database prior to prescribing or dispensing certain drugs for the first time to 
the patient.60 This requirement could help to reduce prescription drug abuse.61 However, since 
the system cannot handle the higher level of use yet, so it may be an impossibility for this 
provision of the law to take effect upon passage. 
 
III. HISTORY  
 
A. History of the MICRA Cap on Noneconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice 
Cases 
 
In the mid-1970s, California doctors were embroiled in a malpractice insurance crisis.62 
Driven by frivolous lawsuits and excessive jury awards, medical liability insurers levied massive 
insurance premium increases and cancelled insurance policies for many physicians across the 
State.63 As their premiums more than tripled by 1975, anesthesiologists and surgeons began a 
walkout, refusing to handle any patients except those in imminent danger of death.64 A 
grassroots campaign was then organized by the California Medical Association in May 1975, and 
more than 800 physicians, nurses, lab technicians and hospital personnel joined in a Capitol rally 
calling on then (and now) Governor Jerry Brown to convene a special session of the Legislature 
to deal with the crisis.65 Three days later, Governor Brown issued the special session that 
resulted in a collection of statutes that is now known as the Malpractice Insurance Compensation 
Reform Act (MICRA).66 
 
As originally introduced at the special session, the bill limited compensation for certain 
noneconomic losses, including pain and suffering, to $800 a month and provided that a claimant 
would not be entitled to noneconomic losses if his earnings exceeded $1,500 a month.67 These 
monthly restrictions were deleted at the request of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, and the 
bill (Assembly Bill 1xx) was passed on June 20, 1975, without any limit on the amount of 
damages that an injured party could recover.68 A week later, the Senate Insurance and Financial 
                                                 
59 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 28.  
60 Id. at 70. 
61 See CURES, supra note 24 (DOJ expressly state that CURES is “an effort to identify and deter drug 
abuse and diversion through accurate and rapid tracking of Schedule II through IV controlled 
substances”). 
62 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 27; MICRA: A Brief History, supra note 8.  
63 MICRA: A Brief History, supra note 8. 
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 S. COMM. ON INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMB. B. NO. 1 AS 
AMENDED JUNE 27, 1975) (on file with Cal. Assemb, B. Author A.B. 1xx 1975 files).  
68 Amanda Edwards, Medical Malpractice Noneconomic Damages Caps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 213, 
221–22 (2006). 
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Institutions Committee adopted significant amendments to the bill, which included the provision 
limiting noneconomic damages to $250,000.69 
 
As the bill progressed through the State Senate, Senate Judiciary Committee consultant 
and later legislative counsel, Bion Gregory, suggested indexing the noneconomic damages cap.70 
However, this suggestion was disregarded because the plaintiff lawyers’ lobby would not support 
the idea.71 Ironically, some of the representatives of the trial bar thought indexing the cap would 
improve the bill’s overall chance for passage and increase the likelihood of the Governor signing 
it.72 As a result, they withheld their support of the indexed cap to try to kill the bill altogether.73 
Even without the provision indexing the cap, the Governor still signed the bill. 
 
Following passage of MICRA, the constitutionality of the noneconomic damages cap was 
challenged on a number of occasions.74 Then, in 1985, the California Supreme Court upheld the 
cap’s constitutionality, stating:  
 
[The limitation on recoverable noneconomic damages] is, of course, one of the provisions 
which made changes in existing tort rules in an attempt to reduce the cost of medical 
malpractice litigation… It appears obvious that this section – by placing a ceiling of 
$250,000 on the recovery of noneconomic damages – is rationally related to the objective 
of reducing the costs of malpractice defendants and their insurers.75 
 
In February 2014, State Senate Democratic leader Darrell Steinberg introduced a bill 
concerning the medical malpractice damages cap that would have avoided the current ballot box 
battle between doctors and lawyers over Proposition 46.76 The compromise would have raised 
the damages limit to $500,000 under MICRA, well below the rate of inflation.77 While 
representatives for both doctors and lawyers seemed close to agreement, no agreement was 
reached.78 Consumer Watchdog (a nonprofit organization with a focus on protecting patients, 
health care, political reform, privacy, and energy79) then drafted Proposition 46.80 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 224. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Lawrence Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, S.F., 38 Cal. 3d 137, 139 (1985). 
76 Walton Law Firm, Medical Malpractice Initiative Will Appear on November Ballot, SAN DIEGO INJURY 
LAW BLOG (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.legalpad.com/2014/04/medical-malpractice-initiative-will-appear-
november-ballot.html. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 Who We Are, CONSUMER WATCHDOG, http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/about (last visited Oct. 10, 
2014). 
80 Id.  
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B. History of Random Alcohol/Drug Testing of Physicians 
 
If Proposition 46 passes, California would become the first State to require doctors to 
submit random drug and alcohol tests.81 However, Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston 
and the Cleveland Clinic Foundation in Ohio have implemented random urine testing in their 
anesthesia residency teaching departments.82 The problem with drug testing doctors is that 
doctors are familiar with the signs of addiction and are sometimes able to mask their drug use 
from coworkers.83 This makes it difficult to detect when they need help, and those determined to 
hide their habits have been known to find creative ways of beating drug tests, including 
submitting fake urine samples.84 Despite the difficulties, the administrators of the programs in 
Boston and Cleveland believe they have been successful, and now hope more comprehensive 
studies will be done to determine whether such programs help stave off drug use long-term.85 
 
C. History of the CURES Database 
 
To combat prescription drug abuse, the California Triplicate Prescription Program (TPP) 
was created in 1939.86 It was replaced by the CURES database in 1997, and in 2009 the 
Prescription Drug Management Program (PDMP) system was implemented as a searchable 
database component of CURES.87 In 2012, the program responded to more than 800,000 
requests.88  
 
CURES is maintained by the DOJ.89 CURES allows preregistered users including 
licensed healthcare prescribers eligible to prescribe controlled substances, pharmacists 
authorized to dispense controlled substances, law enforcement, and regulatory boards to access 
timely patient controlled substance history information.90 As of August 2013, only 8.23 percent 
of prescribers and pharmacists in California were registered with the CURES database.91 
According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) report on Proposition 46, that number has 
since increased to 12 percent.92  
                                                 
81 Adam Nagourney, California Asks: Should Doctors Face Drug Tests?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/us/california-asks-should-doctors-face-drug-tests.html?_r=0. 
82 Lauren Cox, Urine Drug Tests for Doctors?, ABC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/PainManagement/story?id=6232694. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 809, (Aug. 21, 2013), 
available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0801-
0850/sb_809_cfa_20130820_094453_asm_comm.html. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 2–3. 
89 CURES PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM, CAL. DEP’T JUST.  (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/mtgs/pharm_awareness/conf_2013/august_2013/san_diego/small.pdf. 
[“CURES Prescription Drug Monitoring Program”]. 
90 CURES, supra note 24. 
91 CURES Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, supra note 89, at 15-16.  
92 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 28. 
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Senate Bill No. 809, which became effective January 1, 2014, requires prescribers of 
medication and pharmacists to register with CURES.93 Beginning January 1, 2016, providers 
will be required to register with CURES (even if Proposition 46 does not pass), but they will not 
be required to check the database prior to prescribing or dispensing drugs.94 Currently, CURES 
does not have sufficient capacity to handle the higher level of use that is expected to occur when 
providers are required to register beginning in 2016.95 The State is currently in the process of 
upgrading CURES, and these upgrades are scheduled to be complete in the summer of 2015.96 
Currently, CURES has 30,000 registered users.97 If all prescribers of medication and physicians 
register with CURES, that total will increase to 200,000 users.98 Currently, it takes about thirty 
days after a prescriber/pharmacist files their paperwork with the DOJ before they become 
registered with CURES.99 
 
IV. LIKELY FISCAL EFFECTS 
 
Proposition 46 would likely have a wide variety of fiscal effects on State and local 
governments, many of which are subject to substantial uncertainty.100 
 
A. Fiscal Effects of Raising the Cap on Noneconomic Damages in Medical 
Malpractice Cases 
 
Raising the cap on noneconomic damages would likely increase overall health care 
spending in California (both governmental and nongovernmental) by: (1) increasing direct 
medical malpractice costs, and (2) changing the amount and types of health care services 
provided.101 
 
1. Direct Medical Malpractice Costs 
 
Theoretically, raising the cap may encourage health care providers to practice medicine 
in a way that decreases malpractice.  However, the prospect of a more substantial recovery could 
increase the number of claims and, of those that are successful, the damages awarded could be 
significantly higher.102  On balance, it is anticipated by the LAO that the increase in medical 
malpractice costs would result in higher total health care spending.103 
                                                 
93 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11165.1. 
94 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 28. 
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 Dave Roberts, Hearings Dissect Prop 46 on Medical Malpractice, CAL WATCHDOG.COM (Oct. 1, 
2014), http://calwatchdog.com/2014/10/01/hearings-dissect-prop-46-on-medical-malpractice/. 
98 Id.  
99 Joint Legislative Hearing on Proposition 46, California State Legislature, (Sept. 29, 2014) (statement 
of Arwen Flint, Assistant Chief at Attorney General’s Office), video available at 
http://calchannel.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=7&clip_id=2456. 
100 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 29. 
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 30. 
64 
 
California’s counties would be greatly affected by the change in the noneconomic 
damages cap as the counties run hospitals and clinics, offering health care services to the 
underserved and hardest to reach populations.104 Counties would have to pay higher medical 
malpractice premiums if Proposition 46 were to pass.105 Counties that are self-insured would 
have to wholly cover the costs of higher payouts in medical lawsuits – meaning redirecting 
dollars out of the delivery, care, or other local services.106 
  
State and local governments pay for tens of billions of dollars of health care services 
annually.107 Assuming additional costs for health care providers – such as higher direct medical 
malpractice costs – are generally passed along to purchasers of health care services (such as 
governments), and assuming State and local governments will have net costs associated with 
changes in the amount and types of health care services, there would likely be a very small 
percentage increase in health care costs in the economy overall from raising the cap.108 However, 
a 0.5 percent increase in State and local government health care costs in California as a result of 
raising the cap would increase government costs by roughly a couple hundred million dollars 
annually.109 Given the range of potential effects on health care spending, the LAO estimates that 
State and local government health care costs associated with raising the cap would likely range 
in the tens of millions of dollars to several hundred million dollars annually.110 
 
Raising the cap would also affect the amount and types of health care services provided 
in California because health care providers would likely change how they practice medicine in an 
effort to avoid medical malpractice claims.111 A physician may order a test that he or she would 
not otherwise have ordered, and this could either reduce future health care costs by preventing 
future illness or increase the total costs of health care services, with little or no future offset 
savings.112 The LAO estimates that this would result in a net increase in total health care 
spending by 0.1 percent to 1 percent.113 
 
B. Fiscal Effects of Random Alcohol and Drug Testing of Physicians 
 
If Proposition 46 is passed, it could have the effect of savings from fewer medical errors, 
because testing would deter some physicians from using alcohol or drugs while on duty.114 This 
would decrease overall health care spending.115 However, these costs would be offset to a degree 
                                                 
104 Matt Cate, Opinion: California Cannot Afford Proposition 46, PUBLIC CEO (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://www.publicceo.com/2014/09/opinion-california-cannot-afford-proposition-46/. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 2, at 30. 
112 Questions and Answers About the MICRA Ballot Measure, VOTE NO ON 46, 
http://www.noon46.com/take-action/q-a/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
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by the costs of performing the tests.116 Some of these costs would be passed along to State and 
local governments in the form of higher prices for health care services provided by physicians.117 
 
Physician alcohol and drug testing would also create State administrative costs, including 
the costs for the Board to enforce the measure.118 These costs would likely be less than $1 
million annually, to be paid for by a fee assessed on doctors.119 
 
C. Fiscal Effects of Requiring Doctors and Pharmacists to Use CURES  
 
If Proposition 46 has the effect on the CURES database that it intends to have, doctors 
will be using the system to check a patient’s prescription history prior to prescribing certain 
medicines. This could result in lower prescription drug costs because a doctor would be more 
likely to identify potential doctor shoppers and, in turn, reduce the number of prescription drugs 
dispensed.120 This would result in lower governmental costs associated with prescription drug 
abuse, such as law enforcement, social services, and other health care costs.121 However, these 
savings could be lessened if drug abusers find other ways to obtain prescription drugs.122 
Another likely fiscal effect associated with the proposed usage of the CURES database is 
that additional staff may need to be hired at hospitals if doctors are required to spend time using 
CURES.123 Some of these cost increases would eventually be passed on to government 
purchasers of health care services in the form of higher prices.124 
 
D. Overall Fiscal Effect 
 
The requirements to check CURES and test physicians for alcohol and drugs would likely 
result in annual savings to State and local governments.125 Raising the MICRA cap would likely 
result in increased State and local government health care costs, ranging from the tens of millions 
of dollars to several hundred million dollars annually.126 The amount of annual savings is highly 
uncertain, but potentially significant.127 These savings would offset to some extent the increased 
governmental costs from raising the cap on noneconomic damages.128 
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING ISSUES 
 
A. Single-Subject Rule 
 
The California Constitution states that “an initiative measure embracing more than one 
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.”129 The single-subject rule seeks 
to prevent “logrolling,” whereby proponents “combin[e] in one measure two or more unrelated 
provisions” to get the weaker issue passed into law.130 More importantly, the principal objective 
of the constitutional provision is to avoid confusion on voters.131 An initiative complies with the 
single-subject rule if, “despite its varied collateral effects,” all of its parts are “reasonably 
germane” to a common theme or purpose.132 The provisions are not required to “effectively 
interlock in a functional relationship.”133 The court construes the reasonably germane test in “an 
accommodating and lenient manner so as not to unduly restrict the Legislature’s or the people’s 
right to package provisions in a single bill or initiative.”134 
On its face, Proposition 46 appears to have three distinct objectives: (1) to increase the 
noneconomic medical malpractice award; (2) to require alcohol and drug testing of doctors; and 
(3) to require physicians, surgeons, and pharmacists to check CURES prior to proscribing certain 
prescription drugs to patients.135  A constitutional challenge may be brought under the single-
subject rule arguing that each of the objectives in should be voted on separately.  However, due 
to the standard for finding a single-subject violation, it is unlikely the challenge would succeed 
and the court would likely find that the provisions are “reasonably germane” to a common theme 
or purpose – patient safety.136 
  
B. Severability Clause 
 
Proposition 46 contains a severability clause that allows invalid provisions to be removed 
from an otherwise enforceable law.137 Specifically, Section 10 of Proposition 46 states: “If any 
of the provisions of this act, or part thereof, is for any reason held to be invalid or 
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall not be affected, but shall remain in full force and 
effect, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.”138 A severability clause 
“establishes a presumption in favor of severance [although not conclusive.]”139 Proposition 46 
does contain a severability clause so the court will likely favor severance if part of the proposed 
law is found to be invalid or unconstitutional.140  
                                                 
129 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). 
130 Independent Energy Producers v. MacPherson (“MacPherson”), 38 Cal. 4th 735 (2006). 
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When determining whether to maintain other sections where one has been deemed 
invalid, the court will consider three factors.141 First, the court will identify the grammatical 
structure of the clause to determine whether the invalid portion “can be removed as a whole 
without affecting the wording or coherence of what remains.”142 Second, the court will consider 
whether the valid sections can function independently and is “complete in itself.”143  Third, the 
court will decide whether voters would have still passed the legislation knowing that parts of the 
statute would be invalidated.144  
 
Proposition 46 has three distinct provisions relating to patient safety and recovery: (1) the 
alcohol and drug testing of doctors; (2) the checking of CURES; and (3) adjusting the 
noneconomic medical malpractice cap to reflect inflation.145 Proposition 46 meets the 
grammatically separable factor because each of the three categories can be separated 
grammatically and still retain coherence. Proposition 46 is likely to meet the volitional factor, 
because voters who support the measure are likely in support of the proposed law’s focus on 
patient safety. Therefore, voters would likely support the measure “knowing that parts of the 
statute would be invalidated.”146  
 
However, the functional factor is not as clear. At first glance, Proposition 46 likely 
satisfies the functional separation factor because each provision appears to be complete on its 
own and can function independently without relying on the other sections. However, on a closer 
look, there is one provision that cannot stand on its own. Section 6 of Proposition 46, the 
presumption of professional negligence, relies on Section 4 of Proposition 46, the alcohol and 
drug testing, to be valid.147 In other words, Section 6 cannot function independently if Section 4 
is declared invalid or unconstitutional because Section 6 refers to the alcohol and drug testing as 
a prerequisite for the professional negligence presumption.148  
 
Nonetheless, if alcohol and drug testing of doctors is declared unconstitutional and 
invalid, then the severability clause will likely favor severance.149 
 
C. Alcohol and Drug Testing of Doctors May Be a Constitutional Violation  
 
Opponents may challenge the drug and alcohol testing of doctors as a nonconsensual 
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment under the United States Constitution150 
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and a privacy violation of the California Constitution.151 If the challenge is successful, then the 
provisions related to alcohol and drug testing of doctors would be declared unconstitutional and 
be removed from the measure.152 However, such a challenge may not be successful since patient 
safety in the medical and health care industry will likely outweigh privacy rights of doctors.153 
 
In Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, the Supreme Court held that the Federal 
Railroad Safety Act of 1970, which allowed the Federal Railroad Administration “to regulate and 
mandate blood and urine tests of employees who are involved in certain train accidents[,]” did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.154 The Court in Skinner applied a balancing test and found 
that the Government had compelling interests that outweigh privacy concerns.155 Privacy 
interests of employees in a regulated industry are considered minimal where the industry is 
“regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and 
fitness of covered employees.”156  
 
The rationale for the alcohol and drug testing of doctors in Proposition 46 is similar to the 
rationale for alcohol and drug testing of employees in the rail industry.157 The medical and health 
care industry is regulated by both federal and State statutes and regulations to ensure patient 
safety.158 For instance, section 8355 of the California Government Code requires persons or 
organizations that are awarded a contract or grant from the State to provide a drug-free 
workplace.159 Therefore, the provisions relating to alcohol and drug testing of doctors will likely 
be upheld as constitutional under both the U.S. Constitution and California Constitution. 
 
VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
A. Supporting Arguments 
 
As of September 8, 2014, Proposition 46 supporters had raised more than $7.8 million.160 
Among those supporters are the Consumer Attorneys Issue PAC, contributing $1,108,000, 
Consumer Watchdog, contributing $267,148, Casey, Gerry, Schenk, Francavilla, Blatt & 
Penfield, LLP, contributing $100,000, Bruce G. Fagel, A Law Corporation, contributing 
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$85,000, Bisnar/Chase Personal Injury Attorneys, LLP, contributing $75,000, and CA Nurses 
Association Initiative PAC, contributing $50,000.161 
 
1. Medical Malpractice Insurance Will Not Skyrocket if the Cap is Raised, and 
Doctors Will Not Have to Flee California or Reduce Access to Care 
 
Over the last ten years, California medical malpractice insurers have earned a 16.7 
percent return on net worth – more than 250 percent of the industry average (which was a 6.5 
percent return).162 Medical malpractice insurers in California have consistently had such high 
profits that they would continue to make above-average profits even if the MICRA cap were 
indexed to inflation.163 Moreover, in each of the last eight years California malpractice insurers 
had loss ratios of 38 percent or less, meaning that they always had at least 62 cents of each 
premium dollar, plus all investment income, left over for expenses and profit.164 
 
Doctors will not leave California to practice in another State with lower malpractice 
insurance rates because California already has an effective and successful system to regulate 
medical malpractice insurance premiums – a system that will not change because of an 
adjustment of the malpractice cap.165 Proposition 103 gave the California State Insurance 
Commissioner the power to regulate many types of insurance rates, including medical 
malpractice insurance.166 In 2012, the Insurance Commissioner found that California’s medical 
malpractice insurers were charging doctors too much in premiums and ordered several of the 
largest insurers to return $52 million in premiums they overcharged California physicians.167  
 
2. Raising the Medical Malpractice Cap Will Not Lead to the Closure of Community 
Health Centers 
 
Proponents assert that indexing the malpractice cap for inflation will not increase the 
malpractice insurance costs of community health centers because health centers and free clinics 
are protected under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).168 Under the FTCA, individuals 
injured by the negligent acts of federal employees may seek and receive compensation from the 
federal government.169 Therefore, health centers and free clinics are no longer liable for medical 
malpractice and have no need to buy medical malpractice insurance.170 
 
                                                 
161 Id. 
162 Frequently Asked Questions, YES ON 46 SAVES LIVES, https://www.yeson46.org/frequently-asked-
questions/  (last visited September 5, 2014) [“FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS”]. 
163 Id.  
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167 Op-Ed Bob Pack, Prop. 46: When Health Care Kills, CAPITOL WEEKLY (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://capitolweekly.net/health-care-medical-prop-46-negligence-pack/. 
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3. Proposition 46 is About Patient Safety, Not Profits for Attorneys 
 
Proponents of Proposition 46 argue that patient safety is the primary objective of 
Proposition 46 and that attorneys’ fees are incidental.171 Medical malpractice litigation deters 
physicians and hospitals from committing medical errors and encourages them to gather and 
analyze information about past errors, thereby reducing the future costs associated with such 
errors.172 The deterrent effect of patient protection laws can save the health care system from 
these human financial losses;173 increased attorneys’ fees are merely incidental to the incentive 
for doctors and hospitals to fix bad behavior for fear of strong financial repercussion for 
malpractice.174  Further, proponents point out that MICRA’s strict attorneys’ fees structure is left 
entirely in place by the initiative.175 
 
4. Although Current Law Allows Unlimited Economic Damages, There is Still a 
Need for a Higher Cap on Noneconomic “Pain and Suffering” Damages 
 
The cap on noneconomic damages prevents people from getting fair compensation.176 
Economic damages are limited to wage loss and future medical bills, which means that if the 
victim does not have wages or if the victim dies, there can be no economic damages.177 This 
largely has an effect on children, the disabled, the elderly, and stay-at home moms.178 With a 
$250,000 cap, you can rarely find an attorney to take the case, especially when it can cost 
$100,000 or more to do the background work and provide expert witnesses.179 This means the 
most vulnerable among us can recover at most $250,000, while those with higher incomes have 
other avenues for financial redress.180 
 
Although most States have limits on noneconomic damages in medical negligence cases, 
California’s cap of $250,000 is among the lowest in the nation.181 Only two States, Kansas and 
Montana, have a fixed cap as low as California’s.182 Four other States have a basic cap of 
$250,000 on noneconomic damages that can be raised under certain circumstances such as gross 
negligence, serious, permanent, or catastrophic harm, or where justice requires.183 Caps in other 
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States range up to $750,000. At least seventeen States have no caps at all on noneconomic 
damages.184 
 
5. Proposition 46 Will Save Lives By Cracking Down on Prescription Drug Abuse 
 
Proposition 46 would require all doctors and pharmacists to register with and use 
CURES. Checking this database will reduce the number of doctor shopping addicts who harm 
themselves and others.185 The Journal of the American Medical Association found that doctors 
are the biggest suppliers for chronic prescription drug abusers, and called for the mandatory 
usage of State prescription drug databases.186 Further, a 2012 Los Angeles Times investigation 
found that drugs prescribed by doctors caused or contributed to nearly half of recent prescription 
overdose deaths in Southern California.187 Prescription drug addiction is the nation’s fastest 
growing form of drug abuse.188 Unfortunately, less than one in ten physicians bother to use 
CURES.189 
 
6.  Proposition 46 Will Save Lives By Protecting Patients From Impaired Doctors 
 
California’s medical board estimates 18 percent of doctors suffer substance abuse during 
their lifetime.190 Proposition 46 would help by mandating random testing of physicians.191 Drug 
testing is required for pilots, bus drivers, and other safety workers – but it is not required for 
doctors.192 A decade ago, Dr. Stephen Loyd was hooked on prescription painkilling drugs.193 “I 
worked impaired every day,” Dr. Loyd says.194 “Looking back, it scares me to death, what I 
could have done.”195 Drug testing can save lives.196 That is why random drug testing of doctors 
is supported by leading medical safety experts, consumer advocates, the Inspector General of the 
federal agency responsible for overseeing health care, and by doctors who themselves have 
abused drugs.197 
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B. Opposing Arguments 
 
As of September 8, 2014, Proposition 46 opponents had raised over $56.3 million.198 
Among those supporters are the California Medical Association Physicians’ Issues Committee, 
contributing $5,064,542, Cooperative of American Physicians Independent Expenditure 
Committee, contributing $5,000,000, NorCal Mutual Insurance Company, contributing 
$5,000,000, The Doctors Company, contributing $5,000,000, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 
Inc., contributing $3,000,000, California Hospitals Committee on Issues, contributing 
$2,500,000, and Medical Insurance Exchange of California, contributing $2,500,000. 
 
1. Proposition 46 Jeopardizes People’s Access to Their Trusted Doctors 
 
Opponents assert that if Proposition 46 passes and California’s medical liability cap goes 
up, you could also lose your trusted doctor because many doctors will be forced to leave 
California to practice in States where medical liability insurance is more affordable.199 
Opponents argue that even respected community clinics, including Planned Parenthood, warn 
that specialists like OB-GYNs will have no choice but to reduce or eliminate vital services, 
especially for women and families in underserved areas.200 Not only are opponents concerned 
about doctors leaving the State, they are worried about doctors coming to the State.201 If a 
medical student has just graduated from medical school and has upwards of $200,000 in school 
related debt, they are far more likely to practice in an area with lower medical malpractice 
insurance costs.202 
 
2. Proposition 46 Threatens People’s Personal Privacy 
 
Opponents argue that the provision of Proposition 46 that forces doctors and pharmacists 
to use the CURES database significantly jeopardizes the privacy or patients’ personal 
prescription medical information.203 Currently, CURES does not have sufficient capacity to 
handle the higher level of use that is expected to occur when providers are required to register 
beginning in 2016, yet Proposition 46 provides no funding to improve functionality or security, 
and contains no security standards to protect patient information.204 This makes patient 
information even more vulnerable to hacking, breach and unauthorized access.205 Additionally, 
the CURES database expands the number of people who will have access to private health 
information, including non-medical professionals for reasons that have nothing to do with 
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medical history.206 For example, law enforcement, investigatory agencies, and the courts could 
access patient prescription records for investigations that don’t even relate to prescription drug 
abuse and, in many cases, even where the patient is not the subject of the investigation.207 
 
3. Opponents of Proposition 46 Are Not Necessarily Opposed to Drug Testing of 
Doctors, But Such a Law Should Be Drafted Judiciously 
 
Proponents of Proposition 46 have openly admitted that the provision for random alcohol 
and drug testing of doctors was added as a political sweetener.208 The initiative sponsors were 
very smart when they tried to cover up a very controversial policy measure (indexing the 
noneconomic damages cap) with a very popular one (drug testing of doctors).209 In fact, when 
likely voters were polled on what parts of the proposition they would support, 68 percent were in 
favor of requiring random drug and alcohol testing of doctors, while 25 percent were opposed.210 
Respondents were far less enthusiastic about the increased cap: 42 percent of likely voters 
approved, while 47 percent opposed it.211 
 
Opponents of Proposition 46 ask voters to look at the details of how Proposition 46 
works.212 It applies to physicians in hospitals, but not those who are operating on their own.213 It 
does not include nurses.214 It calls for an immediate suspension for doctors who test positive or 
who fail to get tested within twelve hours of an adverse event – which can be impractical or 
impossible at times, especially in rural areas.215 Such a rigid requirement could leave patients 
without health care until the California Medical Board has a chance to review the evidence.216 
 
4. Proposition 46 is Costly for Consumers 
 
Opponents argue that trial lawyers, who are out to profit from medical lawsuits, 
carelessly threw together Proposition 46 without any concern for the taxpayer’s pocketbook, 
privacy, health, or health care.217 If medical malpractice awards go up, health insurance 
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companies will raise their rates to cover their increased costs.218 If Proposition 46 is passed, 
medical lawsuits and jury awards will skyrocket, and the taxpayer will be the one to pay the 
costs.219 
 
5.   The CURES Database Is Not Ready For “Prime Time” 
 
If Proposition 46 is passed, prescribers of medicine and pharmacists will be required to 
register and begin using CURES on November 5, 2014 - the day after the vote.220 There are 
currently 30,000 users of the CURES database, a number which will increase to 200,000 when 
all prescribers and pharmacists are required to register.221 Currently, CURES is undergoing 
updates to accommodate the 200,000 users required to register on January 1, 2016 (in accordance 
with SB 809), but the updates are an ongoing process.222 We do not have the luxury of 
discussing what the CURES database will be able to handle next year, as Proposition 46 
mandates usage of the CURES system by all 200,000 prescribers/pharmacists the day after the 
vote if the initiative is passed.223 Based upon the schedule for the needed updates of the CURES 
system to accommodate such traffic, CURES will not be ready to handle the increase in traffic 
on November 5, 2014.224 
 
Proponents have argued that as long as a prescriber of medication “tries” to access the 
CURES system, their medical licenses will not be at risk.225 But opponents argue this is just not 
true.226 There is nothing in the text of Proposition 46 that says what happens when a prescriber of 
medication attempts to use the CURES system but is unable to access it.227 The text is clear: 
“Licensed health care practitioners and pharmacists shall access and consult the electronic 
history…”228 Therefore, if a patient is in need of medication but the CURES system does not 
respond, the physician will be faced with a dilemma: prescribe the medicine and run the risk of 
putting their medical license at risk, or deny the patient medication and violate their Hippocratic 
oath.229 Proposition 46 also imposes a presumption of negligence on the prescriber/pharmacist if 
they do not access and consult the CURES database.230 Therefore, since Article 2, Section 10 of 
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the California Constitution requires the CURES provisions of Proposition 46 to go into effect the 
day after the election, doctors would be forced to use CURES or be presumed negligent.231  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Proposition 46 will have major fiscal effects on the California budget. The goal of 
protecting the safety of patients by increasing the MICRA cap on noneconomic damages in 
professional negligence claims, requiring alcohol and drug testing of doctors, and mandating use 
of the CURES system by all health care professionals comes at a price. As mentioned earlier, 
increasing the malpractice cap will result in an increase in government spending by hundreds of 
millions of dollars annually.232 This large number will be offset to a degree if malpractice claims 
decrease as a result of doctors taking added precautions to avoid malpractice claims.233 Although 
doctors have an incentive to avoid claims that could see them paying out up to four times more 
for noneconomic damages, malpractice claims will likely increase because of the attractively 
high awards, which was arguably the primary reason MICRA was implemented in 1975.  
 
Requiring prescribers of medication and pharmacists to register with CURES and to use 
the system should help identify “doctor shoppers,” which would result in lower prescription drug 
costs. Eliminating some of the abuse of prescription medication will also allow government 
resources to be used elsewhere (like law enforcement and social services). However, there is a 
big question as to what will happen the day after the election with CURES if Proposition 46 
passes. The system is not due for an upgrade until August 2015, and there is currently a 30-day 
turn around on getting new users registered. If Proposition 46 passes, prescribers of medication 
and pharmacists are required to check CURES. What is going to happen when a large number of 
these prescribers and pharmacists cannot access the system? 
 
Opponents argue that MICRA was passed in reaction to a health care crisis in California 
regarding excessively high jury awards in malpractice cases.234 It would appear that if 
Proposition 46 were passed, the problems that MICRA was intended to solve could likely return. 
Malpractice insurance premiums will rise, but proponents of the initiative allege that this will not 
be to the detriment of doctors.235 
 
If Proposition 46 is passed, it is difficult to say with certainty what effects it will have on 
California, because California would be the first State to implement the alcohol/drug testing 
requirement of doctors.236 Whether you are a proponent or opponent of Proposition 46, it is 
undeniable that the passing of the initiative will have profound effects on future generations in 
California. 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Proposition 47 would (1) reduce a number of non-violent and non-serious property and 
drug crimes that are currently felonies1 or wobblers2 to misdemeanors, (2) reduce a number of 
theft-related wobblers to misdemeanors, (3) allow people convicted of felonies addressed by the 
initiative to petition for resentencing or reclassification of their conviction as a misdemeanor, 
whether they are currently serving their felony sentence or have already completed it, and lastly, 
(4) split the cost savings generated by the initiative between trauma recovery services for 
victims, K-12 schools, and mental health and substance abuse treatment programs.  
 
A “yes” vote on initiative 47 would mean that six offenses would be lowered to 
mandatory misdemeanors, reducing prison sentences and saving $150,000 a year which would 
then go into truancy and prevention programs.3 In addition it would likely release close to 10,000 
prisoners who would qualify for shorter sentences.  
 
A “no” vote would mean that those same six offenses would keep their current charging 
standards, ranging from misdemeanors to felonies.  
 
II. THE LAW 
 
A. Existing Law 
 
Proposition 47 is proposing to change the penalties and classifications for six non-violent 
property and drug offenses. Some of the offenses are felonies, some misdemeanors, and others 
are considered wobblers. Proposition 47 would make them all mandatory misdemeanors.4 
 
1. Petty Theft  
 
Theft of money or property can be charged as either a misdemeanor or a felony based on 
the circumstances, but is generally a misdemeanor when the value is between $50 and $950.5 
However, it can be charged as a felony based on the circumstances.6 
 
                                                 
1 Felonies are the most serious offenses.  In California they are punishable by death or imprisonment in 
the California state prison system.  Many felony offenses are straight felonies. A straight felony can only 
be charged and sentenced as a felony, including but not limited to rape and murder. CAL. PENAL CODE § 
17. 
2 A wobbler is a crime that the prosecutor may elect to file as either a California misdemeanor or a felony 
based on the facts of the case and a person’s criminal history. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17. 
3 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2014, at 72, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/complete-
vig.pdf#page=74 [“NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
4 MAC TAYLOR & MICHAEL COHEN, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE 
REPORT (2014), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/fiscal-impact-estimate-
report%2813-0060%29.pdf? [“FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE REPORT (2014)”]. 
5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 490-490.1. 
6 FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE REPORT (2014), supra note 4. 
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Under current law, the theft of certain property can be considered a felony. In addition, 
petty theft can be charged as a felony if certain circumstances are met. For example, a defendant 
may be charged with a felony if they have at least three prior convictions for theft related crimes. 
A felony may also be found if there is only one prior theft conviction combined with a 
conviction for a serious, violent, or sex offense.7  
 
2. Shoplifting  
 
A misdemeanor is usually found for shoplifting when the property is valued at $950 or 
less. However, shoplifting may be charged as the more serious crime of felony burglary.8 A 
defendant may be charged with burglary instead of shoplifting, which is a more serious offense.9  
 
3. Receiving Stolen Property  
 
It is considered a wobbler crime if someone receives stolen property.10 Being charged 
with possession of stolen property may be charged as receiving stolen property as well.11  
 
4. Writing Bad Checks  
 
A person may be convicted of either a misdemeanor or felony for writing bad checks in 
two circumstances.12 The first is when a bad check is written in the amount of more than $450. 
The second is when a check is written for less than $450, but the person writing the check 
already has convictions on their record for forgery related crimes.13  
 
5. Check Forgery 
 
Forging a check, no matter for what amount of money, is a crime.14  
 
6. Drug Possession  
 
Possession of most controlled substances is a wobbler.15 The most notable exception is 
marijuana, which is not charged as a felony.  
 
B. Proposed Law 
 
Proposition 47 aims to make all six offenses mandatory misdemeanors, but there would 
be exceptions. Offenders who have committed particular severe crimes such as murder, and 
                                                 
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 459.  
10 FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE REPORT (2014), supra note 4. 
11 Id.  
12 CAL. PENAL CODE § 476(a).  
13 FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE REPORT (2014), supra note 4. 
14 Id. § 473 (Deering 2014). 
15 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11350, 11357, 11377. 
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certain sex and gun felonies, will not be eligible to take advantage of the reduced charges and 
sentences.16 
 
1. Petty Theft  
 
Under Proposition 47, petty theft would be a mandatory misdemeanor. However, there 
would be exceptions. Based on the defendant’s criminal history, they may still be charged with a 
felony.17 Proposition 47 would add section 490.2 to the California Penal Code.18  The additional 
section mandates that theft of property where the value does not exceed $950 would be 
considered petty theft and would be charged as a misdemeanor.  The initiative focuses on the 
dollar amount rather than the type of property.  
 
Penal Code Section 666 creates a petty theft enhancement so that any person convicted of 
three or more theft-related crimes19 and who is subsequently convicted of petty theft can be 
charged with a felony as opposed to a misdemeanor. The initiative removes this enhancement. 
Instead of the enhancement, which mandates a felony, a person with three or more prior theft 
related crimes will be charged with a misdemeanor. 
 
The proposition does make an exception, leaving the original language and effect of the 
statute in place in certain situations. People who are required to register pursuant to the Sex 
Offender Registration Act20 or who have a prior violent or serious felony conviction under 
California Penal Code 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) and who have a prior theft-related conviction remain 
unaffected by the proposition.  
 
2. Shoplifting  
 
Shoplifting property valued at less than $950 under this initiative would always be 
considered shoplifting and never considered burglary.21 It would become a mandatory 
misdemeanor.  
 
                                                 
16 FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE REPORT (2014), supra note 4. 
17 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3. 
18 Id. at 72. 
19 Theft-related crimes are defined as “petty theft, grand theft, a conviction pursuant to subdivision (d) or 
(e) of Section 368, auto theft under Section 10851 of the Vehicle Code, burglary, carjacking, robbery, or a 
felony violation of Section 496 and having served a term therefor in any penal institution or having been 
imprisoned therein as a condition of probation for that offense.” California Petty Theft & Shoplifting 
Laws, SHOUSE CALIFORNIA LAW GROUP (2014), http://www.shouselaw.com/petty-theft.html. 
20 A person convicted of any of the following California sex offenses must register under the Sex 
Offender Registration Act, Penal Code 290: most acts involving California rape under the Penal Code 261 
sections and Penal Code 243.4 sexual battery; most acts involving minors, such as Penal Code 288 lewd 
acts with a minor, Penal Code 272 contributing to the delinquency of a minor, acts relating to Penal Code 
311 child pornography, Penal Codes 266h and 266i pimping and pandering with a minor, Penal Codes 
269 and 288.5 aggravated and/or continuous sexual assault of a child, and Penal Code 285 incest; forced 
acts involving Penal Code 288a oral copulation, Penal Code 286 sodomy, and Penal Code 289 acts of 
penetration with a  foreign object; and Penal Code 314 indecent exposure. 
21 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 71. 
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Section five of the initiative addresses California Penal Code Section 459. Currently 
Penal Code Section 459 treats burglary22 of property from any building the same, be it a garage, 
home, or commercial building. Section five creates section 459.5 of the Penal Code, which 
redefines entering a commercial establishment where the total value of property taken or 
intended to be taken is less than $950 as shoplifting instead of burglary. It further requires that on 
these facts the person be charged with shoplifting, and may not be charged with burglary or theft 
of the same property.  
 
Proposition 47 mandates that shoplifting be charged as a misdemeanor unless the person 
being charged has one or more prior convictions under section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) of the Penal 
Code.23 There are no enhancements for repeat offenses.24 
 
3. Receiving Stolen Property  
 
The proposition would change the charge for receiving stolen property valued under $950 
to a mandatory misdemeanor instead of a wobbler.25 
 
Section nine of the initiative amends Penal Code section 496, which addresses buying or 
receiving stolen property.26  Currently, when a person buys or receives stolen property, anything 
with a value of less than $950 is a wobbler. It can be charged as a misdemeanor or a felony, 
while anything over $950 must be charged as a felony. The initiative amends section 496 to 
remove the wobbler so that anything under $950 must be charged as a misdemeanor unless the 
person being charged has one or more prior convictions under Penal Code Section 
667(e)(2)(C)(iv). There are no enhancements for repeat offenses.   
 
4. Writing Bad Checks 
 
This proposal would increase the maximum amount of money that defines a 
misdemeanor for writing bad checks. It would change from a wobbler to a mandatory 
misdemeanor for those who write a bad check worth less than $950.27 However, a defendant 
could still be charged with a felony if he or she has three or more convictions for certain crimes 
related to forgery.28 
 
                                                 
22 At common law, burglary was defined as breaking and entering into another's dwelling at night with the 
intent to commit a felony. The modern definition is breaking and entering into any building with the 
intent to commit a felony.  
23 The “Super Strike” offenses in section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) of the Penal Code are sexually violent offenses, 
child molestation, homicide or attempted homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine 
gun on a peace officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, and any serious or 
violent felony punishable by life imprisonment for death.  
24 The enhancement of a criminal penalty means the increase of punishment, such as by increasing a jail 
sentence. An enhancement for repeat offenses means the increase of punishment based on the fact that the 
person has committed the same offense again. Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
25 FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE REPORT (2014), supra note 4. 
26 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 72. 
27 FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE REPORT (2014), supra note 4. 
28 Id. at 71. 
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Section seven of the initiative amends section 476(a) of the Penal Code, which currently 
outlines the sentencing guidelines for a person who, with the intent to defraud, delivers a check 
for payment knowing that there are not sufficient funds to support the transaction.  Currently, 
using a bad check with a value below $450 is a misdemeanor, unless the person has a prior 
conviction for a similar offense.29 The initiative would amend Penal Code section 476(a) so that 
using a bad check with a value below $950 would be a misdemeanor, unless a person has three 
priors for similar offenses.  
 
5. Check Forgery 
 
Section six of the initiative amends section 473 of the Penal Code so that “forgery30 
would be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by 
imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.”31 
 
Currently, forgery is a wobbler, but under the initiative’s amendments it would be a 
straight misdemeanor, so long as the amount being forged was less than $950.32 There would be 
one exception. An offender could still be charged with a felony if he or she commits identity 
theft in connection with forging a check.33 There are no enhancements for repeat offenses.  
 
6. Drug Possession  
 
Possession of a controlled substance would become a mandatory misdemeanor. The 
initiative does not propose changes to marijuana possession as it is currently charged as a 
misdemeanor or an infraction depending on the amount possessed.34 
 
Sections 11-13 of the initiative would amend section 11350 of the Health and Safety 
Code.35 The initiative makes simple drug possession a misdemeanor.36  
                                                 
29 CAL. PENAL CODE § 476(a). 
30 When people hear the word "forgery," they think of faking someone else's signature or handwriting. 
But the legal definition of California forgery is much broader than that. The legal definition of forgery is 
the creation of a new, false document for your own benefit and gain. California “Forgery” Laws Penal 
Code 470 PC, SHOUSE CALIFORNIA LAW GROUP (2014), http://www.shouselaw.com/forgery.html. 
31 Section 1170(h) of the Penal Code would be amended to read: “If the sentence is not recalled, the 
defendant may submit another petition for recall and resentencing to the sentencing court when the 
defendant has been committed to the custody of the department for at least 20 years. If recall and 
resentencing is not granted under that petition, the defendant may file another petition after having served 
24 years. The final petition may be submitted, and the response to that petition shall be determined, 
during the 25th year of the defendant's sentence.”; NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 72–
73. 
32 THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS ACT, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. – OFF. ATT’Y GEN 
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs. 
33 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 47 CRIMINAL SENTENCES. MISDEMEANOR 
PENALTIES. INITIATIVE STATUTE., (July 17, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-
47-110414.pdf. 
34 Id. 
35 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 72–73. 
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Proposition 47 also amends section 11357 of the Health and Safety Code, which is the 
marijuana counterpart of section 11350 of the Health and Safety Code as discussed above. 
Additionally, the initiative makes some format changes so that the sections will read with 
parallel structure should the initiative be passed.  
 
C. Exceptions 
 
Proposition 47 will not apply to “sex offenders or anyone with a prior violent felony 
conviction for crimes such as rape, murder, and child molestation.” 37Inmates may only be 
released if they are no longer a threat to public safety.38  
 
D. Retroactive Application 
 
In addition, Proposition 47 is retroactive, which would mean that some convicted felons 
could be resentenced and others could have their records reclassified if they petition the court.39 
An offender currently serving a sentence for one of the crimes that the initiative reclassifies as a 
misdemeanor may apply to be resentenced by the court. They would have three years to apply 
for resentencing.40  
 
Section 14 of the initiative adds section 1170.18 to the California Penal Code.41 Section 
1170.18 creates a resentencing petition process for persons who are currently serving or have 
finished serving sentences on any of the charges addressed in the initiative.  
 
Persons currently serving sentences on a conviction addressed by the initiative can 
petition to have their charge reduced to a misdemeanor and their sentence amended to match the 
guidelines set by the initiative.42 Persons who have completed a sentence on a conviction 
addressed by the initiative can petition to have their conviction reclassified as a misdemeanor.43  
 
The initiative gives the power to review petitions for resentencing to judges and creates 
an “unreasonable risk of danger”44 standard of review.45  People petitioning for resentencing 
who pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public should be denied resentencing, while 
persons who are not a threat should have their resentencing request granted.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
36 Drug possession refers to any controlled substance or narcotics that are used without a written 
prescription. Id.  
37 Id.at 70. 
38 Yes on 47 Fact Sheet, CAL. FOR SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS (July 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.safetyandschools.com.  
39 Cal. Proposition 47 at § 14(j) (2014). 
40 Id. 
41 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 73. 
42 Cal. Proposition 47 at § 14 (f) (2014). 
43 Id. 
44 See drafting issue section of this paper for more information.  
45 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 73. 
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“The court does not have to grant the resentencing if it believes that the applicant will 
likely commit one of the severe crimes specified in the measure. This option would not be 
available to those who have committed severe crimes, which include murder and certain sex and 
gun felonies. Those that are resentenced would be subject to a year of supervision on state 
parole.”46 
 
E. Other Changes Proposed by Proposition 47  
 
Proposition 47 has been titled “The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act,”47 selected to 
highlight the way the initiative mandates that the money saved through implementation of the 
initiative will be put towards K-12 schools, as well as prevention and treatment programs.48 The 
initiative has three distinct and identifiable goals.  First, it aims to ensure that prison spending is 
focused on violent and serious offenses.  Second, the initiative aims to maximize alternatives49 
for non-serious and nonviolent crimes.  Lastly, a goal of the initiative is to invest money in 
prevention and support programs in K-12 schools, invest in victim services programs, and invest 
in mental health and drug treatment programs.50  
 
Though not specifically listed as a goal of the statute, the Findings and Declaration 
Clause does ensure that sentencing requirements for dangerous crimes like rape, murder, and 
child molestation are not changed.51 
 
F. Funding Appropriation 
 
Proposition 47 creates the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Fund.  The initiative directs 
the Director Department of Finance to calculate the amount of money saved by Proposition 47.52 
That sum would then be moved from the General Fund to the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools 
Fund where it would be apportioned out to three different entities for grant programs.  
 
Ten percent of the fund would be given to the Victims Compensation and Government 
Claims Board53 to be spent on trauma recovery centers that provide services to victims of crime.  
                                                 
46 LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 47 CRIMINAL SENTENCES. MISDEMEANOR 
PENALTIES. INITIATIVE STATUTE., (July 17, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-
47-110414.pdf. 
47 THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS ACT, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. – OFF. ATT’Y GEN 
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs.  
48 See Section 4 of The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act for more information. 
49 Probation, fines, community service, work training, education courses and rehabilitation classes are 
some examples of alternatives to prison sentences.  
50 See Section 4 of The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act for more information. 
51Id.  
52 Estimates show that enacting the initiative should save $150-$250 million annually, after adjustment 
period. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 47 CRIMINAL SENTENCES. MISDEMEANOR 
PENALTIES. INITIATIVE STATUTE., (July 17, 2014), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-
47-110414.pdf. 
53 The Victims Compensation and Government Claims board runs the California Victim Compensation 
Program (CalVCP) which provides compensation for victims of violent crime. CalVCP provides eligible 
victims with reimbursement for many crime-related expenses. CalVCP funding comes from restitution 
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Twenty-five percent of the funds would go to the State Department of Education.  Those funds 
would be used by public agencies that work to decrease truancy and improve graduation rates of 
students in K-12 schools by supporting students who are at risk of dropping out and/or students 
who are victims of crime. The remaining 65 percent would go to the Board of State and 
Community Corrections54 to support mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment 
programs.  
 
Proposition 47 also requires an audit of the grant programs that are established as a result 
of the initiative every two years.  
 
Any costs that the Department of Finance may incur calculating the funds saved by the 
initiative, or running audits of the programs, would be taken out of the Safe Neighborhoods and 
Schools fund prior to it being distributed.55 Finally, the initiative mandates that no more than five 
percent of the funds awarded to any entity may be used for administrative costs.56 
 
G. Standard Sections in an Initiative 
 
Sections 15-18 in the Proposition are standard for most propositions.57 They allow the 
legislature to amend the measure so long as the amendments remain consistent with the purpose 
of the initiative.58 If one section is found to be invalid, the rest of the proposition would still be 
given effect. These sections also direct courts to look at the initiative in a broad way. Should a 
provision be challenged in court, judges are instructed to read and interpret the initiative broadly, 
in a way that makes the changes actually create the intended effect.  
 
III. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND DRAFTING ISSUES 
 
A. Sends new people to prison, while goal is to reduce prison population 
 
Proposition 47 is written in a way that creates a small subset of people who could go to 
prison on misdemeanor convictions where they would not go to prison under the current law. 
This is probably a drafting error or oversight given that a likely goal of the initiative is to reduce 
prison populations.  
 
Under current law, petty theft with no prior theft related convictions is a misdemeanor.59  
It is only when you have three or more theft related convictions that petty theft becomes a 
                                                                                                                                                             
paid by criminal offenders through fines, orders, penalty assessments and federal matching funds. See 
generally About the Board, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION PROGRAM, http://www.vcgcb.ca.gov/board/ 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2014). 
54  See generally Home, BOARD OF ST. & COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS CAL., http://www.bscc.ca.gov/ (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2014). 
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.   
58 Id. 
59 CAL. PENAL CODE § 476(a). 
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felony.60 The initiative will increase the value limit in the definition of petty theft to $950 so 
more thefts will be classified as petty thefts.  Additionally the initiative gets rid of the theft-
related convictions consideration, so no matter how many theft-related priors a person has, their 
new theft will still be a misdemeanor. These actions function to make penalties for theft less 
severe and to reduce prison time on theft convictions.  
 
However, the initiative only makes these changes for people without a “super strike” 61 
prior under Penal Code 667(e)(2)(C)(iv).  For anyone with a “super strike” prior the petty theft 
will be a wobbler, meaning it could be charged as a felony.  Then under section 1170(h)(3), a 
person who has a “super strike” must serve their felony sentence in prison. This has the effect of 
automatically sending anyone with a “super strike” prior to prison, for a misdemeanor crime.   
 
For example, imagine a person has only one prior for murder.  That person is convicted 
of shoplifting $100 in clothes from Target. Under the current law, this would be petty theft 
without any theft related prior and it would be charged as a misdemeanor.  Under Proposition 47, 
because the prior is a “super strike,” the petty theft can be charged as a felony for which the 
person will have to serve mandatory time in prison. Thus, the initiative would have sent someone 
to prison who would not have had to go otherwise, counter to its objectives.  
 
Proposition 47 has the same effect for certain controlled substance crimes. Currently, 
possession of controlled substances is a misdemeanor, regardless of a prior conviction.  The 
initiative, however, amends the current law to make possession of controlled substances a 
wobbler if the person has a “super strike” prior conviction.  Again, since section 1170(h)(3) 
requires that people with “super strike” priors have to serve their felony sentence in prison, this 
will have the effect of sending a new group of people to prison.  
 
B. Excludes some people from resentencing  
 
The initiative includes provisions on resentencing that will allow people who are 
currently serving prison sentences on convictions of crimes affected by the initiative to petition 
the court to change their felony convictions to misdemeanor convictions.62  This will have the 
effect of reducing their prison sentence.  
 
Since the language that accomplishes this only applies to a person who is, “currently 
serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would 
have been guilty of a misdemeanor under this Act,”63 it excludes anyone who is on probation 
because a grant of probation is not a sentence.64  This is most likely a drafting error or oversight 
                                                 
60 Russell Cooper & Erica Scott, Proposition 36: Three Strikes Law, Repeat Felony, Offenders, Penalties, 
CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2012), available at 
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Publications/californiaInitiativeReviewNov2012.pdf. 
61 Supra note 23 
62 THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS ACT, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. – OFF. ATT’Y GEN 
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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because a person who received a grant of probation instead of a felony sentence on the same 
crime is likely less of a threat than someone who received a prison sentence.  
 
That said, if this issue was brought into court by a felon on probation, it is likely that a 
judge would construe the initiative broadly pursuant to section 18, which says that the “act shall 
be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.” 65 Interpreting the initiative broadly may allow 
for a reclassification of the crime so long as the person in question meets the criteria but it 
remains unstated in any clear way by the text of the statute.66  
 
C. Broad use of the word “code” 
 
The initiative, in its resentencing guidelines, says, “As used throughout this Code, 
‘Unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will 
commit a new violent felony.”67  The issue here is that it says “as used throughout this Code.”  
Instead of applying the definition of unreasonable risk to just this new section, the initiative 
applies that language to the entire California Penal Code.  
 
The language, “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” is used in the code in 
section 1170.126 of the Penal Code, which sets the standards for reviewing resentencing 
petitions under Proposition 3668 (another California initiative passed in 2012). This means that 
the standard for review of Proposition 36 petitions for resentencing and the standard for 
reviewing petitions for resentencing under this initiative would become the same. 69 
 
This is likely a drafting error or oversight. Because Proposition 36 addresses the 
resentencing of “super strikes” whereas this initiative addresses the resentencing of nonviolent, 
non-serious felonies specifically excluding “Super Strike” crimes had no intention of making 
changes to Prop 36, it is likely that the drafters did not intent to make changes to the Proposition 
36 standard.  
 
 It is unknown at this time how this drafting error might be addressed.  A likely solution 
may be legislation to amend the language and differentiate the standards for reviewing petitions 
for resentencing between Proposition 36 and Proposition 47. Another may be asking a court to 
interpret the statute in a way that makes these different pursuant to Section 18 of Proposition 
47.70 
                                                 
65 Id. at 15 
66 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 74. 
67 THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS ACT, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. – OFF. ATT’Y GEN 
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs. 
68 Proposition 36 modifies elements of California's "Three Strikes" Law, which was approved by the 
state's voters in 1994. In 2004, voters rejected Proposition 66, which like the 2012 measure was an 
attempt to change some aspects of the original "Three Strikes" Law. California Proposition 36, Changes 
in the “Three Strikes” Law (2012), BALLOTPEDIA 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_36,_Changes_in_the_%22Three_Strikes%22_Law_(2012) 
(last visted Sept. 10, 2014). 
69 Cal. Penal Code § 1170.126; NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 74. 
70 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 74. 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
An initiative may be challenged on constitutional grounds. Some potential problems with 
Proposition 47 would be the effect it may have on state power, following the single-subject rule, 
and the effect on search and seizure practices. Specifically, the potential for police to make a 
warrantless arrest for crimes they did not witness and searches incident to arrest.   
 
A. State Power 
 
The Supreme Court interprets the United States Constitution as providing the federal 
government with enumerated powers.71  This means that the power has to be spelled out and 
explicitly given to the federal government.  If it is not directly spelled out in the Constitution, 
then the power resides with the states.72 This interpretation is codified in the Tenth Amendment, 
which reads, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, and to the people.” 73 
 
As such, the states retain what is referred to as “police power,” which means that the 
states have the power to make laws regarding the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.  
This initiative is well within the police power of the states and so, should not pose a 
constitutional conflict.74 The Supreme Court expressly explained that “Selecting the sentencing 
rationale is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts.”75 
 
B. Single-Subject Rule 
 
Initiatives are allowed on the ballot so long as they follow certain rules and requirements. 
One of those requirements is that an initiative may only cover a single subject.76 All of its parts 
must be reasonably germane to each other, and to the general purpose or object of the initiative.77  
 
Proposition 47 covers six different sections of the penal code, but each section that is 
affected by the initiative shares the common thread of addressing sentencing of a nonviolent 
crime. As such, the initiative may be read to cover one single subject, comprehensive criminal 
justice reform. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has allowed comprehensive criminal 
justice initiatives in the past.  These initiatives have addressed comprehensive reform of gang 
sentencing and juvenile sentencing.78   
 
Similarly, Proposition 47 addresses the single subject of reforming sentencing for some 
minor offenses so it would meet the single subject rule standard. 
  
                                                 
71 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
72 Id.  
73 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
74 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884). 
75 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003). 
76 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). 
77 Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990); Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 4th 537 (2002). 
78 Id.  
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C. Effect on Search and Seizure Practices 
 
1. Warrantless Arrest Under the Fourth Amendment 
 
While there is likely no constitutional conflict with the initiative, there might be 
constitutional implications in terms of lawful/constitutional searches and seizures. The Fourth 
Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable search and seizures.79  An arrest of a person is 
considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Every time someone is arrested, in any state, 
the conduct of that arrest must meet constitutional standards – it must be reasonable.80  
 
The Supreme Court has considered and ruled on a series of cases that have created rules 
that govern when an arrest is reasonable versus when it is unreasonable.81 In general, an arrest is 
always reasonable if the arresting officer has obtained an arrest warrant.  If the officer does not 
have an arrest warrant then the officer may only arrest in certain situations.  
 
An officer may make a warrantless arrest if the officer has probable cause82 to believe 
that the person has committed a felony and the arrest occurs in public. The officer does not have 
to witness the crime being committed.83 If the officer wishes to make a warrantless arrest of an 
individual they believe has committed a misdemeanor, they may not do so unless the officer has 
actually witnessed the misdemeanor occur and makes the arrest at that same time.84 
 
Since the initiative changes certain felonies to misdemeanors, there are constitutional 
implications for when officers will be able to perform warrantless arrests. While Proposition 47 
itself, would not change U.S. criminal procedure, the standard for seizure is broader when the 
crime is a felony versus when the crime is a misdemeanor.85  As such, recategorizing crimes 
from felonies to misdemeanors has an effect on U.S. criminal procedure even though one is 
explicitly stated in the proposition’s language. For example, under the current law an officer can 
arrest a person without a warrant for theft or drug possession. 86 Under the initiative the officer 
would have to actually see the person stealing or see the person holding drugs to make a 
warrantless arrest because those crimes will be recategorized as misdemeanors.87  
 
// 
// 
                                                 
79 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
80 The Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, so as long as the seizure is 
reasonable there is no constitutional violation.  
81 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
82 An officer has probable cause if, “whether considering the totality of the circumstances there is a fair 
probability of finding evidence of a crime at a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 
(1983). 
83 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
84 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 532 U.S. 318 (2001).  
85 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
86 Id. 
87 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 532 US 318 (2001). 
89 
 
2. Search Incident to Arrest Under the Fourth Amendment 
 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that an officer can search a person “incident to 
arrest.”88 This means that if a person is arrested, the officer can search that person without a 
search warrant simply because they are arrested.  In the Supreme Court’s view, the fact that the 
person is arrested gives the Officer probable cause, which makes the search reasonable, and 
therefore not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.89  
 
With more misdemeanors there will be less warrantless arrests, which in turn will mean 
fewer searches incident to arrest. For example, under the current law, in a situation where 
someone is reported for stealing a gun, an officer can arrest an individual who fits the description 
of the thief and is near the scene of the theft because the officer has probable cause to believe 
that person has committed a felony and the arrest is occurring in public.90  Once arrested, the 
officer can search the person.  During the search the officer may find the gun, or drugs, or other 
illegal items.  Everything recovered would be the product of a lawful and constitutional search 
and could be used as evidence in court. 91 
 
The way Proposition 47 would work with the Supreme Court’s search and seizure 
jurisprudence could mean that the reported gun theft, in the example above, is a misdemeanor, so 
the officer could only make the warrantless arrest if he actually saw the person steal it, as 
opposed to it being reported.  Since there could be no lawful arrest there could also be no search.  
The initiative categorizes the crime as a misdemeanor, so now the officer would need to request 
an arrest warrant, or search warrant, or both, depending on the situation – and a judge has to 
review and grant that request in order for the action to be constitutional.  
 
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
A. Supporting Arguments 
 
1. Consistent With Other Initiatives Recently Passed by California Voters  
 
In 2000, California voters passed the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act through 
the initiative process.92 The act permanently changed state law to allow qualifying defendants 
convicted of non-violent drug possession offenses to receive a probationary sentence in lieu of 
going to prison. As a condition of probation, defendants are required to participate in and 
complete a licensed and/or certified community drug treatment program93. If the defendant fails 
                                                 
88 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). 
89 Id. at 346. 
90 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
91 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346 (2009). 
92 Proposition 36 Official Title: Drugs. Probation and Treatment Program, CAL. VOTER FOUND., 
http://www.calvoter.org/voter/elections/archive/2000/general/propositions/36.html (last visited Oct. 4, 
2014). 
93 California Proposition 36, Probation and Treatment for Related Offences (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_36,_Probation_and_Treatment_for_Drug-
Related_Offenses_%282000%29 (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). 
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to complete this program or violates any other term or condition of their probation, then 
probation can be revoked and the defendant may be required to serve an additional sentence 
which may include going to prison.94 The focus of the act is putting rehabilitation over prison. 
 
The current initiative shares the same goals; it focuses on decriminalizing drug 
possession and sentencing people found in possession of illegal substances in a way that 
promotes rehabilitation.  In addition, it funnels money to mental health and substance abuse 
rehabilitation programs.95  
 
In the last cycle of propositions in 2012, the voters of California also passed Proposition 
36, which was an initiative to amend the three strikes law.96 This was separate and different from 
the Proposition 36 passed in 2000. 
 
The initiative, which passed with almost 70 percent of the vote, focused on revising the 
three strikes law to impose life sentences only when the new felony conviction is serious or 
violent.  It also authorized re-sentencing for offenders currently serving life sentences if their 
third strike was not serious or violent and the judge determined that the re-sentencing would not 
pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.97  
 
In this way, this initiative is complementary to Proposition 36 of 2012.  Both focus on 
reducing prison sentences and have resentencing provisions. Additionally, both are focused on 
maintaining sentences for felons with convictions for murder, rape, or child molestation, 
ensuring that it is only nonviolent and non-serious crimes that are affected.  
 
2. Will Help California Meet the United States Supreme Court Ruling to Reduce 
Prison Populations 
 
In 2009, a three-judge panel issued an injunction mandating that California reduce its 
prison population.98 The panel ruled that the prisons were operating with unconstitutionally poor 
care for mental and physically ill inmates.99  At the time of the ruling, the problem was not new. 
The original case actually grew out of a series of lawsuits on the same subject, prison conditions, 
dating back twenty years.100  
                                                 
94 Id.   
95 THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS ACT, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. – OFF. ATT’Y GEN 
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs.  
96 Russell Cooper & Erica Scott, Proposition 36: Three Strikes Law, Repeat Felony, Offenders, Penalties, 
CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2012), available at 
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Publications/californiaInitiativeReviewNov2012.pdf. 
97 California Proposition 36, Probation and Treatment for Related Offences (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_36,_Probation_and_Treatment_for_Drug-
Related_Offenses_%282000%29 (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). 
98 Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910 (2011). 
99 Id. 
100 Some of the conditions overcrowding at more than 144%, suicidal inmates being held in telephone-
booth sized cages with no toilets, inmates living in makeshift housing in gymnasiums and other common 
areas, inmates sleeping on bunk beds stacked three people high, prison doctors conducting examination in 
shower or bathroom stalls, lack of running water, and medical examinations in full view of other inmates. 
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The case was appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.  In 2011, in a 5-4 decision, the 
Supreme Court declared “A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including 
adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in 
civilized society.”101,102 
 
Since then, California has worked to reduce its prison population by moving inmates 
from prison to county jails, or putting them in private for profit prisons in other states.103 These 
efforts have helped to meet the Supreme Court’s mandate but have not fully accomplished it.104 
Just this year, another three-judge panel reviewed California’s efforts and agreed to extend the 
deadline for meeting the Supreme Court’s mandate to 2016.105   
 
Proposition 47 will allow people currently serving sentences in prisons to apply for 
resentencing making their prison sentence shorter.106  Additionally, it changes the way we 
sentence nonviolent, non-serious crimes so that people who are committing thefts or are charged 
with drug possession are not taking up beds in our prison system, where the most dangerous of 
criminals belong.  
 
3. Will Save Taxpayers Money 
 
California is currently spending about $235 million dollars to house prisoners out of 
state.107 The initiative will reduce the amount of people in prison by approximately 10,000 
within the first three years,108 meaning the state will have less need to house prisoners in for 
profit out of state prisons.  
 
The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) has reviewed the state’s plan to meet the 
Supreme Court’s mandate, which includes contracting for out of state prison beds, and has found 
                                                                                                                                                             
See generally Heather MacDonald, California’s Prison-Litigation Nightmare, CITY JOURNAL (Autumn 
2013), http://www.city-journal.org/2013/23_4_california-prisons.html. 
101 Brown v. Plata 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).  
102 Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority while Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the 
dissent.  Both opinions used passionate language, revealing a sharp divide between the Justices.  Scalia 
called the ruling “perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our nation’s history” and argued 
that it would lead to the release of a “staggering number “of felons. Brown v. Plata 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1950 
(2011). 
103 Capacity Challenges in California’s Jails, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication_quick.asp?i=1034 . 
104 Associated Press, California Gets Two More Years to Cut Prison Numbers, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 
2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/10/california-prison-numbers/5369333/. 
105 THE 2014–2015 BUDGET: ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO PRISON OVERCROWDING ORDER, 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (February 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/budget/three-judge-panel/three-judge-panel-022814.aspx. 
106 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 73. 
107 Id.  
108 California Proposition 47, Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_47,_Reduced_Penalties_for_Some_Crimes_Initiative_(2014
) (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).   
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that it will likely “achieve compliance in the short run, but is costly and less certain in the long 
run.”109 This initiative is a step towards actually addressing the issue, in a long term and 
sustainable way, as oppose to paying to move the issue out of state.  
 
The initiative is in line with the LAO’s suggestion to increase rehabilitation programs, to 
incentivize the state and counties to reduce prison population, and to focus on long-term 
compliance.  In fact, the LAO recommends reclassifying certain misdemeanors, felonies, and 
wobblers as misdemeanors, which is exactly what the initiative does.110 
 
In addition, lawsuits over prison conditions cost the taxpayers money. The California 
Department for Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) legal team is funded by tax dollars. 
When prisoners challenge prison conditions and bring lawsuits against CDCR they have a right 
to counsel.111 In most cases private counsel represent them and are paid for their work by tax 
dollars, not by the prisoners themselves. In practice, taxpayers are funding both sides of the 
lawsuit. 
 
In the case of the redistricting, the expense is astronomical.112 The law suits spread out 
over twenty years, culminating in a Supreme Court ruling in 2011. Even after the ruling, legal 
bills did not cease because each order was preceded by a furious exchange of motions and was 
followed by more motions over compliance. From 1997 to 2009 alone, excluding payments to 
experts, prison-overcrowding litigation cost taxpayers $38 million.113 
 
The initiative puts fewer people in prison, meaning the state is more likely to stay 
compliant with the injunction. Therefore the state can expect to see a reduction in prison 
condition based lawsuits all together.  
 
4. Dedicates Hundreds of Millions of Dollars to Good Causes  
 
The objective and nonpartisan LAO studied the initiative and concluded that it would 
save “hundreds of millions of dollars annually.”114 The money that is saved by the initiative will 
be spent in three areas.  
 
                                                 
109 THE 2014–2015 BUDGET: ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO PRISON OVERCROWDING ORDER, 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (February 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/budget/three-judge-panel/three-judge-panel-022814.aspx. 
110 Id.   
111 Don Thompson, California Inmate Lawsuits Cost State $200 Million, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/11/california-inmate-lawsuits_n_2661250.html. 
112 In a review of California’s prison litigation history, investigative journalist, Heather Mac Donald wrote 
for the City Journal, “California has long been the epicenter of prison litigation, but for cataclysmic force 
and sheer staying power, nothing beats two massive and now inextricably intertwined class-action 
lawsuits.” Heather MacDonald, California’s Prison-Litigation Nightmare, CITY JOURNAL (Autumn 
2013), http://www.city-journal.org/2013/23_4_california-prisons.html. 
113 See generally id. 
114 THE 2014–2015 BUDGET: ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO PRISON OVERCROWDING ORDER, 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (February 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/budget/three-judge-panel/three-judge-panel-022814.aspx. 
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First, 65 percent of funds will go to mental health and substance abuse rehabilitation 
programs through the Board of State and Community Corrections.115  Then 25 percent of funds 
will be used for grants targeting reducing truancy, dropping out of school, and making sure that 
children who are victims of crimes receive the help and attention they need.116  The funds will go 
through the California Department of Education.  Lastly, the Victims Compensation and 
Government Claims Board will receive the remaining ten percent to be spent on improving 
victim services.117  
 
The money is allocated in a way that is focused on preventing criminal activity at 
different stages.  The money will be used to help students stay in school because education 
reduces crime, to help people who have mental health or drug problems so that they can live 
crime free lives, and to support victims of crime.  
 
5. Works With Proposition 98 to Increase Funding to Schools Beyond the Allocated 
25% of Saved Funds to the California Department of Education  
 
California Proposition 98, also called the "Classroom Instructional Improvement and 
Accountability Act," passed in 1988, requires a minimum percentage of the state budget to be 
spent on K-12 education and guarantees an annual increase in funding for K-12 education in the 
California budget.  The proposition amended the California Constitution to mandate a minimum 
level of education spending based on three tests.118  
 
Test one, used only from 1988 to 1989, requires spending on education to make up at 
least 39% of the state budget. The second test, used in years of strong economic growth, requires 
spending on education to equal the previous years spending plus per capita growth and student 
enrollment adjustment. The final test, used in years of weak economic growth guarantees prior 
years spending plus adjustment for enrollment growth, increases for any changes in per capita 
general fund revenues, and an increase by 0.5 percent in state general funds.119 
 
Proposition 47 takes all of the funds saved by its implementation and directs them to the 
general fund.120  This means that the total amount of money saved, which is estimated to be in 
the hundreds of millions of dollars,121 will be considered as part of the general fund when the 
legislature conducts the Proposition 98 tests and awards funds, increasing the amount of money 
awarded to K-12 education through Proposition 98.  
 
                                                 
115 PROPOSITION 98 SETS MINIMUM FUNDING GUARANTEE FOR EDUCATION, EDUC. SOURCE, POLICY 
BRIEF (March 2009), available at 
http://www.cta.org/~/media/Documents/Issues%20%20Action/School%20Funding/EdSource%20Prop%2
098%20Primer%20Updated%20309.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20141026T1752520188.  
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE REPORT (2014), supra note 4. 
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Then after these calculations are made, 25 percent of the funds are sent directly to the 
California Department of Education for grants as outlined in the initiative. Essentially, 
Proposition 47 gives two increases of funds to K-12 education.  
 
Increasing spending on education and decreasing spending on prisons is consistent with 
budget recommendations from the LAO.  
 
6. Increases Eligibility for Government Assistance Programs 
 
Access to various government assistance programs can be limited based on prior felony 
convictions or drug convictions. Should Proposition 47 pass, more people would be convicted of 
misdemeanors instead of felonies, making them eligible to receive state aid for food and work 
programs. Although exact numbers at this time are not known, any increase in eligible 
population could mean an increase in costs to these programs.122 This could be seen as an 
argument for either side depending on political beliefs of the voter.  
 
B. Opposing Arguments  
 
1. Allows Criminals to Own Guns 
 
When a person is convicted of a felony, his or her sentence includes a prohibition on 
owning a gun.123  Misdemeanors do not have the same requirement. The initiative makes several 
crimes that were charged as felonies into misdemeanors.  This has the effect of allowing people, 
who under current law would be prohibited from gun ownership, to legally own guns.  
 
2. Stealing a Gun Becomes a Misdemeanor  
 
Currently, under section 478(d)(2) of the Penal Code stealing a gun is a felony because of 
the nature of the item being stolen.124 Anytime a gun is stolen no matter what the value of the 
gun, it is automatically charged as a felony. 125 The initiative refocuses the line between theft 
misdemeanors and theft felonies126 on the value of the item rather than the type of item stolen. 
Under the initiative anything, or combination of things, stolen with a value of less than $950 
would be charged as a misdemeanor.127  
 
Because most handguns cost less than $950, stealing a gun would be a misdemeanor and 
classified as a petty theft as oppose to a grand theft.128  
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 CAL. PENAL CODE, Ch. 12 – Punishments. 
124 CAL. PENAL CODE § 478 
125 Id. 
126 A misdemeanor theft is also called petty theft, while a felony theft is also called grand theft. Michael 
Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1996-1997).  
127 THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS ACT, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. – OFF. ATT’Y GEN 
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs.  
128 Op-Ed Jan Scully, Scott Jones & Chris Boyd. Prop 47 Would Turn Criminals Loose, SACRAMENTO 
BEE (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/2014/10/03/6753330/viewpoints-prop-47-would-turn.html.  
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To this end, opponents have said, “Current law provides that stealing a firearm is a 
felony. Every handgun is worth less than $950. This measure opens the door for people who are 
going to steal a firearm for crime. If I’m going to steal a gun, I’m not going to steal it for my 
collection. I’m going to steal it to commit a crime.”129 Additionally, because there is no 
enhancement for repeat offenses under the initiative a person could steal guns repeatedly and still 
be consistently charged with a misdemeanor.  
 
Opponents argue that this result is counter to the initiative’s promise to “ensure that 
prison spending is focused on violent and serious offenses,”130 since gun theft is likely to result 
in violent and serious offenses.  
 
3. Negative Effect for Counties With Agricultural Communities  
 
Currently, under 487(b)(1) of the Penal Code,  stealing agricultural crops and livestock is 
a wobbler.  This means that the court can consider what the items stolen are, what their value is, 
and the conditions under which they were taken.   
 
If the crops are valued at more than $250 then the crime can be charged as grand theft 
instead of petty theft. The current law makes this exception because of the type of item, similar 
to how the current law makes an exception for guns as discussed above.  
 
Since the initiative fails to consider the type of item stolen and focuses only on the value 
of the item, the initiative could have a negative effect for agriculturally heavy counties. The 
initiative would change the law so that any theft of agriculturally related items would have to 
have a value of $950 before it could be charged a grand theft.  
 
Similarly, 487a makes theft of horses, cows, pigs and sheep grand theft regardless of the 
value of the animals, but under the initiative it would become petty theft unless the value 
exceeded $950.  
 
4. Potential Problems for Victims of Sexual Assault 
 
Under current law, possession of most controlled substances can be charged either as a 
misdemeanor or a felony. Proposition 47 makes it a mandatory misdemeanor if someone is found 
in possession of drugs, including GHB and Rohypnol, common date rape drugs.131  
 
According to John Lovell, the Government Relations Manager for the California Police 
Chiefs Association who is the opposition to the proposition, “There is a cavalier disregard for 
sexual assault victims. It takes possession of drugs used to facilitate sexual assault, date rape 
                                                 
129 Interview with John Lovell, Government Relations Manager, California Police Chiefs Association 
(Sept. 9, 2014) (Notes on file with California Initiative Review).  
130 THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS ACT, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. – OFF. ATT’Y GEN 
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs. 
131 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 3, at 72–73. 
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drugs, and it makes it a misdemeanor no matter how many times the criminal is caught with the 
drugs in his possession.”132 
 
5. There is a Disincentive to Seek Drug Treatment 
 
Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, was passed by a 
majority of voters in the state.133 It changed state law to allow those convicted of non-violent 
drug possession to choose to participate in a drug treatment program instead of serving a prison 
sentence.134 Any felony conviction that they had would fall away upon completion of the 
treatment program.  
 
Opponents believe that Proposition 47 will encourage those who are charged to plead out 
and never seek treatment because they will not be eligible to serve serious prison time.135 “It 
disincentivizes anybody convicted of a drug offense from even wanting to seek treatment,” said 
Lovell.136  
 
C. Funding Information  
 
Funding for the initiative has come from two main sources.  Charles Feeney, a 
businessman who made a $7.5 billion fortune establishing duty free shops in airports and B. 
Wayne Hughes, another businessman who made his $3.5 billion fortune as the CEO of Public 
Storage.  Feeney has contributed $600,000 to the initiative while Hughes has donated $250,000.  
 
As of October 1, 2014, proponents of the initiative have raised $3.5 million in support 
which included the donations from Feeney and Hughes.137  Of the amount raised, $938,000 was 
spent on collecting signatures. 138 
 
As of July of this year the registered supporters for the initiative were the San Francisco 
District Attorney George Gascon, the Humbolt County District Attorney Paul Gallegos, San 
Diego Police Chief (Retired) Bill Landsdowne, and the Crime Survivors for Safety and Justice 
group.139 
                                                 
132 Interview with John Lovell, Government Relations Manager, California Police Chiefs Association 
(Sept. 9, 2014) (Notes on file with California Initiative Review).  
133 Proposition 36 Official Title: Drugs. Probation and Treatment Program, CAL. VOTER FOUND., 
http://www.calvoter.org/voter/elections/archive/2000/general/propositions/36.html (last visited Oct. 4, 
2014). 
134 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1210, 3063.1. 
135 Interview with John Lovell, Government Relations Manager, California Police Chiefs Association 
(Sept. 9, 2014) (Notes on file with California Initiative Review). 
136 Id.  
137 California Proposition 47, Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_47,_Reduced_Penalties_for_Some_Crimes_Initiative_(2014
) (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).   
138 Id. 
139 Rapper Jay-Z (real name Shawn Carter) is also a supporter of Proposition 47. Jay Z is no stranger to 
the politics game. In fact, he’s quite skilled in blurring the lines and using hip-hop as a vehicle to spread 
political messages. From his widely public support of President Obama to using his On The Run Tour 
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Funding for the opposition of the initiative has come from one main source and has been 
supplemented by a few additional sources. The funding for opposition has overwhelmingly come 
from the California State Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police Issues Committee.140 In addition, 
the California Police Chiefs Association and LACPPOA Special Issues Committee have each 
donated $5,000 while the California Peace Officers Association has donated $4,500 and the 
California Correctional Supervisors Organization has donated $3,000.141 In total, the opposition 
has raised $43,500 under the Californians Against Prop. 47, Sponsored by California Public 
Safety Institute.142 
 
As of the same time the registered opposition included California Coalition Against 
Sexual Assault, California District Attorney Association, California Fraternal Order of Police, 
California Grocers Association, California Narcotics Officers Association, California Peace 
Officers Association, California Police Chiefs Association, California Retailers Association, 
California State Sheriffs Association, Crime Victims Action Alliance, and Crime Victims 
United.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
  
Proposition 47 would change six offenses from crimes that could be felonies to crimes 
that are mandatory misdemeanors. Those with a criminal history of serious or violent offenses 
would not be eligible to take advantage of the change in law.143 The change would likely release 
10,000 current inmates due to resentencing.144 Due to this release, costs would increase for the 
courts and parole system for the next few years.145 However, after the initial three years, these 
costs would fall below the costs now being incurred. Proposition 47 would also likely decrease 
the prison population by a few thousand people annually in the future.146 The state would save 
between $150 and $200 million a year in prison costs, which would be distributed by grant to 
                                                                                                                                                             
stage Aug 3 at the Rose Bowl in California to support Proposition 47. During his “Hard Knock Life” 
performance, Jay took a moment to voice his support for building “more schools, less prisons.” (See 
generally Nicole Hardesty, Jay Z Champions “Less Prisons, More Schools” On Stage In California, 
URBAN DAILY (Aug. 5, 2014), http://theurbandaily.com/2014/08/05/jay-z-supports-proposition-47-
california/.  
140 California Ballot Measures, VOTER’S EDGE, http://votersedge.org/california/ballot-
measures/2014/november/prop-47?jurisdictions=28.1.28-upper-ca.28.28-upper-
ca&state=CA#.VDHREdF0yP-, (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
141 California Proposition 47, Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_47,_Reduced_Penalties_for_Some_Crimes_Initiative_(2014
) (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).   
142 Id.  
143 THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS ACT, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. – OFF. ATT’Y GEN 
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs. 
144 Interview with John Lovell, Government Relations Manager, California Police Chiefs Association 
(Sept. 9, 2014) (Notes on file with California Initiative Review). 
145 FISCAL IMPACT ESTIMATE REPORT (2014), supra note 4. 
146 Id. 
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truancy prevention (25%), victim compensation (10%), and mental health and substance abuse 
treatment programs (65%).147  
 
                                                 
147 THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS ACT, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST. – OFF. ATT’Y GEN 
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs. 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Indian gaming has enabled some California Indian tribes to rise from abject poverty and 
political disenfranchisement to being one of the most influential interest groups in the state with 
large tribal government offices and large per capita payments to tribal members.1 However, not 
all tribes have benefited equally from Indian gaming, with unemployment and government 
dependency still high on the reservations of many non-gaming tribes.2 As a result, many tribes 
are looking outside their existing reservations to identify ways to take advantage of all the 
benefits Indian gaming has created for other tribes.3 Proposition 48 would, for the first time in 
California, approve an agreement between an Indian tribe and the State that would permit the 
tribe to operate a casino off of the tribe’s existing reservation.4 
 
Indian gaming in California is regulated by a combination of federal and state laws. At 
the federal level, Indian gaming is governed by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).5 At 
the state level, California voters amended the California Constitution in 2000 to authorize Indian 
tribes to operate “Las Vegas-style” casinos featuring slot machines and house-banked card 
games6 on Indian reservations throughout the state.7 This amendment authorized the governor to 
negotiate compacts8 with tribes, subject to ratification by the Legislature, governing gaming 
                                                 
1 JAY MICHAEL & DAN WALTERS WITH DAN WEINTRAUB, THE THIRD HOUSE: LOBBYISTS, MONEY, AND 
POWER IN SACRAMENTO 57–59 (2001). 
2 Alison Owings, Op-Ed, The Ka-Ching Doesn't Ring for Everyone / Indian Casinos are Thriving but 
They Haven't Made Most Indians Wealthy, and They Can't Solve the Myriad Problems that Exist on 
Reservations, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 11, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/The-ka-ching-
doesn-t-ring-for-everyone-Indian-2618214.php.  
3 See Controversial Applications in Process, STAND UP FOR CAL.!, http://www.standupca.org/off-
reservation-gaming/contraversial-applications-in-process (last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (listing dozens of 
proposals by tribes to acquire new land for economic development). 
4 Greg Lucas, State’s First Off-Reservation Tribal Casino Poised for OK, CAPITOL WEEKLY (June 24, 
2013), http://capitolweekly.net/states-first-reservation-tribal-casino-poised-ok/ (describing the impacts of 
the underlying statute that is subject to a referendum by Proposition 48). The tribe in this case though 
takes the position that the casino is not “off-reservation” because the tribe followed the “rule and letter of 
the law” in obtaining additional reservation land for its casino. Facts vs. Faction: The North Fork 
Rancheria Project – Fact Sheet, NORTH FORK RANCHERIA (Jan. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.northforkrancheria.com/files/NFR%20Project%20Fact%20vs%20Fiction%203_0312121.pdf.     
5 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721. See supra Part II. A. for more 
information on IGRA. 
6 House-banked game is defined in the California Penal Code and is distinguishable from a nonhouse-
banked game because the house occupies the role of the banker rather than players betting against each 
other. CAL. PENAL CODE § 330.11.; see also Sullivan v. Fox, 189 Cal. App. 3d 673, 678 (1987) (“Banking 
game has come to have a fixed and accepted meaning: the ‘house’ or ‘bank’ is a participant in the game, 
taking on all comers, paying all winners, and collecting from all losers.”). Blackjack and Baccarat are 
common examples of house-banked games and IGRA defines this type of game as class III gaming. 25 
U.S.C. § 2703(8).    
7 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2000, at 4–5, available at 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2000/primary/pdf/2000ballot1.pdf.   
8 A compact, or tribal-state gaming compact, is an intergovernmental agreement between a tribe and State 
governing the conduct of gaming activities. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
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operations at tribal casinos in 
accordance with federal 
law.9 California has 
negotiated and ratified 
compacts with seventy-one 
Indian tribes;10 as of 2014 
there are sixty casinos 
operated by fifty-eight tribes 
throughout the state.11 
 
Proposition 48 is a 
referendum on the 
Legislature’s ratification of a 
compact between the North 
Fork Rancheria of Mono 
Indians (the North Fork 
Tribe) and the State of 
California.12 The North Fork 
Tribe is a federally-
recognized Indian tribe with 
its original reservation and 
government headquarters 
located in North Fork, California.13 While this land is eligible for gaming,14 Proposition 48 
would authorize the North Fork Tribe to build and operate a casino in a more lucrative location 
off of Highway 99 near Madera, California, thirty-six miles away from its reservation.15 
Proposition 48 would also ratify a tribal-state gaming agreement with the Wiyot Tribe, which has 
                                                 
9 CAL. CONST. art. IV § 19(f). 
10 The North Fork and Wiyot Compacts are not included in this total. 
11 Ratified Tribal-State Gaming Compacts (New and Amended), CAL. GAMBLING CONTROL COMMISSION, 
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/?pageID=compacts (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
12 See Figure 1 for proposed location of the North Fork Casino in relation to other casinos and cities. 
Figure 1 courtesy of the November 2014 Voter Guide. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER 
INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, TUESDAY NOVEMBER 4, 2014, at 43, available 
at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf#page=74 [“NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER 
GUIDE”].   
13 Tribal Offices, NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO INDIANS, 
http://www.northforkrancheria.com/page.cfm?pageID=55 (last visited Aug. 24, 2014). 
14 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION: TRUST ACQUISITION OF THE 305.49-ACRE 
MADERA SITE IN MADERA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, FOR THE NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO INDIANS 
§ 2.1.3 (2012), available at http://www.northforkeis.com/documents/rod/ROD.pdf (explaining the 
original rancheria is technically eligible for gaming under IGRA but that the land is held in trust for 
individual tribal members rather than the tribe, the land is steep and remote, and there would be 
significant community opposition to building a casino there). 
15 Letter from Larry Echohawk, Assistant Sec’y – Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Edmund G. 
Brown, Jr., Governor, State of Cal. at 6 (Sept. 1, 2011). 
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agreed to abstain from pursuing gaming activities on its eighty-eight-acre reservation near the 
Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge in exchange for payments from the North Fork Tribe.16  
Influential elected officials and organizations are on both sides of Proposition 48.17 Proponents 
of Proposition 48 contend the North Fork Tribe followed a procedure provided in federal law to 
acquire the land and a casino will allow the North Fork Tribe to be self-sufficient and bring 
thousands of jobs to a region with high poverty and unemployment. Opponents argue that the 
North Fork Compact breaks promises that Indian tribes made in 2000 to limit gaming to existing 
reservations. Both proponents and opponents of Proposition 48 are financially supported by out-
of-state gaming interests whose genuine concerns for the welfare of Indian tribes, the California 
economy, and environmental impacts are questionable.18 
 
California law requires the governor to develop the substance of a tribal-state gaming 
compact, and thus the Legislature is precluded from amending the compact terms when it ratifies 
the compact with a statute. As a result, a statute ratifying a tribal-state gaming compact is 
distinguishable from other statutes. Should Proposition 48 fail, the North Fork Tribe will 
undoubtedly seek legal relief and argue that the North Fork Compact should not have been 
subject to a referendum.  
 
In addition to whether a compact can be the subject of a referendum, there are also other 
provisions in IGRA that could provide causes of action for the North Fork Tribe to secure a 
compact—and thus a lucrative casino—regardless of the outcome of Proposition 48.19 Some 
commentators have even suggested that in light of the Legislature’s authority to amend or repeal 
referendum statutes,20 rejecting Proposition 48 would simply result in the governor and the North 
Fork Tribe negotiating a new compact for the Legislature to ratify.21 However, this simple 
                                                 
16 TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE WIYOT TRIBE (2012), 
available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Wiyot_Compact.pdf [“WIYOT COMPACT”]. 
17 For a detailed list of the proponents and opponents of Proposition 48 see infra notes 149 and 175.  
18 The YES campaign is largely funded by Station Casinos LLC of Las Vegas and the NO campaign is 
largely supported by Wall Street banks with an interest in a casino that would compete with the North 
Fork Casino. Campaign Finance: YES On Prop. 48. – All Contributions Received, CAL. SECRETARY ST., 
http://cal-
access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1359411&session=2013&view=received (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014) (listing Station Casinos LLC as a major source of funding); Campaign Finance: 
NO On Prop. 48. – All Contributions Received, CAL. SECRETARY ST. http://cal-
access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1359207&session=2013&view=received (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014) (listing Brigade Capital Management, LLC and affiliated entities as major 
contributors). 
19 Infra Part IV. B, C (explaining two possible methods through IGRA that could provide for a valid 
compact).   
20 CAL. CONST. art. II § 10(c) (“The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes.”). 
21 See Omid Shabani & Daniel Reid, Proposition 94, 95, 96, 97: Referenda on Amendment to Indian 
Gaming Compact, CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2008) available at 
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Publications/2008ReferendaonAmendmenttoIndianGamingCompa
ct.pdf (contending that voter rejection of tribal-state gaming compacts in 2008 would send the tribes and 
State “back to the negotiating table”). However, while courts have not considered the issue in the context 
of a referendum, courts are cautious about allowing the Legislature to contradict the will of California 
voters. See In re Estate of Claeyssens, 161 Cal. App. 4th 465, 471 (2008) (repealing a legislatively-
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solution of ratifying a newly-negotiated compact in 2015 seems unlikely given the political 
consequences of reversing the will of California voters with a statute that barely passed in the 
Assembly by one vote and then only after reconsideration was granted.22 
 
Even if voters approve Proposition 48, the opponents of the North Fork Compact still 
have several opportunities to challenge the North Fork Casino.23 As a result, no matter what 
happens in November, Proposition 48 will likely not be the end of the story for the North Fork 
Tribe and its proposed casino. It will be just the latest chapter in California’s history of Indian 
gaming.  
 
II. THE LAW 
 
A. Brief History of Indian Gaming in California 
 
Modern Indian gaming in California has its roots in the early 1970s when the Rincon 
Band of Mission Indians adopted a tribal ordinance authorizing the establishment of a card room 
on the tribe’s 3500-acre reservation in eastern San Diego County.24 Fearing the reservation 
would become a “little Las Vegas,” San Diego County officials sued in federal court arguing that 
the card room violated the County’s gambling ordinance.25 The district court found that the 
County had jurisdiction over the reservation, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision on appeal in a 2-1 decision.26  
 
Throughout the 1970s and 80s other tribes in California opened small card rooms and 
bingo halls, including the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians in Riverside County. With local law 
enforcement and state officials looking for guidance on regulating these gaming operations, the 
Supreme Court defended the sovereign right of Indian tribes to govern themselves and the 
activities on their land in Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside in 1986.27 The 
court held that local and state governments did not have jurisdiction to enforce their gambling 
laws on Indian reservations in California.28  
                                                                                                                                                             
enacted statute that conflicted with a voter-enacted statute and stating that “[a]ny doubts should be 
resolved in favor of the initiative and referendum power, and amendments that may conflict with the 
subject matter of initiative measures must be accomplished by popular vote, as opposed to legislatively 
enacted ordinance, where the original initiative does not provide otherwise”). 
22 Complete Bill History of AB 277, http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014). Additionally, Senate President Pro Tem Elect Kevin de León is not likely to 
support another compact for the North Fork Tribe after urging Governor Brown to stop submitting 
compacts for off-reservation casinos to the Legislature until a proper policy could be developed. Letter 
from Kevin de León, Senator, Cal. State Senate, to Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor, State of Cal. (July 
29, 2013).  
23 Infra Part IV. D (describing the ongoing legal challenges to the North Fork Compact). 
24 Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. San Diego Cnty., 324 F. Supp. 371, 373 (S.D. Cal. 1971) rev'd, 495 
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974). 
25 Id.  
26 Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. San Diego Cnty., 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing on a 
procedural error after finding the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case).  
27 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
28 Id. at 221–22.  
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In response to the Cabazon decision, Congress passed IGRA in 1988 and created a 
framework for the regulation of Indian gaming throughout the United States.29 Under IGRA, 
tribes have a right to conduct gaming on Indian land30 to the extent permissible under state law 
and states have an obligation to negotiate compacts in good faith with Indian tribes governing the 
proposed gaming activities.31  
 
Following Congress’ enactment of IGRA, many California tribes operated gaming 
establishments largely unregulated for several years. California Governor Pete Wilson asserted 
the state’s interest to regulate gaming under IGRA in 1998 when he negotiated the first tribal-
state gaming compacts with several California Indian tribes.32 The compacts, known as the Pala 
Compacts, strongly favored state interests, but eleven tribes joined to support the compacts in 
exchange for the right to operate Las Vegas-style casinos in California.33   
Other California tribes opposed the Pala Compacts, claiming that the compacts infringed on 
tribal sovereignty34 due to the burdensome conditions imposed on tribes.35 These tribes collected 
signatures to place Proposition 5 on the ballot in November 1998 to establish a compact process 
more favorable to tribal interests than the Pala Compacts.  Accordingly, Proposition 5 sought to 
enact a statute allowing tribes to play a more active role in negotiating the terms of their 
compacts than under the Pala Compacts.36  
 
Proposition 5 was the most expensive initiative campaign ever at the time,37 which 
included well-funded opposition from Nevada casino corporations including the same Station 
Casinos involved in Proposition 48 in 2014.38 Voters passed Proposition 5,39 but the California 
                                                 
29 25 U.S.C. § 2702. 
30 Defined in IGRA section 2703(4) as: “(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and 
(B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or 
individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against 
alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.”  
31 Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1994) opinion 
amended on denial of reh’g, 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996). 
32 Aaron Peardon, Jackpot! A Legal History of Indian Gaming in California at 124 (May 2011) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas). 
33 Id. at 127.  
34 The concept of tribal sovereignty recognizes that Indian tribes are dependent sovereign nations, with 
distinct political communities, although they are under the “protection and dominion of the United 
States.” Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown, No. C074506, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 864, 
at *22 n.6 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Sept. 24, 2014).  
35 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1998, at 22–23, available 
at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1998g.pdf.  
36 See id. at 20–21. 
37 Michelle DeArmond, Indian Tribes Take Early Lead in Ballot Initiative Battle Over Tribal Casinos, 
LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 3, 1998, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/1998/nov/03/indian-tribes-take-early-
lead-in-ballot-initiative/. 
38 List of Contributions Received in Support of Proposition 5: Tribal-State Gaming Compacts, CAL. 
SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/bmgeneral98/prop5.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
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Supreme Court invalidated most of the statute holding that it conflicted with the California 
Constitution’s prohibition against “Las Vegas-style” casinos.40  
 
Following the court’s invalidation of Proposition 5, California voters amended the state’s 
constitution in March of 200041 through Proposition 1A.42 Amending the constitution addressed 
Proposition 5’s conflict with the constitution by creating an exception in the constitution itself 
allowing for Indian gaming.43 Proposition 1A also resulted in the approval of gaming compacts 
with fifty-seven tribes that the Legislature had ratified and governor negotiated, but which 
required the constitutional change to be effective.44  
 
The March 2000 ballot also contained a referendum on the eleven Pala Compacts, which 
the Legislature had ratified and compact opponents sought to reverse.45 While voters approved 
Proposition 29 53.1 percent to 46.9 percent,46 voters more strongly supported Proposition 1A 
64.5 percent to 35.5 percent.47 As a result, the eleven compacts approved by Proposition 29 were 
superfluous in light of the constitutional amendment in Proposition 1A and the compacts 
previously negotiated under the terms of Proposition 1A prevailed.48  
 
The years that followed saw a dramatic expansion of Indian gaming in California. In 
2008, voters supported the Legislature’s ratification of gaming compacts with four Indian tribes 
through the referendum process.49 The referenda allowed each tribe to significantly increase the 
number of slot machines at its casino.50 Today there are approximately 63,835 slot machines in 
                                                                                                                                                             
39 62.4 percent in support and 37.6 percent against. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE: 
GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 3, 1998, at 85, available at 
http://vote98.sos.ca.gov/Final/sov/SOV98.pdf. 
40 Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 21 Cal. 4th 585, 615 (1999). The court found 
one portion, the portion waiving the state’s sovereign immunity, was still valid. See infra Part IV. C.   
41 Prior to the passage of SB 202 (Chapter 558, Statutes of 2011), referendum and initiatives could be 
presented to the voters at the primary or general election. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 
202, at 1 (Sept. 9, 2011). After July of 2011 referendum and initiatives can only be placed on the ballot 
for the general election. Id. at 2. 
42 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2000, at 4, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2000/primary/pdf/2000ballot1.pdf.   
43 Id. 
44 The fifty-seven tribes included the eleven tribes that also had signed the Pala Compacts. Id. 
45 Id. at 78.  
46 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE: PRIMARY ELECTION MARCH 7, 2000, at 161, 
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000-primary/sov-complete.pdf. 
47 Id. at 146.  
48 CAL. CONST. art. II § 10(b) (“If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the same election 
conflict, those of the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail.”). 
49 Propositions 94, 95, 96, 97. The measures passed by near identical margins with Propositions 94 and 95 
getting 55.6 percent of the vote and propositions 96 and 97 getting 55.5 percent. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
STATEMENT OF THE VOTE: PRIMARY ELECTION FEB. 5, 2008, at 62, 65 available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-primary/2008-sov.pdf. 
50 Propositions 96 and 97 allowed the Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation and Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians to increase from 2000 to up to 5000 machines and propositions 94 and 95 allowed the 
Pechanga Band of Luiseño Mission Indians and Morongo Band of Mission Indians to increase from 2000 
to up to 7500 slot machines. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 
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the state51 with the largest casino operating 4900 machines at Pechanga Resort & Casino in 
Temecula.52 
 
B. Factual Background of Proposition 48 
 
Proposition 48 seeks to reverse the Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork and Wiyot 
Compacts. Even before the North Fork Compact was subject to a referendum, the North Fork 
Tribe’s casino project near Madera was a lightning rod for controversy.  
 
The North Fork Tribe began its pursuit of a casino in 2004 with the announcement of a 
partnership with casino management corporation Station Casinos of Las Vegas.53 The tribe 
applied to the United States Department of the Interior to take the land near Madera into trust for 
gaming in 200554 and the Secretary of the Interior approved the application in September 2011 
through the two-part determination process authorized by IGRA.55 The two-part determination 
process in IGRA allows tribes to open a casino on land other than existing reservation land.56 
This was the first time a tribe in California had successfully completed this process.57 In 
September 2012, Governor Brown concurred with the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to 
permit a casino for the North Fork Tribe near Madera,58 as required by IGRA.59 
                                                                                                                                                             
SUPPLEMENTAL: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2008, at 12, 20, 28, 36, 
available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/feb/lang/english-sup.pdf.   
51 California Casinos, 500 NATIONS, http://500nations.com/California_Casinos.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 
2014).  
52 California’s Largest Indian Casinos, 500 NATIONS, 
http://500nations.com/California_Casinos_Largest.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
53 Project Overview, NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO INDIANS, 
http://www.northforkrancheria.com/page.cfm?pageID=21 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).  
54 Trust land is land that the federal government holds title to for the benefit of an Indian tribe or 
individual, or which is held by an Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United States 
against alienation. 25 U.S.C. § 2201(4)(i). 
55 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Assistant Sec’y Echohawk Issues Four Decisions on Tribal 
Gaming Applications (Sept. 2, 2011). 
56 The two parts of the determination are: 1) the Department of the Interior determining that taking land 
into trust for a casino is in the best interest of the tribe and would not be detrimental to the surrounding 
community; 2) the governor concurring in that decision. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).  
57 The Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enterprise Rancheria received approval at the same time 
through the same process. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Assistant Sec’y Echohawk Issues 
Four Decisions on Tribal Gaming Applications (Sept. 2, 2011). This process is controversial because the 
governor unilaterally has the authority to concur with the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to permit 
Indian gaming on a proposed parcel of land. Briefing Report: Making Tribal Land Gaming-Eligible 
Through the ‘Two-Step Determination Process’, REPUBLICAN CAUCUS CAL. ST. SENATE, 
http://cssrc.us/content/briefing-report-making-tribal-land-gaming-eligible-through-two-step-
determination-process (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (“The most controversial aspect of the two-part 
determination process arises over the governor’s role in the concurrence.”). 
58 Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Concurs with U.S. Dep’t of 
the Interior Decision, Signs Compact with North Fork Rancheria (Aug. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17700. 
59 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (requiring the governor of the state where the land is located to concur with 
the findings of the Secretary of the Interior). 
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At the same time Governor Brown announced his concurrence allowing the North Fork Tribe to 
build a casino near Madera, he also announced that he had signed a compact with the North Fork 
Tribe governing gaming activities at the proposed casino.60 Pursuant to the California 
Government Code,61 the Legislature ratified the North Fork Compact by passing AB 277 on June 
27, 2013 and Governor Brown signed the bill on July 3, 2013.62  
 
On October 22, 2013, the Secretary of the Interior published notice that the North Fork 
Compact had “tak[en] effect” in accordance with federal law.63 California Secretary of State 
Debra Bowen certified that a sufficient number of signatures had been submitted to qualify a 
referendum on AB 277 on November 20, 2013.64  
 
C. Existing Law and Proposition 48 
 
Proposition 48 is a referendum on the November 2014 ballot regarding Indian gaming 
compacts enacted by AB 277 (Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013).65 Proposition 48, and the 
underlying statute Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013, represents compacts ratified by the Legislature 
and negotiated by Governor Brown with the North Fork Tribe and Wiyot Tribe.66  
The Wiyot and North Fork Compacts are closely intertwined.67 The North Fork Tribe’s compact 
authorizes the tribe to offer class III68 gaming on land in Madera County outside of the North 
Fork Tribe’s existing reservation.69 The Wiyot Tribe’s compact prohibits the tribe from 
constructing and operating a casino on tribal land in environmentally sensitive areas near 
Humboldt Bay.70 In exchange, the Wiyot Tribe will receive between 2.5 and 3.5 percent of the 
                                                 
60 Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Concurs with U.S. Dep’t of 
the Interior Decision, Signs Compact with North Fork Rancheria (Aug. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=17700 (announcing both the concurrence to allow the federal 
government to take the land in Madera into trust and the signing of a compact with the North Fork Tribe). 
61CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.25(explicitly requiring that ratification be by statute). 
62 Complete Bill History of AB 277, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_0251-
0300/ab_277_bill_20130703_history.html (last visited September 9, 2014).  
63 78 Fed. Reg. 62649 (Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-
22/pdf/2013-24350.pdf  (“This notice publishes the Class III Gaming Compact between the North Fork 
Rancheria of Mono Indians and the State of California taking effect.”).  
64 Press Release, Cal. Sec’y of State, Referendum Qualifies for November 2014 California Ballot (Nov. 
20, 2013) http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/press-releases/2013/db13-052.htm.  
65NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 40.  
66 Id.  
67 See id. at 41–42 (explaining the relationship between the Wiyot and North Fork Compacts).  
68 Defined in IGRA section 2703(8) as all forming of gaming that are not class I or II, but understood to 
mean house-banked games such as blackjack and slot machines. For more information on house-banked 
games see supra note 6. 
69 TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE NORTH FORK TRIBE at 
Preamble & § 1 (2012), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Final_Compact_--__North_Fork.pdf [“NORTH 
FORK COMPACT”].  
70 WIYOT COMPACT, supra note 16. 
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North Fork Tribe’s revenue from the North Fork Casino.71 The Wiyot Compact a twenty-year 
term that expires on December 31, 2033.72 
 
Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013, includes specified exemptions from the requirements of the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).73 However, the CEQA exemptions are limited to 
activities undertaken by the tribal government itself and do not extend to any intergovernmental 
agreements made with local governments for projects undertaken in support of tribal activities.74  
The North Fork Compact requires that the tribe complete a Tribal Environmental Impact Report 
studying the impact of a casino near Madera on environmental resources outside Indian land.75 
Thus, there will be an environmental review of the project, but a more limited review than would 
be required under CEQA.  
 
Under the terms of the North Fork Compact, the tribe is allowed to build and operate a 
casino in Madera County with up to 2000 slot machines and no other tribe can build a casino 
within sixty miles of this facility.76 The North Fork Tribe agreed to quarterly payments to the 
State Gaming Agency’s Revenue Sharing Trust Fund, which supports the activities of non-
gaming California Indian tribes.77 The North Fork Compact authorizes the tribe to make 
deductions from its revenue prior to making payments into the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund for 
reimbursement to the State for services provided, the tribe’s payment to the Wiyot Tribe, and 
mitigation payments to local agencies.78 
 
The North Fork Compact is extremely prescriptive, setting out explicit requirements for 
development and oversight of operations that encompasses state licensing, state inspections, 
dispute resolutions, compliance with state public health and safety law and regulations, and 
myriad other requirements.79 The term of the North Fork Compact is twenty years expiring on 
December 31, 2033.80 
 
D. Effects of the Referendum  
 
In the November 2014 General Election, California voters will decide whether the 
Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts should stand. A YES vote will 
affirm the compacts. A NO vote will reverse the Legislature’s ratification of the compacts.  
Referenda, by their very structure can be confusing to many voters, your authors included. 
However, voters who wish to affirm the compacts negotiated by Governor Brown and approved 
by the Legislature should vote YES. Those who want to reject the compacts should vote NO. In 
this paper we will refer to those groups who want voters to vote “No” and reject the compacts as 
                                                 
71 Id. § 4.1.  
72 Id. § 7.2. 
73 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.59 (b)(1)(A)–(F).  
74 Id. § 12012.59 (b)(1)–(b)(2).  
75 NORTH FORK COMPACT, supra note 69, at § 11.8.1.  
76 Id. § 4.7(b). 
77 Id. §§ 4.6, 5.1. For additional explanation of the fiscal impacts of Proposition 48 see infra Part V. C.  
78 Id. §§ 4.3, 5.7(a)–(h). 
79 Id. §§ 6–13.  
80 Id. § 14.2. 
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the opponents. Those groups that want voters to vote “Yes” and affirm the compacts will be 
referred to as the proponents.81  
 
III. DRAFTING ISSUES  
 
The language of Proposition 48 is not in dispute nor is it ambiguous. If passed, the 
referendum would affirm the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts as approved by the Legislature 
and Governor by AB 277 (Chapter 51, Statutes of 2013). If not approved, the referendum would 
overturn the ratification of the compacts.  
 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ISSUES 
 
The story of the North Fork Tribe and its proposed casino near Madera will not be over 
when polls close on November 4. The tribe will still have several options in court to obtain a 
compact if voters reject the compacts and Proposition 48 fails. First the tribe can argue that the 
statute ratifying the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts is not the proper subject of a referendum.82 
Second, Proposition 48 cannot annul the Secretary of the Interior publishing a valid compact in 
the Federal Register, which is all that IGRA requires.83  The North Fork Tribe can also argue that 
the State negotiated in bad faith so the Secretary of the Interior should impose a compact.84 
Finally, if Proposition 48 passes and voters approve the Legislature’s ratification of the 
compacts, the opponents of the North Fork Compact will have several causes of action as well.85  
 
A. Subjecting a Compact to a Referendum  
 
AB 277 is distinguishable from other statutes that are normally subject to a referendum 
because AB 277 is the ratification of an agreement between two sovereign governments rather 
than a statute subject to amendments, hearings, and voting in policy committees.86 The 
referendum process allows voters to affirm or reject statutes or parts of statutes enacted by the 
Legislature.87  
 
                                                 
81 This simplification is necessary as technically the groups on the “No” side of Proposition 48, such as 
Stand Up for California and the Chukchansi Tribe, were the supporters of subjecting AB 277 to a 
referendum and obtained the signatures to put the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts on the ballot. 
However, in order to avoid the confusion that would result if we were to refer to “No” side as the 
proponents and the “Yes” side as the opponents, we will refer to the “No” side as the opponents and the 
“Yes” side as the proponents.   
82 Infra Part IV.A. 
83 Infra Part IV.B. 
84 Infra Part IV.C. 
85 Infra Part IV.D. 
86 There are also implications with tribal sovereignty at issue here because the voters of California are 
dictating to a sovereign tribal government the terms of the activities on its land, but this discussion is 
outside the scope of this article. 
87 CAL. CONST. art. II § 9. 
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The question whether the North Fork Compact could properly be subject to a referendum 
was decided by the Madera County Superior Court in June 2014.88 The court held that 
ratification of the North Fork Compact was a legislative act properly subject to the referendum 
process.89 The North Fork Tribe has appealed the decision to the Fifth District Court of Appeal.90 
On appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the referendum power extends to statutes 
that merely ratify negotiated agreements.91  
 
While California voters’ initiative and referendum powers are expansive and protected by 
the California Constitution, the powers are still not unlimited. In American Federation of Labor 
v. Eu, the California Supreme Court held the voters’ initiative power is restricted to the adoption 
or rejection of laws.92 The court went on to explain that a law must be “declared by some 
authority possessing sovereign power over the subject.”93 The court found the voters lacked the 
authority through initiative to compel the Legislature to adopt a resolution urging Congress to 
submit a balanced budget amendment to the state.94  
 
Similarly, in People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court 
held that the voters’ initiative power did not extend to determining the process for the 
appointment of legislative leadership, how legislative committee assignments were made, and 
how legislative personnel were hired.95 Rather, the court found that the rules and resolutions 
enacted by voter initiative were outside the scope of permitted subject matter that the people 
could legislate through the initiative.96 The court concluded “[i]n sum, the people through the 
electorate have been given the power to make statutes, i.e. the power to make laws for all the 
people, but not the power to make rules for the selection of officers or rules of proceeding or 
rules which regulate the committees or employees of either or both houses of the Legislature.”97  
 
In contrast, in Legislature v. Eu, the California Supreme Court held that constitutional 
provisions adopted through an initiative imposing term limits on legislators and reducing 
legislative funding levels were valid.98 The statutes under review did “not affect either the 
structure or the foundational powers of the Legislature, which remains free to enact whatever 
                                                 
88 North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v. California, No. MCV062850, (Madera Cnty. Super. Ct. June 
26, 2014) (ruling on demurrers to cross-complainant’s cross-complaint).  
89 Id. at 6–10. 
90 North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians v. California, No. MCV062850, (Madera Cnty. Super. Ct. Sept. 
4, 2014) (notice of appeal). 
91 Cases in other jurisdictions have held that a legislature’s approval of a compact is a legislative act 
because it is a policy decision that changes state law. See e.g., Florida House of Representatives v. Crist, 
999 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2008); Saratoga Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801 (2003).   
92 Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687 (1984). 
93 Id. at 711. 
94 Id. at 692.  
95 People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 316, 334 (Ct. App. 1986). 
96 Id at 326.  
97 Id.  
98 Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 535 (1991). 
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laws it deems appropriate.”99 In addition, the court found “[t]he challenged measure alters 
neither the content of those laws nor the process by which they are adopted.”100  
 
In the context of tribal-state gaming compacts, ratification takes the form of a traditional 
statute, yet the act taken by the Legislature is more like rule or resolution making. If the 
Government Code required a resolution rather than a statute to ratify a compact101 then it would 
be clear in light of the holding in People’s Advocate that voters lack the power to reverse the 
action of the Legislature by referendum. While ratification is simply a yes or no vote much like a 
resolution, the Legislature required ratification through a statute, suggesting that it intended a 
referendum to be possible. On its face, Proposition 48 does not change the internal structure of 
the Legislature and is essentially a measure that allows voters to reconsider a policy decision 
made by the Legislature through a statute. However, after carefully analyzing the meaning of 
ratification, the appellate court will need to consider whether ratification is more like compelling 
the Legislature to adopt a resolution and making rules for the Legislature, or more similar to a 
policy decision of a traditional statute.  
  
These arguments regarding whether the compact could be subject to a referendum are 
intertwined with other questions of federal law discussed below.102 As a result, these arguments 
will likely also surface in federal question litigation103 in federal court where the court may be 
less likely to follow California courts’ obligation to “jealously guard” the people’s right to a 
referendum under California law.104  
 
B. Effect of Publication of Compact in Federal Register 
 
If the referendum fails and the Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork Compact is 
reversed, the North Fork Tribe may file a lawsuit arguing that its compact is effective and valid 
because the Secretary of the Interior published the compact in the Federal Register. By this 
reasoning, Proposition 48 is a superfluous exercise because the compact was effective after it 
was negotiated by Governor Brown, approved by the Legislature, and published by the Secretary 
of the Interior in the Federal Register.  
 
IGRA specifies the procedure for a compact to be effective. Among other requirements 
not in contention here, IGRA permits class III gaming on Indian land if gaming is conducted in 
conformance with a tribal-state compact entered into by the tribe and state and approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior.105 A compact takes effect under IGRA “only when notice of approval 
by the Secretary [of the Interior] of such compact has been published by the Secretary [of the 
                                                 
99 Id at 292.  
100 Id. 
101 Or even if the Government Code was silent and the ratification process was ambiguous.  
102 Infra Part IV.B (questioning whether legislative approval and publication in the Federal Register 
finalized the compact).  
103 Federal question jurisdiction is ability of a federal court to hear a case because it involves a question of 
federal law. 
104 Rossi v. Brown, 9 Cal. 4th 688, 695 (1995). 
105 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). 
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Interior] in the Federal Register.”106 The North Fork Tribe’s argument would hinge when exactly 
a compact is entered into and effective.  
 
The argument that a compact is per se valid because the Secretary of the Interior 
published it in the Federal Register was rejected by the Tenth Circuit in Pueblo of Santa Ana v. 
Kelly (Pueblo).107 In that case, the tribe argued that the compacts were valid because the 
Secretary of the Interior published the compacts in the Federal Register even though the New 
Mexico Supreme Court had invalidated the compacts.108 Despite this argument, the court held 
that because the Governor of New Mexico did not have authority to validly “enter into” the 
compacts, the underlying compacts were invalid and the publication in the Federal Register did 
not cure the flaws.109 The court made clear that a valid compact is a two-step inquiry: “(1) the 
compacts must be validly ‘entered into’ under applicable state law and (2) they must be ‘in 
effect’ pursuant to Secretarial approval and notice.”110  
 
While Pueblo would seem to preclude the North Fork Tribe from arguing the validity of 
their compacts based on their publication in the Federal Register, the North Fork Tribe can argue 
its compact is distinguished from the Pueblo case. Unlike the compacts in Pueblo, there has been 
no determination from California’s Supreme Court that the North Fork Compact is invalid, and 
thus, the North Fork Tribe can argue that the compact was validly entered into pursuant to state 
law. The North Fork Compact was not void ab initio as the Pueblo compacts were.  
 
Also importantly, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen did not certify Proposition 
48 for the ballot until November 20, 2013,111 nearly a month after the North Fork Compact 
appeared in the Federal Register on October 22, 2013.112 The span of time in which the North 
Fork Compact was “in effect” before Proposition 48 qualified for the ballot makes a stronger 
argument that publication in the Federal Register was all the North Fork Tribe needed to make 
the compact effective.   
 
However, in fulfilling her duty to transmit the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts to the 
Department of the Interior, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen made the Department of 
the Interior aware of the possible referendum on the statute ratifying the compacts.113 Secretary 
of State Debra Bowen stated that California statutes, including Chapter 51 ratifying the 
                                                 
106 Id. at § 2710(d)(3)(B). 
107 Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997). 
108 Id. at 1548. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1553. These same two requirements are also provided in the North Fork Compact itself in section 
19.1, which states that the compact is not effective until it is ratified in accordance with state law and 
notice of approval is published in the Federal Register.    
111 Press Release, Cal. Sec’y of State, Referendum Qualifies for November 2014 California Ballot (Nov. 
20, 2013) http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/press-releases/2013/db13-052.htm.  
112 78 Fed. Reg. 62649 (Oct. 22, 2013) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-
22/pdf/2013-24350.pdf. 
113 Letter from Debra Bowen, Sec’y of State, State of Cal., to Paula Hart, Dir., Office of Indian Gaming 
(July 16, 2013). 
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compacts, did not become effective until January 1, 2014114 or if a referendum qualified, the day 
after the election.115 Consequently, the North Fork Tribe and the Department of the Interior had 
notice that the compacts did not necessarily go into effect after publication in Federal Register. 
 
As the court in Pueblo stated, IGRA “does not define what is necessary for a tribe and 
state to ‘enter[] into’ a compact,” rather state law determines the required procedure.116 The 
California Constitution provides that the governor negotiates compacts and the Legislature then 
ratifies them.117 Although the California Constitution is silent on the ratification procedures, the 
California Government Code provides that compacts “shall be ratified by statute” and goes on to 
describe that a majority is required in each house along with the governor’s signature.118 
As described above,119 the North Fork Compact was negotiated by Governor Brown and 
approved by a majority of both the Assembly and Senate before it was signed by Governor 
Brown and published in the Federal Register. The North Fork Tribe will argue that this process 
was faithfully followed and as a result the compact was validly “entered into” as required by 
IGRA. 
 
The opponents of Proposition 48 will argue that the compact was not validly “entered 
into” because the California Constitution allows for a referendum to reverse a statute passed by 
the Legislature.120 Article II, section 9, of the California Constitution defines the referendum 
power as “the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes except 
urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations 
for usual current expenses of the state.”121 As a result, the compact will not be validly “entered 
into” until the voters have decided whether to affirm the statute.122 
  
The opponents will point out that other compacts have been passed as urgency measures, 
which precludes the referendum process.123 If the Legislature had sought to similarly exempt the 
North Fork Compact, it could have done so by passing an urgency measure.  
 
                                                 
114 CAL. CONST. art. IV § 8(c) (Absent an urgency clause, “a statute enacted at a regular session shall go 
into effect on January 1 next following a 90-day period from the date of enactment of the statute . . . .”). 
115 Letter from Debra Bowen, Sec’y of State, State of Cal., to Paula Hart, Dir., Office of Indian Gaming 
(July 16, 2013). 
116 Pueblo, 104 F.3d at 1546.  
117 CAL. CONST. art. IV § 19(f). 
118 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.25(c).  
119 Supra, Part II. A.  
120 CAL. CONST. art. IV § 1 (“The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature . . . 
but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.”). 
121 CAL. CONST. art. II § 9.  
122 Id. at § 10(a) (stating that a statute subject to a referendum does not go into effect until the day after 
the election).  
123 Compacts with the Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians and Pinoleville Pomo Nation were passed 
as urgency statutes. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.53 available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/asm/ab_3051-3100/ab_3072_bill_20080926_chaptered.pdf (noting that the statute is an urgency 
statute); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12012.551 available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/asm/ab_1401-1450/ab_1418_bill_20111002_chaptered.pdf (noting that the statute is an urgency 
statute). 
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Ultimately, the opponents will rely on the Tenth Circuit’s statement in Pueblo that the 
Secretary of Interior’s approval of a compact in the Federal Register “cannot, under [IGRA], 
vivify that which was never alive.”124 The court will have to decide if the referendum process 
can “un-ratify” a compact or whether the approval by the Legislature was sufficient ratification 
regardless of Proposition 48. 
 
C. An Alternative Compact Process Through IGRA 
 
If Proposition 48 fails and voters reverse the Legislature’s ratification of the North Fork 
Compact, the North Fork Tribe may seek to invoke a provision in IGRA that allows the 
Secretary of the Interior to impose a compact without ratification by the Legislature. IGRA 
provides two avenues for a tribe to obtain a compact authorizing class III gaming. First, the tribe 
may request the state negotiate a compact in good faith and the tribe and state may voluntarily 
enter into a compact governing gaming activities.125  
 
If the first method is unsuccessful,126 a tribe can sue the state seeking a determination that 
the state did not negotiate in good faith and compel the Secretary of the Interior to impose a 
compact.127 If a tribe obtains a declaration from a federal court that the state failed to negotiate in 
good faith, the court will order the state and the tribe to conclude a compact within sixty days.128  
Should the tribe and state not conclude a compact within sixty days, the tribe and state will each 
provide their last, best offer for a compact to a court-appointed mediator.129 The mediator will 
select a compact from the two options submitted, and the state will have sixty days to consent to 
the compact.130 If the state fails to consent, the Secretary of the Interior works with the tribe to 
impose gaming procedures consistent with the compact selected by the mediator.131 
 
As a preliminary matter, California waived its sovereign immunity, opening the state to a 
lawsuit arising from the state’s failure to conduct good faith negotiations with a tribe.132 Many 
states have not waived their sovereign immunity in suits related to compact negotiations, 
precluding tribes from seeking this remedy provided in IGRA.133 
 
                                                 
124 104 F.3d at 1557.   
125 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
126 Which would be the case if the voters reject the North Fork Compact. 
127 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). The purpose of this section in IGRA is to provide tribes an expeditious 
means to engage in class III gaming even if negotiations between the tribe and State break down. 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. State of Conn., 913 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990). 
128 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). 
129 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). 
130 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(v),(vi). 
131 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii). 
132 Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 21 Cal. 4th 585, 615 (1999) (striking down 
an initiative that authorized various forms of tribal gaming, but finding the waiver of sovereign immunity 
portion was separable and remained in effect).  
133 Gregory R. Mulkey, Texas v. United States: The Legality of the Secretarial Procedures Following 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 525, 525 (2009). 
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The state has the burden of showing that the negotiations were conducted in good 
faith,134 and if the court determines the state negotiated in good faith, the tribe’s proposal fails.135 
Only one tribe in California has ever obtained a declaration from a court that the state negotiated 
in bad faith.136 In that case, the court found bad faith after the state took a “hardline” approach to 
the negotiations and attempted to include provisions in the compact outside the scope of what 
IGRA permitted.137   
 
Before reaching the question of bad faith, the first hurdle for the North Fork Tribe is 
showing that the referendum is properly considered part of the negotiations.138 After all, the 
actual negotiation process in which Governor Brown and the North Fork Tribe bargained to 
identify the mutually agreeable terms of the North Fork Compact concluded in 2012.139 This is 
distinguishable from the Rincon case in which the governor was still conducting the negotiations 
so the court was able to immediately reach the question of good or bad faith. With the North 
Fork Tribe, it is the electorate acting in the place of the Legislature to ratify the compact 
negotiated by the governor.  
IGRA provides that the state must “negotiate . . . in good faith to enter into . . . a 
compact,”140 while California law creates the distinction between ratification and negotiation.141 
A court would need to find that IGRA’s broader directive of negotiating to enter into a compact 
includes the ratification, in which case the court can then consider the question of good or bad 
faith negotiations in the context of a referendum. 
If the court is willing to consider the referendum as part of the negotiations, the court 
must next determine that the negotiations over the North Fork Compact are within the scope 
permitted by IGRA and were conducted in good faith. IGRA provides factors for courts to 
                                                 
134 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(II). 
135 Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 2007). 
136 Staff, Rincon Band Becomes First California Tribe To Renegotiate Tribal-State Gaming Compact 
With Federal Courts, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/02/13/rincon-band-becomes-first-california-tribe-
renegotiate-tribal-state-gaming-compact; Rincon Band of Luiseño Mission Indians of Rincon Reservation 
v. Schwarzenegger (Rincon), 602 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010). 
137 Rincon, 602 F.3d at 1031, 1042.  
138 Some experts do not even consider this hurdle an obstacle and assume a state referendum is part of 
negotiations amounting to bad faith. See Marc Benjamin, Outcome of Proposition 48 May Have No 
Bearing on North Fork Casino Project, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 24, 2014, 
http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/10/24/4197065_outcome-of-proposition-48-may.html?rh=1 (quoting 
Michigan attorney Bryan Newland, a lawyer who worked for the Department of the Interior when the 
North Fork Tribe’s application for federal trust land was approved, stating that ultimate approval is with 
the Department of the Interior and the North Fork Tribe has a right to sue for bad faith because they have 
a right to negotiate for class III gaming).  
139 Defining the parties in this litigation will create an awkward circumstance for Governor Brown and the 
California government. On the one hand, Governor Brown negotiated the North Fork Compact so he 
presumably would be content to see it implemented. On the other hand, if the voters rejected the compact, 
the attorney general would still have an obligation to defend the voters’ ability under the referendum 
process to reverse legislation enacted by the Legislature. 
140 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
141 CAL. CONST. art. IV § 19(f). 
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consider when determining whether negotiations were conducted in good faith.142 Those factors 
include: “the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse economic 
impacts on existing gaming activities.”143  
If the court is considering whether voters rejecting Proposition 48 is bad faith, the 
opponents of the North Fork Compact should argue that the voters’ rejection was not bad faith 
because the voters rejected the compact for permissible reasons under IGRA. The opponents 
superficially included these reasons in the November 2014 Voter Guide but would have been 
able to make this argument much stronger if the voter guide had expressly stated that voters 
should reject the North Fork Compact because of adverse impacts to other casinos and public 
safety concerns. The opponents note the casino will bring crime and pollution to the Central 
Valley,144 but the arguments are largely focused on the expansion of Indian gaming off of 
existing reservations and other similar arguments.145 While these broad policy arguments could 
be considered the “public interest,” the connection is much more tangential—and thus a larger 
leap for a court to make—than explicitly stating specific criminal consequences and other public 
safety impacts. 
On the other side, the North Fork Tribe would need to show the exact opposite—that 
voters rejected the compacts for impermissible reasons. In Rincon, the court found bad faith 
because the taxes the state sought were outside the scope of the negotiations authorized by 
IGRA.146 However, the North Fork Tribe’s argument for bad faith is much less certain because 
notwithstanding the voter guide, there is no way to know why voters vote in a particular way. 
Moreover, the referendum is not part of the traditional negotiation process so there is no 
provision in the compact that the tribe can point the court to as constituting bad faith. Although 
the State backing out of a ratified agreement would seem to be bad faith,147 the possibility of a 
referendum undoing the ratification would not be a surprise to the North Fork Tribe considering 
referenda have occurred in the past.148   
                                                 
142 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(iii). 
143 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(iii)(I). 
144 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 46 (this is the only mention of crime in the entire 
argument against Proposition 48 and is contained in the quote from Madera County Supervisor Dave 
Rogers). 
145 Id. at 47 (The first line of the opponents’ argument against Proposition 48 states “Keep Indian gaming 
on tribal reservation land only.”). 
146 Rincon, 602 F.3d at 1033. The scope of permissible negotiations is delineated in IGRA and includes: 
(i) application of laws related to licensing class III gaming; (ii) enforcement of laws; (iii) reimbursal of 
the State for costs of regulating class III gaming; (iv) taxation by the tribe; (v) remedies for breach of 
contract; (vi) standards for operation and maintenance of the casino; and (vii) any subjects directly related 
to the operation of gaming activities.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)–(vii). 
147 Timm Herdt, What Prop. 48 Will and Won't Decide, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Oct. 22, 2014, 
http://www.contracostatimes.com/opinion/ci_26779849/timm-herdt-what-prop-48-will-and-wont (“The 
federal law requires states to negotiate tribal compacts in good faith; reneging on a signed compact would 
seem to be the definition of bad faith.”). 
148 Referenda on tribal-state gaming compacts have been on the ballot twice since 2000. Proposition 29 
(2000) (eleven Pala Compacts); Propositions 94, 95, 96, 97 (2008) (compacts with the Sycuan Band of 
the Kumeyaay Nation, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, Pechanga Band of Luiseño Mission 
Indians, and Morongo Band of Mission Indians).   
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Importantly, the burden is on the state to show good faith and not on the tribe to show 
bad faith.149 In Rincon, the state attempted to overcome its burden by arguing that the provisions 
in the compact providing revenue to the state general fund were not bad faith because they 
should be considered “other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming 
activities”150 and thus within the scope negotiation permitted by IGRA. The court rejected this 
argument and emphasized the limited nature of the negotiations.151 Accordingly, the state will 
rely heavily on the court considering the public interest as a factor in overcoming its burden of 
proving the negotiations were not bad faith. 
Ultimately, if the North Fork Tribe can overcome the question of whether the referendum 
is part of the negotiation process, the tribe has a compelling argument that the voters’ rejection 
was bad faith because it was outside the scope of IGRA. If Proposition 48 is rejected by voters 
and the North Fork Compact is not ratified, this litigation is likely to be a component of the 
proponents’ post-election legal strategy. 
D. Other Causes of Action 
 
If voters approve Proposition 48 and the Legislature’s ratification is not reversed, the 
opponents will still have multiple causes of action to challenge the North Fork Compact. 
However, these claims are all outside the scope of the validity of the referendum and speak more 
to the validity of the North Fork Compact itself and the procedure used for the taking the land for 
the proposed casino into trust. 
The following cases are noted below to demonstrate that the North Fork Casino is not 
finalized by the outcome of Proposition 48 as it will be months or years before these cases are 
resolved. 
Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians v. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Case No. 
C074506 in the California Third District Court of Appeal – on September 24, 2014 the 
appellate court issued its opinion and held that the governor is not a public agency under 
CEQA, so the governor was not required to complete an environmental impact report 
prior to his decision to transfer land to the federal government for the North Fork 
Casino. As of this writing, the decision is not finalized and the petitioner has not 
appealed.  
Stand Up For California! v. Dept. of the Interior, Case No. 1:12-cv-02039 in the D.C. 
District Court – alleging the decision by the Department of the Interior to take land into 
trust for a casino for the North Fork Tribe was arbitrary and capricious and violated the 
National Environmental Protection Act. 
Stand Up For California! v. Brown, Case No. F069302 in the California Fifth District 
Court of Appeal – alleging that Governor Brown violated the California Constitution’s 
                                                 
149 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(II). 
150 Rincon, 602 F.3d at 1033–34. 
151 Id.  
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separation-of-powers by making a policy decision to concur with the Department of the 
Interior’s decision to take the land into trust for the North Fork Casino.  
If the voters approve Proposition 48 and affirm the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts, 
these continuing legal challenges may still result in judicial invalidation of the compacts. These 
ongoing legal challenges demonstrate the intensity of the opposition to the compacts. Although 
the proponents may succeed if the voters affirm the compacts, the opponents may ultimately 
triumph if they can convince a court to overturn the compacts on other grounds.   
V. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES  
 
A. Supporters of the Compacts 
 
The proponents of this referendum, who support the compacts and urge a yes vote, argue 
that the compacts negotiated by Governor Brown and approved by the Legislature are 
advantageous to both the tribes and California.152 First, the construction and operation of a 
casino will create thousands of direct and indirect jobs.153 Second, the proponents contend that 
the casino will generate new state and local revenue. 154 Third, the proponents argue that 
approval of the compacts, in their current form, respects the concept of local control.155 Finally, 
the approval of the compacts will result in the protection of a scenic wildlife area.156 
 
The supporters of the compacts, who urge a yes vote on the referendum, assert that the 
construction and operation of the casino will result in thousands of new jobs including—
temporary construction jobs, long term operations jobs, and indirect jobs in the local 
community.157 The proponents note that “[t]he project will create over 4000 jobs as the result of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in private investment, boosting state and local economies.”158  
 
Robby Hunter, President of the California State Building and Construction Trades 
Council is quoted by the proponents in support of the project: “Voting YES guarantees good jobs 
for Californians and new economic opportunities for one of our state's poorest regions.”159 In 
addition, the Central California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce “support[s] the North Fork 
gaming compact to help bring jobs and business to Madera, Fresno, and the entire San Joaquin 
                                                 
152 Proponents include Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Republican state and local legislative 
representatives, cities of Madera and Chowchilla, numerous local chambers of commerce, the Madera Co. 
Sheriff, labor groups, environmental groups, ethnic groups and chambers of commerce, state and local 
Democratic organizations and clubs and over 70 California tribal groups. Who Supports It, YES ON PROP 
48, http://www.voteyes48.com/who-supports-it/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2014).   
153 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 46. 
154 Id.  
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 Id.  
159 Id. 
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Valley.”160 These statements demonstrate the broad support from diverse business and labor 
groups for the referendum and approval of the project.161 
 
Second, the supporters of the compacts assert that the construction and operation of a 
casino in Madera County will generate new revenue for both the state and local governments.162 
The supporters contend that “[v]oting YES provides crucial funding for public safety, schools, 
parks, roads and other public services.”163 Madera County Sheriff John Anderson states, that if 
passed, “[t]his project will fund local sheriff, police, fire, and other first responders.”164  
 
The Legislative Analyst’s Office states, that if approved, Madera County will receive a 
onetime payment of $6.9 million to $17.9 million and annual payments over the life of the 
compact of $3.8 million.165 The City of Madera, if the referendum is successful, will receive a 
onetime payment between $6.3 to $10.3 million and annual payments of $1.1 million once the 
casino is open for the term of the compact.166 The Madera Irrigation District will receive annual 
payments of $47,500 with a provision increasing that amount if water usage is higher than 
anticipated.167 In addition, the North Fork Tribe is required to make annual payments of $3.5 
million to other local governments for the life of the compact.168 
 
Third, the supporters argue that this project respects local control of economic 
development and urban planning.169 Tom Wheeler, Chairman of the Madera County Board of 
Supervisors, stated in support of Proposition 48: “Our region will benefit economically from this 
project. We can’t allow New York hedge-fund operators with financial ties to a competing 
casino to determine our economic future. Vote YES to protect local control.”170 The supporters 
make this claim based on the Chukchansi Tribe’s partnership with Brigade Capital—an out-of-
state hedge fund operator and investment advisor with offices in New York City and Zurich, 
Switzerland.171  
 
However, while local control is an argument used by proponents because the North Fork 
Tribe and local governments negotiated agreements related to the casino, Stations Casinos LLC 
                                                 
160 Id. 
161 Who Supports It, YES ON PROP 48, http://www.voteyes48.com/who-supports-it/ (last visited September 
6, 2014). 
162 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 46. 
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Id. at 44. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 46. 
170 Id.  
171 Ian Lovett, Tribes Clash as Casinos Move Away From Home, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 2014  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/us/tribes-clash-as-casinos-move-away-from-home.html?_r=0 (“The 
Chukchansi and their Wall Street backers — Brigade Capital Management, an investment firm [and 
others] have spent more than $2 million to place a question on the statewide ballot in November about 
whether the North Fork tribe should be allowed to build its casino.”). 
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of Las Vegas has been a major contributor to the Yes on Proposition 48 campaign.172 The casino 
corporation has an agreement to manage the North Fork Casino and stands to profit significantly 
if the casino is approved. The contributors to the Yes on Proposition 48 campaign also include 
the statewide Democratic Central Committee.173 
 
Fourth, the supporters of the compacts assert that voting yes of Proposition 48 will result 
in the protection of scenic wildlife areas. The supporters state “[a] YES vote avoids potential 
casino construction in the Sierra foothills near Yosemite and near the Humboldt Bay National 
Wildlife Refuge.”174 Dan Cunning, representing the Yosemite Sierra Visitors Bureau, argues, 
“[a] yes vote on Proposition 48 protects two of California’s most environmentally precious 
areas.”175 The State expressed concern about the negative environmental impact upon the 
Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge if the Wiyot Tribe were to build on land the tribe owns 
near the refuge.176 These concerns were significant enough that the State included a provision in 
the Wiyot Compact prohibiting the Wiyot Tribe from building a casino near the refuge in 
exchange for 2.5 to 3.5 percent of the annual slot machine net revenue from the North Fork 
Tribe’s casino.177 
 
The supporters of the compacts contend that voters who wish to create thousands of jobs 
in the Central Valley, generate state and local revenue for governments in Madera County, 
protect local control of development, or protect scenic wildlife areas should vote yes on 
Proposition 48 and allow the Legislature’s approval of the compacts to stand.  
 
B. Opponents of the Compacts  
 
The opponents of Proposition 48 urge the voters to overturn the ratification of the 
compacts for three fundamental reasons.178 First, the compacts set a precedent that could result in 
a massive increase in off-reservation gambling while breaking the tribes’ promise in 2000 to 
limit Indian gaming to existing tribal land.179 Second, the North Fork Compact will result in 
more pollution and negative social impacts in the Central Valley.180 Finally, the North Fork 
                                                 
172 For a more detailed overview of contributors for and against the Proposition 48 see supra note 18.  
173 Campaign Finance: YES On Prop. 48. – All Contributions Received, CAL. SECRETARY ST., http://cal-
access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1359411&session=2013&view=received (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
174 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 46. 
175 Id.  
176 WIYOT COMPACT, supra note 16, at Preamble. 
177 Id. § 4.1. 
178 There is no complete list of groups and individuals who have formally opposed Proposition 48 on the 
opponents’ website; however, included in the Arguments Against Proposition 48 in the November 2014 
voter Guide are the following individuals and organizations: Senator Diane Feinstein, Fresno County 
Supervisor Henry Perea, Manuel Cunha, Jr., President of Nisei Farmers League, Gary Archuleta, Tribal 
Chairman Mooretown Rancheria, Madera County Supervisor, David Rogers, and Stand Up For 
California. NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 46–47. 
179 Id. at 47. 
180 Id.  
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Compact will not result in new money being given by the tribe to the state general fund or 
schools.181 
 
The opponents of the compacts assert that the approval of this compact will set a 
precedent of tribes “reservation shopping,” where rural tribes in remote areas will seek to have 
urban land, far from their historic reservations, taken into trust to build and operate new 
casinos.182 The opponents state that Proposition 48, if passed, would “allow the North Fork Tribe 
to build an off-reservation, Vegas-style 2,000 slot machine casino more than an hour’s drive 
from the tribe’s established reservation land, closer to major freeways and Central Valley 
communities.”183 In addition, several major newspapers have editorialized that these compacts 
will result in a massive shift in California’s Indian gaming policy that will likely result in the 
growth of Indian gaming outside of traditional, recognized, Indian land.184  
 
Additionally, the opponents of the compacts argue that when voters originally approved 
Indian gaming in 2000, it was with the understanding that such gaming was limited to existing 
Indian land and the approval of off-reservation casinos such as the North Fork Tribe’s breaks 
that understanding.185 “Years ago, California Indian Tribes asked voters to approve limited 
casino gaming on Indian reservation land. They promised Indian casinos would ONLY be 
located on the tribes’ original reservation land.”186 In addition, “[w]hile most tribes played by the 
rules, building on their original reservation land and respecting the voters’ wishes, other tribes 
are looking to break these rules and build casino projects in urban areas across California.”187 
Therefore, voters who want to continue the original, voter-approved policy of allowing tribes to 
build and operate casinos on their traditional, rural reservations and take a position against 
expansion into urban, more densely populated areas, should vote no on Proposition 48.188 
 
                                                 
181 Id.  
182 Id. 
183 Id.  
184 The newspapers quoted in the oppositions’ argument against Proposition 48 include the Fresno Bee, 
Bakersfield Californian, Los Angeles Times, and San Diego Union Tribune. Id. The San Francisco 
Chronicle, Sacramento Bee, Modesto Bee, Orange County Register, and San Jose Mercury News also 
recently editorialized specifically against Proposition 48.  Editorial, Time to Draw the Line on 
‘Reservation Shopping’, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 7, 2014 http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Time-to-
draw-the-lineon-reservation-shopping-5736926.php; Editorial, Vote No on Proposition 48, Enough 
Gambling Expansion, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 7, 2014 
http://www.sacbee.com/2014/09/07/6683079/endorsements-vote-no-on-proposition.html; Editorial, Prop. 
48 Would Build Casino in Madera; We Don’t Need It, MODESTO BEE, Sept. 7, 2014 
http://www.modbee.com/2014/09/07/3522787_prop-48-would-build-casino-in.html?rh=1; Editorial, 
Expanding Tribal Casinos a Bad Bet for California, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Sept. 18, 2014 
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/indian-635600-gaming-casino.html; Editorial, Keep a Lid on Indian 
Casinos, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 8, 2014, 
http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_26688978/mercury-news-editorial-keep-lid-indian-casinos.  
185 Home, STOP RESERVATION SHOPPING, http://stopreservationshopping.com/ (last visited September 6, 
2014). 
186 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 47. 
187 Id. at 46. 
188 Id. at 47. 
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The opponents of the compacts also argue that approving the compact and allowing the 
North Fork Tribe to develop a casino and resort near Madera will result in negative social and 
environment impacts in Madera County.189 Opponents also argue that Proposition 48 is “opposed 
by Central Valley businesses, farmers, and community leaders because it means MORE air 
pollution, MORE traffic, and the loss of open space.”190 In addition, the operation of a casino 
and resort in this location will create a “greater burden on an already limited water supply.”191 
The opponents argue that voters who value the current environmental quality of Madera County, 
the larger Central Valley, and ultimately California, should vote no on Proposition 48.  
 
Finally, the opponents of Proposition 48 contend that the Wiyot and North Fork 
Compacts fail to increase revenue for the general fund and schools.192 The opponents note that 
“[u]nlike prior Indian gaming compacts this deal provides NO money for California’s schools 
and NO additional money for our state general fund.”193 Therefore, voters who believe that 
former compacts requiring tribes to pay a percentage of their gaming revenue to the general fund 
and schools was an advantageous policy should vote no on Proposition 48.  
 
While “reservation shopping” and social impacts are concerns expressly listed by 
opponents of Proposition 48 in the voter guide, the identity of the major financial backers of the 
No on Proposition 48 campaign suggests other motives. The financial backers of the No on 
Proposition 48 include the Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (Chukchansi Tribe) and 
the Table Mountain Rancheria, which both operate casinos whose revenue would be significantly 
impacted by a new casino in the region.194 The financial backers also include hedge fund 
manager Brigade Capital, which is the financial backer of the Chukchansi Tribe’s casino.195 This 
list of supporters suggests that the actual financial backers of the campaign are more concerned 
with protecting their own investments than the concerns expressed in the voter guide.  
 
The opponents of the compacts contend that voters who are concerned about the potential 
spread of Indian gaming beyond traditional reservations into populated urban areas, the 
environmental quality in Madera County and the Central Valley, or the lack of revenue to the 
state should vote no on the referendum and reject the North Fork and Wiyot Compacts.  
 
C. Fiscal Impact of Proposition 48  
 
The economic benefits to the State of California of a casino and resort in Madera County 
are uncertain.196 According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office, the economic impact will depend 
on several factors including the size and type of casino constructed, the extent to which the 
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190 Id.  
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192 Id.  
193 Id. 
194Sudhin Thanawala, California Tribe's Casino Plan to Go Before Voters, ASSOCIATED PRESS, October 
4, 2014, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/California-tribe-s-casino-plan-to-go-before-voters-
5801482.php  
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196 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 44 (stating that fiscal effects are “uncertain” and 
“depend on several factors”). 
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casino impacts the revenue of other tribal and nontribal revenue generating activities, and the 
manner in which payments to state and local governments are implemented.197  
 
Although the North Folk Tribe is required to make payments to the State, these payments 
are compensation for the State’s expenditures related to regulatory monitoring and transportation 
improvements.198 While opponents compare the North Fork Compact to previous compacts 
providing for payments to the state general fund,199 the absence of payments to the state general 
fund is consistent with IGRA, which only authorizes payments to the state for direct 
reimbursement of expenses incurred by the state.200  
 
The lack of payment to the state general fund is also consistent with the federal policy 
that Indian casinos are for the economic development of the tribes, their self-sufficiency, and 
strengthening of tribal governments rather than as a revenue stream for a state.201 According to 
the Legislative Analyst’s, any changes in revenue for the state will come at the expense of other 
gambling enterprises and from a shift in other forms of discretionary spending.202 
 
The direct economic impact upon local governments is clear—there will be large onetime 
payments in the first year the casino is in operation followed by much smaller annual payments 
for the life of the North Fork Compact.203 Madera County as well as the City of Madera will 
receive onetime payments between $16 million and $35 million in compensation for services to 
the casino once the casino is in operation.204 In addition, the compact will result in Madera 
County, the City of Madera, and the Madera Irrigation District receiving about $3.5 million a 
year for the duration of the compact.205 Also, both the state and the local governments will 
experience a decrease in direct tax revenue as tribal land is not subject to state and local taxes.206 
However, the Legislative Analyst’s Office classifies this loss of revenue as “not significant.”207  
 
There will also be an increase in economic activity in the region, and commensurate 
increase in local and state tax revenue, as more people come into Madera County and spend 
money on goods and services.208 Indian casinos generally stimulate local economies and a 
                                                 
197 Id.  
198 Id.  
199 See supra, Part V.B. 
200 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)–(vii) (specifying what provisions may be included in tribal-state gaming 
compacts). 
201 Id. § 2702 (stating the purposes of IGRA); see also Rincon, 602 F.3d at 1042) (holding the State 
negotiated in bad faith when it tried to use the tribe’s casino as a revenue stream for the State by 
attempting to require the tribe pay a percentage of net win directly to the State general fund). 
202 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 45. 
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207 Id. 
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Madera casino will likely do so as well.209 However, this increased activity will most likely be 
redirected from other surrounding counties rather than be truly new revenue.210  
 
The economic benefit of this compact for the North Fork Tribe is unknown, but is likely 
significant. However, any revenue generated by the North Fork Tribe comes at the direct expense 
of the Chukchansi Tribe and their Chukchansi Gold Resort & Casino in the mountains above 
Highway 99.211 The Chukchansi Tribe estimates a 40 percent loss in revenue from the North 
Fork Tribe’s casino in Madera County, which will purportedly result in the closing of the 
Chukchansi Gold Resort & Casino.212 Chairman Reggie Lewis of the Chukchansi Tribe 
describes the impact as a “devastating economic blow to my people from which I do not know 
how we will recover.”213  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
To its opponents, Proposition 48 represents much more than one casino, for one tribe, in 
the Central Valley—it represents whether California voters are willing to allow an expansion of 
Indian gaming off of existing reservations and closer to urban areas. To the North Fork Tribe and 
those most closely tied to the success of the tribe’s casino near Madera, Proposition 48 represents 
an opportunity to join other tribes in the state as wealthy and influential political entities.  
 
Regardless of the outcome in November, litigation is sure to follow. If voters reject 
Proposition 48, the North Fork Tribe is sure to contend that the compacts should never have been 
subject to the referendum process, and if Proposition 48 passes, opponents are sure to claim that 
Governor Brown never had the authority to approve the land transfer for the North Fork Tribe.     
 
For voters on the outside looking in though, it is important to put the measure into its 
proper context. The Fresno Bee succinctly frames the issue: “There are no angels in this fight. A 
Las Vegas casino corporation wants to expand, while a New York hedge fund wants to protect 
its investment. Some tribes would benefit, and others might lose.”214 It is up to the voters to 
determine who those winners and losers will be.  
 
                                                 
209 See Amy Quinton, Study Shows California Tribal Gaming Casinos Have Big Economic Impact, KPBS 
(Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2012/aug/08/study-shows-california-tribal-gaming-casinos-
have-/ (describing the overall economic impact of tribal casinos on communities). 
210 NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 12, at 45. 
211 Letter from Reggie Lewis, Chairman, Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians, to Cal. 
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214 Editorial, Vote ‘No’ on Prop. 48 — Stop Highway 99 Casino, FRESNO BEE, Sept. 6, 2014 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Proposition 49 was an advisory question that was put on the ballot by the Legislature. 
The Proposition asked Californians two questions: (1) whether or not Congress should be 
instructed to pass a constitutional amendment that would limit campaign spending; and (2) 
whether the California Legislature should ratify said amendment. Proposition 49 was placed on 
the ballot but was challenged and ultimately removed by the California Supreme Court, pending 
a full trial after the election.  
 
This report first addresses why the Supreme Court and other officials are hesitant to allow 
advisory questions such as Proposition 49, in a state that is known for its direct democracy. 
Second, it addresses the possible outcomes of the upcoming California Supreme Court case 
regarding Proposition 49 as well as how it will affect future propositions advocating for national 
change. Additionally, this report attempts to educate voters on the limits of California’s direct 
democracy, highlighting how the pending California Supreme Court decision may affirm or 
extend these limits. Finally, this report explores how other states have implemented advisory 
questions and how incorporation of advisory questions in California may be possible in the 
future. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Past Advisory Questions in California 
 
Unlike other initiatives on the ballot, advisory questions, would not create binding law if 
the electorate were to answer with a majority Yes. An advisory question simply polls voters to 
give the Legislature information about voter opinions regarding the topic at hand.  
 
Although advisory questions are uncommon, they have been on the ballot three other 
times in California’s history.1 In November 1892, voters approved a legislatively referred 
advisory question that United States senators should be elected directly by a vote of the people.2 
Twenty years later in 1912, the United States Congress submitted for ratification the Seventeenth 
Constitutional Amendment to the states, which changed the election process of U.S. senators to 
be directly elected by a vote of the people.3 On January 28, 1913, California ratified the 
amendment. On May 31, 1913, thirty-six states had ratified the amendment so the Secretary of 
State certified it as part of the United States Constitution.4 The advisory question in 1982 
provided Congress with the voters’ opinion that senators should be elected by a direct vote, 
resulting in Congress proposing the Seventeenth Amendment.  
 
In June 1933, voters rejected two advisory questions on whether the legislature should 
divert gas taxes to pay off highway bonds.5 In this election, the Secretary of State made it clear 
                                                 
1 ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1272, at 2 (June 26, 2014). 
2 Id.  
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
4 Id.  
5 ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1272, at 2 (June 26, 2014). 
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that this was a question posed by the Legislature through the title and summary.6 Voters rejected 
the advisory questions7, directing their elected officials not to divert gas taxes and thus 
participating in the legislative process.   
 
 
In November 1982, voters approved an advisory question that urged the United States 
government to propose to the Soviet Union that both countries agree to immediately stop all 
testing and production of nuclear weapons.8 Voters answered with a majority Yes.9 
After the November election in 1982, the Supreme Court of California ruled in American 
Federation of Labor v. Eu regarding an advisory question on the November 1984 ballot, stating 
that placing advisory questions on the ballot by means of the voter initiative process was an 
improper use of the initiative system.10 The court held that the initiative was invalid because it 
did not adopt a state statute.11 However, the court did not directly address whether or not the 
Legislature was permitted to place an advisory question on the ballot through the referendum 
process.12  
 
B. Proposition 49’s Removal from the Ballot  
 
1. The Nature of Proposition 49 
 
Proposition 49 was an advisory question, enacted by the Legislature. The proposition was 
to ask Californians: whether or not the United States Congress should propose a constitutional 
amendment regarding campaign spending, and whether the California Legislature should ratify 
that amendment.  
 
                                                 
6 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 1933, at 32, available 
at http://web.archive.org/web/20110725180054/http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1933s.pdf. 
7 ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1272, at 2 (June 26, 2014). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.; American Federation of Labor v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687 (1984). 
11 American Federation of Labor v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687 (1984). 
12 Id. 
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If Proposition 49 had garnered an affirmative majority vote, the California Secretary of 
State would have had to inform the United States Congress of the results.13 The advisory 
question asked voters: 
 
Shall the Congress of the United States propose, and the California Legislature 
ratify, an amendment or amendments to the United States Constitution to overturn 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) 558 U.S. 310, and other 
applicable judicial precedents, to allow the full regulation or limitation of 
campaign contributions and spending, to ensure that all citizens, regardless of 
wealth, may express their views to one another, and to make clear that the rights 
protected by the United States Constitution are the rights of natural persons 
only?14 
 
2. Proposition 49 and Citizen’s United 
 
The federal constitutional amendment that Proposition 49 sought to propose would be 
focused on overturning the results Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.15 Citizens 
United was a case regarding the First Amendment protections of free speech heard by the 
Supreme Court in 2010. Citizens United, a non-profit corporation, produced a film regarding a 
candidate seeking nomination with a political party in the next presidential election.16 
 
The law at the time prohibited corporations and unions from funding speech that 
expressly advocates an “electioneering communication.”17 Electioneering communications are 
public cable or satellite broadcasts made within thirty days of the primary election that refer to a 
clearly identified candidate for federal office.18 Citizens United brought the case to ask the 
Supreme Court to grant a declaratory judgment so they would not be subject to civil and criminal 
penalties for broadcasting their film.19  
 
The United States Supreme Court held that under the First Amendment, the government 
may not suppress the political speech of a corporation or union.20 The federal statute barring 
independent corporate funding for electioneering communications was thus unconstitutional and 
void.21  
 
// 
// 
// 
                                                 
13 S.B. 1272 (Lieu) (2013–2014), available at 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml. 
14 Id. at § 4(a). 
15 S.B. 1272 (Lieu) (2013–2014). 
16 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
17 Id. at 310. 
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 311. 
21 Id.  
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This change in federal campaign finance law angered many across the nation, as the law 
no longer limited the influence of wealthy corporations on elections.22 This outrage resulted in 
the California Legislature passing Assembly Joint Resolution 1, which called for an amendment 
similar to the one called for by Proposition 49. 23 
 
3. Summary of Proposition 49’s Effect 
 
In essence, Proposition 49 sought to ask Californians if they agreed or disagreed with the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United. A “Yes” vote would have meant voters 
support a Congressional amendment to overturn Citizens United and other applicable laws so 
that regulations and limitations could be placed on campaign contributions and spending.24 The 
theory was that this would allow equal expression of opinion by citizens, regardless of wealth.25 
A “No” vote would mean voters do not support a Congressional amendment to overturn the 
holding in Citizens United and that the law should stay the same.26  
 
III. PROPOSITION 49’S ROAD TO THE BALLOT 
 
Proposition 49 was introduced by Senator Lieu as Senate Bill 1272 in February 2014.27 It 
was named the “Overturn Citizens United Act.”28 The bill included numerous legislative 
findings: that corporations are not mentioned in the United States Constitution; and that 
corporations have not historically been given constitutional rights.29 The bill effectuated the 
placement of Proposition 49 on the ballot by calling a special election in the form of an advisory 
question and ordering the Secretary of State to place Proposition 49’s language on the ballot.30  
 
 Both the Senate and the Assembly passed S.B. 1272, so it was presented to Governor 
Brown.31 In July 2014, SB 1272 became law without the Governor’s signature.32 The Governor’s 
allowance of the measure to become law without taking the action of a signature veto was a 
compromise position.33 The Governor expressed concern that the measure was invalid because 
of its advisory nature and was concerned with “cluttering” the ballot with speculative 
                                                 
22 Bob Elgko, California Seeks Constitutional Convention Over Citizens United, SF GATE (June 24, 
2014),  http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/California-seeks-constitutional-convention-over-
5579322.php.  
23 Id. 
24 S.B. 1272 (Lieu) at § 4(b) (2013-14). 
25 Id. 
26 S.B. 1272 (Lieu) (2013-14). 
27 Id. at § 1. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at §2(b). 
30 S.B. 1272 (Lieu) (2013-14). 
31 Id. 
32  Editorial, Fighting Ballot Bloat in California: The Prop. 49 Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-citizens-united-20140813-story.html. 
33 Id. 
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propositions.34 Members of the Governor’s political party supported the measure through the 
Legislature and sought to have it appear on the ballot.35 
 
A. Senate Floor 
 
The Senate Floor Report explained that existing law authorizes cities, counties, school 
districts, or special districts to hold an advisory election in order to allow voters to voice their 
opinions on issues or to inform the local government of their approval or disapproval of the 
ballot proposal.36 
  
Senators in support of Proposition 49 argued that it would give Californians a valuable 
opportunity to respond to the United States Supreme Court rulings, as well as to advise Congress 
and the California Legislature to pass an amendment that would overturn Citizens United and 
allow regulation and limitation of campaign spending.37 Senators in opposition cited the 
additional costs that the advisory question would impose, which are not in the budget.38 
 
B. Assembly Floor 
 
The Assembly’s analysis of SB 1272 explains Senator Lieu’s position that the United 
States Constitution and Bill of Rights protect the rights of individual human beings, per the 
phrase “We the people.”39 Lieu and others warned that the Citizens United holding grants those 
same rights to corporations.40Assembly analysis also pointed to California’s past experience with 
advisory questions.41  
 
IV. LITIGATION IN THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 
 
In 2014, the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association sued the California Secretary of State 
and the Legislature to have Proposition 49 removed from the ballot.42 The court, through a 
preliminary order, has removed Proposition 49 from the ballot for the November 2014 election. 
This is unusual, as the policy of the court is that “it is usually more appropriate to review 
constitutional and other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative measures after an election 
                                                 
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1272, at 2 (July 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_1251-
1300/sb_1272_cfa_20140701_164653_sen_floor.html. 
37 Id. at 4. 
38 Id.  
39 ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1272, at 1 (June 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_1251-
1300/sb_1272_cfa_20140627_131559_asm_floor.html. 
40 Id.  
41 Supra Sec. II Background: Past Advisory Questions in California. 
42 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bowen, Secretary of State S220289 (2014).  
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rather than to disrupt the electoral process by preventing the exercise of the people’s franchise, in 
absence of some clear showing of invalidity.”43  
 
Rather than applying the “clear showing of invalidity” standard for removal, the majority 
considered the potential harm that the invalid measure may have on the electorate. The court 
decides that “an ultimate decision that the measure is invalid, coming after the voters have voted 
in favor of the measure, tends to denigrate the legitimate use of the initiative procedure.”44 The 
court reasoned that because there is not enough time for a full trial on the merits before the voter 
guides and ballots need to be printed, the course of action that brings the least harm is to not have 
Proposition 49 on the ballot.45 The case will be heard in the spring of 2015. If the court rules 
favorably, the advisory question could be placed on the ballot for the 2016 election.  
 
A. Majority Opinion in Proposition 49 Case 
 
The court refers to the American Federation of Labor v. Eu case, in which the court 
removed an advisory measure from the ballot.46 The court reasoned that an invalid measure on 
the ballot takes attention, time, and money, away from the valid propositions that are on the same 
ballot.47 The court believes advisory questions would confuse or frustrate voters because the 
advisory question has no legal effect.48 
 
The court ordered California Secretary of State Debra Bowen to refrain from taking 
further action to place Proposition 49 on the November 2014 ballot.49 However, if the court finds 
the Proposition valid after a trial on the merits, where the Secretary of State has shown why the 
advisory question should be included, it would appear on the ballot at the next general election.50  
 
B. Concurring Opinion in Proposition 49 Case   
 
The people have the powers of initiative and referendum, which Justice Liu asserts are 
solely law-making powers and do not include the expression of the wishes of the enacting 
body.51  
 
1. Legislative Validity  
  
According to Justice Liu’s concurring opinion, Proposition 49 is neither an initiative nor 
a referendum because it does not propose a law.52 The Legislature refers to it as an “advisory 
                                                 
43 Independent Energy Producers Assn. v. McPherson 38 Cal. 4th 1020, 1029 (2006) (quoting Brosnahan 
v. Eu 31 Cal.1, 4 (1982)). 
44 American Federation of Labor v. Eu, 36 Cal.3d 687, 697 (1984). 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 1. 
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bowen, Secretary of State S220289 (2014). 
50 Id. 
51 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bowen, Secretary of State S220289 (2014) at 3.  
52 Id. at 2. 
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question,” while the Howard Jarvis Taxpayer’s Association refers to it as an “opinion poll.”53 
Justice Liu further asserts that there is not a specific constitutional provision that authorizes the 
Legislature to put this kind of question on the ballot.54  
 
Proposition 49 asks Congress to propose a federal constitutional amendment regarding 
campaign spending.55 If such an amendment is proposed, Proposition 49 asks the California 
Legislature to ratify it.56 Justice Liu cites Hawke v. Smith, a case in which the Ohio Secretary of 
State placed an advisory question regarding a federal constitutional amendment on the ballot. 
Justice Liu quotes: “ratification by a State of a constitutional amendment is not an act of 
legislation within the proper sense of the word”57 thus concluding that Proposition 49 is outside 
the legislative authority of the California State Legislature. 
 
2. California State Constitution   
 
Justice Liu further asserts that the California Constitution only gives the Legislature the 
authority to propose three kinds of measures on the ballot.58 The first is a state constitutional 
amendment.59 The second is a statute authorizing issuance of bond debt.60 The third is an 
amendment or repeal of previously enacted initiative or referendum measures.61 The California 
Constitution states,  
 
The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature which consists 
of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative 
and referendum.”62  
 
The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to 
the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.63 
The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts 
of statutes except urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes 
providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State.64 
 
Justice Liu argues that the California Constitution creates a distinct line between the 
Legislature’s law making power and the citizens’ lawmaking power through the ballot.65 
Furthermore, he states that the structure of the California Constitution does not grant authority 
for advisory questions because the concept conflicts with our representative democracy, as 
                                                 
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Id.; Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229 (1920). 
58 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bowen, Secretary of State S220289 (2014) at 3.  
59 CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4. 
60 Id. art. XVI, § 2. 
61 Id. art. II, § 10, subd. (c). 
62 Id. art. IV, § 1; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bowen, Secretary of State S220289 (2014). 
63 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
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opposed to a direct democracy.66 The California Constitution does not explicitly grant the 
combination of direct and representative law making and thus there should not be advisory 
questions on California state ballots.67  
 
V. ADVISORY QUESTIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
 
 When the election is over and the case is returned to the California Supreme Court, the 
validity of Proposition 49 will be determined based on California precedent and California’s 
Constitution. However, as there is no previous California case that has expressly addressed a 
legislatively proposed advisory question like Proposition 49, the California Supreme Court may 
wish to look to fellow states who have dealt with this exact issue in recent years. The electorate 
may also wish to understand the use and value of advisory questions elsewhere in deciding 
whether a change to the constitutional reservation of initiative and referendum power may be 
necessary.  
  
A. Citizen’s United Ballot Questions 
 
The subject matter of Proposition 49, being of national importance, has motivated other 
states including Montana and Colorado and cities such as San Francisco and Chicago to use 
advisory questions to voice their discontent with the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court.68  
   
1. Colorado 
 
 In 2012, the electorate of the state of Colorado, through its initiative power, placed the 
“Colorado Corporate Contributions Amendment” on the ballot as Amendment 65.69 The 
electorate approved the amendment with over 74% of voters stating Yes to the advisory 
question.70 The question was similar to that of Proposition 49: 
 
Shall there be amendments to the Colorado constitution and the Colorado revised 
statutes concerning support by Colorado’s legislative representatives for a federal 
constitutional amendment to limit campaign contributions and spending, and, in 
connection therewith, instructing Colorado’s congressional delegation to propose 
and support, and the members of Colorado’s state legislature to ratify, an 
amendment to the United States constitution that allows congress and the states to 
limit campaign contributions and spending?71 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Derek Cressman, Amend 2012 Ballot Measure Victories, COMMON CAUSE,  
http://www.commonblog.com/2012/11/06/amend-2012-ballot-measure-results/ (last visited Sept. 15, 
2014). 
69 Amendments and Propositions on the Ballot 2012, COLO. SECRETARY ST., 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/ballot/contacts/2012.html (last visited Sept. 15, 
2014). 
70 General Election Results 2012 Amendments and Propositions, COLO. SECRETARY ST., available at 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/Abstract/2012/general/amendProp.html (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2014). 
71 Colorado Amendment 65 (2012). 
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Both Amendment 65 and Proposition 49 stated the intention that federal representatives 
propose and support an amendment to the U.S. Constitution and that state representatives ratify 
the federal amendment when the time comes.72 However, Colorado’s Amendment 65 goes 
further by also suggesting that state representatives amend the state constitution and codes to 
effect the ability to limit campaign contributions and spending. 
 
This broad based question has not been challenged as unconstitutional under either the 
Colorado Constitution or the U.S. Constitution. While the amendment’s ability to avoid judicial 
review may be in part due to its popularity, as there was no official opposition filed with the 
Colorado Secretary of State,73 it is also due to the nature of the constitutional reservation of 
initiative power. The Colorado Constitution states in pertinent part: 
  
The legislative power of the state shall be vested in the general assembly . . . but 
the people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to 
the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the 
general assembly and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject 
at the polls any act or item, section, or part of any act of the general assembly.74 
   
 The Colorado Supreme Court has read this provision, like the California Supreme Court 
has read its provision, to liberally protect the electors’ power.75 In Colorado one of the few limits 
on this power is that the initiative must be within legislative power, as that is the branch from 
which the constitution reserves the people’s power, not the executive branch with its 
administrative power.76 The Colorado Supreme Court in turn has found that an act that 
represents “a declaration of public policy of general applicability” is legislative in nature and is 
thus an appropriate use of the reserved power.77 With this broad interpretation of the electors’ 
power, it is likely no one out of the small number of No voters felt that a challenge would be 
successful or worthwhile. 
 
2. Montana  
 
 Also in 2012, the electorate of the State of Montana through its initiative power placed 
the “Montana Corporate Contributions Initiative” on the ballot as I-166.78 The initiative was 
challenged before the election, but it was allowed on the ballot by the Montana Supreme Court, 
as it narrowed its review to the procedural aspects of the initiative process and did not review the 
                                                 
72 Compare Colorado Amendment 65 (2012) with California S.B. 1272 (Lieu) (2013-2014). 
73 Amendments and Propositions on the Ballot 2012, COLO. SECRETARY ST., 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/ballot/contacts/2012.html (last visited Sept. 15, 
2014). 
74 COLO. CONST. Art. V § 1. 
75 Vagneur v. City of Aspen, 295 P.3d 493 (Colo. 2013). 
76 Id. at 507.  
77 Id. at 507.  
78 2012 Ballot Issues, MONT. SECRETARY ST., http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/2012/BallotIssues/  (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2014). 
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substantive portions of the ballot measure.79 After I-166 passed with 74.67% of the vote, the 
validity of the initiative was challenged again on constitutional grounds. The language of I-166 
was longer than Proposition 49 or Amendment 65, establishing a state policy in one section and 
charging elected state and federal legislators with official actions.80 The Montana Constitution 
states in pertinent part: 
The legislative power is vested in a legislature consisting of a senate and a house 
of representatives. The people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and 
referendum.81 
The people may enact laws by initiative on all matters except appropriations of 
money and local or special laws.82 
  
 The district court split its decision, granting both sides a partial victory. The portion of I-
166 that charged elected state and federal officials to act was struck down, but upheld the 
validity of the portion that established state policy.83 The court held that “the people of the state 
of Montana may pass as an initiative a law that states policy.”84  
 
The Montana court reasoned that state precedent required the reserved powers of the 
people to be broadly construed to maintain power in the people,85 just as California precedent 
demands.86 Further, the only restriction on those powers are the explicit terms; appropriations of 
money, and local or special laws, not the narrow argument offered by the dissent in the pre-
election action that argued the use of laws in the reservation meant a specific type of act.87 The 
court ruled that since laws as a term was not defined by the constitution it did not exclude non-
binding policy acts, such as I-166.88 
 
B. Michigan’s Local Ballot Questions  
 
 The state of Michigan also has an important example to be understood about the 
relationship between state power and advisory questions. Within the context of a local advisory 
measure, the Court of Appeals of Michigan discussed important aspects of reservation of power 
between a state and its people.89 The Michigan Constitution states: 
                                                 
79 Charles S. Johnson, Judge Strikes Part of Montana Ballot Measure on Citizens United, MISSOULAN 
(December 23, 2013), http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/judge-strikes-part-of-montana-
ballot-measure-on-citizens-united/article_c83a8b54-6c3f-11e3-a678-0019bb2963f4.html. 
80 Montana Initiative 166 (2012). 
81 MONT. CONST. Art. V  sec. 1. 
82 MONT. CONST. Art. III sec. 4. 
83 Rickert v. McCulloch,  2013 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 10 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Mont. 2013) Case No. CDV-
2012-1003 [“Rickert”]. 
84 Id. at 9. 
85 Id.  
86 American Federation of Labor v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 708 (1984).  
87 Montanans Opposed to I-166 v. Bullock, 2012 MT 168, 365 Mont. 520, 285 P.3d 435, 2012 Mont. 
LEXIS 217 (2012); Rickert, 2013 Mont. Dist. LEXIS at 13. 
88 Rickert, 2013 Mont. Dist. LEXIS at 13.  
89 Se. Mich.Fair Budget Coal. v. Killeen (Killeen), 153 Mich. App. 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
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The people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and to enact and 
reject laws, called the initiative, and the power to approve or reject laws enacted 
by the legislature, called the referendum.90 
 
The power of initiative extends only to laws which the legislature may enact 
under this constitution. The power of referendum does not extend to acts making 
appropriations for state institutions or to meet deficiencies in state funds and must 
be invoked in the manner prescribed by law within 90 days following the final 
adjournment of the legislative session at which the law was enacted.91 
 
The case involved a local county refusing to place advisory questions onto a ballot, as 
there was no clear grant of authority to do so.92 The court held that nothing in the Michigan 
Constitution explicitly prohibited the use of advisory questions.93 It further reasoned that since 
the state government holds plenary power subject only to the federal and state constitution, the 
state, and by extension their subordinate counties, could do anything not constitutionally 
restricted from them, including advisory questions.94 The court upheld the placement of the 
advisory questions on the ballot, since the power of counties could be implied from Michigan’s 
broad power sharing between the state and local governments.95 
 
VI. THE UPCOMING TRIAL ON THE MERITS  
  
 California precedent will be of paramount importance to the California Supreme Court 
next spring when the fate of Proposition 49, and all future advisory questions, will be decided. 
Prior cases such as A.F.L. v. Eu will frame the discussion of the court.  
 
In A.F.L. v. Eu, the California Supreme Court reviewed an initiative that was placed on 
the ballot by the electorate that asked the voters whether or not the California Legislature should 
call for a national constitutional convention for the purposes of amending the federal constitution 
to include a requirement for a balanced budget.96 The initiative, if passed, would have withheld 
the salaries of the legislators if they did not comply with the directive to call for the convention. 
The court held that the initiative’s requirement that the Legislature initiate processes to amend 
the federal constitution violated the federal constitution’s procedures for amendment, but more 
importantly held that, since the initiative did not create a statute, it was outside the reserved 
initiative power in the California constitution. This, however, was a limited exploration of 
advisory ballot questions, as it did not venture into the power of the legislature to place advisory 
questions on the ballot. As the prior decisions by the California Supreme Court do not have an 
exact precedent for the justices to follow, supporters of Proposition 49 have an opportunity to 
encourage the court to chart a more defined course in this area. 
                                                 
90  MICH. CONST. Art. II §9 
91 Id. 
92 Killeen, 153 Mich. App. at 376. 
93 Id. at 379. 
94 Id. at 381. 
95 Id.  
96 American Federation of Labor, 36 Cal. 3d at 687. 
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 Opponents of Proposition 49 will enter the trial on the merits in a strong position as the 
order removing Proposition 49 from the ballot suggests that five out of the seven justices 
strongly question the validity of advisory questions on the ballot. The weight of precedent also 
weighs heavily in their favor. As A.F.L. v. Eu states, “the reserved powers of initiative and 
referendum do not encompass all possible actions of a legislative body. Those powers are limited 
. . . it does not include a resolution which merely expresses the wishes of the enacting body.”97 
 
Supporters of Proposition 49 will have a more difficult experience at trial. The supporters 
will need to distinguish Proposition 49 from the facts of A.F.L. v. Eu and persuade the court into 
a new viewpoint on the unique nature of advisory questions. Arguments from Colorado, 
Montana, and Michigan can help both sides expand the court’s understanding of advisory 
questions. 
 
 The dissent in A.F.L. v. Eu by Justice Lucas points to a break in jurisprudence within the 
majority’s reasoning.98 The court affirmed that the people’s reserved legislative power must be 
“liberally constructed” and “guarded jealously by the court” but goes on to interpret the term 
statutes within the reservation, and its prior iterations of law and acts narrowly, to exclude 
resolutions of public policy.99 This narrow interpretation is based upon the decisions of the 
Supreme Courts of Arkansas, Colorado, and Michigan in cases regarding the 18th Amendment, 
which would eventually enact the prohibition of alcohol due to the temperance movement of 
1910’s.100 Those courts used a variety of historical sources unique to their own states to support 
the contention that a vote on the ratification of a federal constitutional amendment did not fall 
under their definition of an act or law.101 The California Supreme Court found these decisions to 
be persuasive enough to adopt this narrow view and apply it to the California Constitution.102 
Supporters may attempt to persuade the court to look to Montana’s more recent understanding of 
the term laws in deciding whether to maintain the narrow definition that constricts the people’s 
reserved power or expand it under its charge to liberally construct and guard the power. 
 
 In the pre-election litigation, Justice Liu cited Hawke v. Smith in asserting that the act of 
ratifying an Amendment to the U.S. Constitution through the proscribed methods is not a 
legislative act, and thus Proposition 49 is not within the legislative powers granted to the 
Legislature by the Constitution.103 Supporters however, in asserting Colorado’s view that “a 
declaration of public policy of general applicability” is legislative,104 can assert that Proposition 
49 is in fact not the ratification of an amendment, but an ancillary consideration which seeks to 
declare public policy on potential amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  
 
                                                 
97 Id. at 708. 
98 Id. at 720 (Lucas, J. dissenting). 
99 Id. at 707–08. 
100 Id. at 710–11. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 714. 
103 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bowen, Secretary of State S220289 (2014) at 2 (Liu, J. concurring).  
104 See supra Section IV.1.a. 
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 The experience and reasoning of Michigan’s local advisory ballot questions could be 
applied in reverse to California. Michigan’s cities and counties were found to have an implied 
ability to propose advisory questions as the state had no explicit constitutional prohibition, and 
the state as the seat of general power could by extension provide its subordinate counties the 
power. The Michigan court had reasoned that state power was only limited by the state and 
federal constitutions, as such an explicit prohibition was required to remove the advisory ballot 
question power from the state.105 In California, by explicit statutory grant, local governments 
including cities, counties and other special districts are allowed to place advisory questions on 
the ballot.106 As these governments receive their power and authority from the state, it follows 
that if this statute is constitutionally valid, then advisory questions are within the state power of 
California.  
 
Finally, the supporters may attempt to convince the court that Justice Liu’s narrow 
structural argument about the power of the Legislature to place only the three explicit types of 
measures before the voters on the ballot unnecessarily confines California’s power as protected 
by the U.S. Constitution’s Tenth Amendment broad reservation of general legislative and police 
power to the states.107 If Justice Liu’s narrow view of the California Legislature’s power 
concerning the ballot is adopted, a collection of powers within California’s purview, and used by 
other states, would be lost. 
 
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FORTHCOMING OPINION 
 
 The decision of the California Supreme Court on Proposition 49 and the wider issue of 
advisory questions, regardless of the outcome, will have a lasting effect on direct democracy in 
California and how Californians can approach grass-root campaigns for wider social issues. 
  
A decision that allows Proposition 49 onto the ballot in 2016 and holds advisory 
questions to be constitutional will have various effects. Numerous advisory questions from the 
Legislature may begin to flood the ballot. Opponents have expressed this fear and have cited it as 
a reason against recognizing the power. However, the normal checks on legislative action 
through elections will still be present, and the voters can temper any level of questioning by the 
Legislature they deem excessive by voting for Assembly members and Senators that use the 
power judiciously. Restraint by the Legislature is likely though. During this past session while 
passing Proposition 49, the Legislature debated another advisory question on immigration reform 
that failed to pass and be placed on the ballot.108 It is likely that only advisory questions that 
require the most reflective considerations by the entire population will survive the legislative and 
arrive on the ballot. This will allow legislators to make better decisions based on a more 
reflective polling of the electorate, resulting in better outcomes, rather than utilizing the less-
than-accurate commercial polling that interrupts Californians with a phone call during dinner.  
 
                                                 
105 See supra Section IV.2. 
106 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9603 (1994). 
107 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
108 S.B. 1402 (De León) (2013–2014), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-
14/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1402_bill_20140604_amended_asm_v97.pdf. 
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 A decision that does not allow Proposition 49 on the ballot will leave the state in the 
same position in which it is has been since the last advisory question was on the ballot in 1982 
for decades. However, this will be at the cost of limiting the tools of the people to voice their 
political views. 
 
 Further, a decision to not allow advisory questions will require future initiative and 
referendum campaigns to expend additional time and money drafting their measure, to clearly 
promulgate law rather than policy. If they do not, their chances of drawing litigation on policy 
aspects of proposals increases, as opponents will use this new standard to defeat measures in 
court rather than at the ballot box. A decision against advisory questions would forever sink the 
hopes of initiative proponents like Tim Draper and his Six Californias Initiative that he attempted 
to get onto the 2016 ballot. While Mr. Draper failed for a lack of signatures, his initiative would 
likely have been found to not make law and merely be advisory. The initiative he proposed by 
itself could not have created the new states as federal Congressional action is required, and there 
would be no effective change of law for the people, as they awaited federal action that may never 
happen.109 
  
 The ability of the people to grant themselves additional powers of direct democracy 
should not be forgotten. As the reservation explicitly allows constitutional amendments,110 the 
electorate may decide that advisory questions are important enough that they will amend the 
California Constitution to explicitly allow for legislatively referred, or even go further and have 
voter initiated, advisory questions on the ballot. While even this may be challenged as a revision, 
which requires a state constitutional convention called by the Legislature to enact,111 the support 
of the Legislature in this matter has already been demonstrated by its passage of Proposition 49.  
 
The electorate may even concede that placing non-binding questions on general election 
ballots is confusing, but propose that placing non-binding questions on primary ballots as an 
acceptable alternative. Primary ballots are filled with electoral races which may need a second 
vote to actually elect an official, either due to the top-two primary system in partisan races or a 
candidate failing to receive a majority requiring a run-off. Thus, the presence of a measure which 
will not effect a change in the law without another subsequent vote, be it by another initiative or 
act of the Legislature, will not be out of place on a primary ballot. In light of changes to the 
initiative and referendum systems that only allows their placement on general election ballots, 
there could be a clear segregation of law-making votes to November, and tentative electoral 
decisions, including advisory questions, to June. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
 While the fate of Proposition 49 and advisory questions on the California statewide 
ballots looks grim in the face of California precedent, the proponents should find hope in the fact 
that the California Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has used other states’ opinions in adopting 
changes to its understanding of the people’s reserved legislative powers, and that recent 
                                                 
109 Jim Miller, Six California Initiative Fails to Make 2016 Ballot, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 12, 2014, 
http://www.sacbee.com/2014/09/12/6702457/six-californias-initiative-fails.html. 
110 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. 
111 CAL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
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decisions in favor of advisory questions may well influence the court. Additionally, supporters 
can always use the initiative process the traditional way and amend the California Constitution to 
explicitly provide for the use of advisory questions by the Legislature on statewide ballots. 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 Most cities are structured through one of two different forms of government: “council-
manager” and “strong-mayor.”1 In council-manager cities, the mayor and each council member 
has equal strength in developing policy.2 The city manager handles the day-to-day community 
operations, including making all personnel decisions.3 The strong-mayor system is modeled after 
state and federal governments, so the mayor leads as a governor or the president would, and the 
city council acts as the legislature.4 As a result, the mayor does not have a vote, but does have 
veto power.5 Most large city governments, including New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and 
San Francisco, have a strong-mayor form of government.6 
 
Measure L, which is on the ballot in the city of Sacramento, aims to change the 
government structure from council-manager to strong-mayor.7 Revisions under Measure L 
would include removing the mayor’s vote on the city council, but giving the mayor veto power 
over ordinances and the city budget; vesting power akin to that of a chief executive officer in the 
mayor, rather than the city manager; conferring the power to make personnel decisions, 
including appointing and removing the city manager, to the mayor; and imposing term limits on 
the mayor and council members.8 
 
Proponents state a strong-mayor government would create more accountability, place 
checks and balances on the government, and help modernize Sacramento.9 Opponents, however, 
insist putting the ultimate power over city government into the hands of one elected official will 
make it easier for special interests to influence decision making.10 In addition, they feel the 
“system is working well…if it’s not broken, don’t break it.”11 This article will discuss 
                                                 
1 STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, STRUCTURES, http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structures.html (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
2 Cal. City Mgmt. Foundation and Int’l City/County Mgmt. Ass’n, Council-Manager or “Strong Mayor”: 
The Choice is Clear (2001), https://icma.org/Documents/Document/Document/302618. 
3 Id. 
4 Structures, STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structures.html (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
5 Id. 
6 STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, TOP 25 CITIES (2012) available at 
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/images/City_List_Top_25_2011_Publication.pdf. 
7 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf. 
8 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, IMPARTIAL ANALYSIS OF MEASURE L PREPARED BY SACRAMENTO CITY 
ATTORNEY 1–2 (2014), available at http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_ImpartialAnalysis.pdf [“IMPARTIAL ANALYSIS”]. 
9 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF MEASURE L, available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_For.pdf [“IN FAVOR”]. 
10 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF MEASURE L, available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_RebuttalAGAINST.pdf 
[“REBUTTAL TO FAVOR”]. 
11 “Strong Mayor” Forum, Sierra Curtis Neighborhood Ass’n (Sept. 22, 2014) [“Forum”] (statement of 
council member Steve Hansen) (notes on file with the California Initiative Review). 
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Sacramento’s current government, the history of strong-mayor in Sacramento, how Measure L 
would change the law, constitutional and charter implications of the initiative, and public policy 
considerations.12 
 
II. CURRENT LAW 
 
In California, all incorporated cities are what are known as “general law” cities, unless 
the electorate of a city opts to be what is called a “charter city.”13 Sacramento is a charter city.14 
 
A. Charter Cities  
 
In operation, a city’s charter is analogous to a state’s or country’s constitution.15 A city 
charter provides both broad authority and vestment of powers in a governing body, as well as 
acts as “an instrument of limitation on the broad power of charter cities over municipal affairs.”16 
The city’s electorate must approve the charter and any revisions.17 Only conflicting provisions in 
the state or federal constitutions, or any state statute on a matter of statewide concern can 
preempt the laws contained in a city’s charter.18 
 
The California Constitution grants cities the authority to adopt a charter.19 Once a charter 
is adopted, a charter city has the power to create and regulate a police force and conduct 
municipal elections, and broad authority over its governmental structure, including all aspects of 
employment.20 
 
The 482 incorporated cities in California have either one of two forms of municipal 
governmental structure: the “council-manager” structure or the “strong-mayor” structure.21 
General law cities must operate under the council-manager structure.22 While charter cities have 
the option of adopting either structural format, of California’s 120 charter-cities, “only five use 
the true strong-mayor form.”23 
 
// 
// 
// 
 
                                                 
12 Infra Sections II–VI. 
13 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
14 See EILEEN TEICHERT AND MATTHEW RUYAK, PROPOSED 2012 CHARTER REVISION ANALYSIS 6 
(2012), available at http://www.cityofsacramento.org/cityattorney/documents/StaffReport1_17_12.pdf 
[“2012 ANALYSIS”] (stating the charter “operates as a ‘Constitution’”). 
15 See id. at 7 (stating the charter “operates as a ‘Constitution’”). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
20 2012 ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 7. 
21 Id. 
22 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 34409 (West 2014). 
23 2012 ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 7. 
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B. Current Sacramento Charter Law 
 
Like all city charters, Sacramento’s presiding document identifies a governing body, and 
vests widespread powers in it.24  
 
1. The City Council: Article III 
 
In its most-current version, Sacramento’s charter vests authority in the nine-member city 
council to act as the governing body of the city.25 The council comprises eight members, each 
elected from one of eight districts within the city limits.26 The ninth member of the council is the 
mayor.27 The city council is the legislative body within municipal government, and is vested 
with various powers including the power to propose and adopt city ordinances to be contained 
within the municipal code, reapportion and redistrict council-seat districts, conduct investigations 
into the affairs of city government, and conduct legislative business at public meetings.28 
Currently, council members are not subject to any term limits.29 
 
2. The Mayor: Article IV 
 
The mayor is the “presiding officer of the city.”30 While he or she is a voting member of 
the council, the mayor also assumes the leadership role in relations between city government and 
the citizens of Sacramento.31 In effect, the mayor of Sacramento is seemingly intended as a 
position that will guide the council in the administration of its legislative duties, ensuring the 
priorities of the city’s citizens are furthered, all while maintaining a position of equal-footing 
with other members of the council.32 The charter also grants specific powers and duties to the 
mayor, including that he or she may propose ordinances and resolutions for the council to 
consider and shall appoint and may remove members of boards, commissions, and advisory 
agencies.33 The mayor is elected to a term of four years.34 Currently, there are no term limits for 
this office.35  
 
3. The City Manager: Article V 
 
Under the charter, the city manager is vested with the role and responsibility of being the 
city’s chief executive officer, overseeing the numerous departments that make up Sacramento’s 
municipal government.36 In essence, the city manager is responsible for the city’s day-to-day 
                                                 
24 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. II §§ 10, § 20–21. 
25 Id., art. III, § 20–21. 
26 Id., art. III, § 21. 
27 Id. 
28 Id., art. III, §§ 24–25, 31–32, 34. 
29 Id., art. III, §26. 
30 Id., art. IV, § 40. 
31 Id., art. IV, § 40(b)(2). 
32 Id., art. IV, § 40(b)(2)–(5). 
33 Id., art. IV, § 40(b)(6)–(7). 
34 Id., art. IV, § 42–43. 
35 Id., art. IV, § 43. 
36 Id., art. V, § 61(b). 
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administration.37 In addition, the charter vests in the city manager various powers and duties, 
including the responsibility to ensure that all laws and ordinances are enforced; to act as an 
advisor to the city council; to oversee and manage contracts, leases, and permits that the city 
council enters into for goods and services; and to propose the annual city budget.38 
 
Sacramento’s charter anticipates the need for separation of powers because it expressly 
prohibits the council from circumventing the city manager to work with any part of city 
government under the manager’s direction and supervision, including any attempts to appoint or 
hire any city officer or employee.39 Similarly, the charter provides for checks on the authority of 
the city manager through its grant of investigatory power to the city council.40 In order to remove 
the city manager from office, at least six city council members must approve his or her 
termination.41 
 
4. The Annual Budget: Article IX 
 
Under the existing charter, the city manager develops and proposes the city’s budget for 
presentation to the city council not less than 60 days prior to start of each fiscal year.42 The city 
council then considers the budget recommendations during public hearings, and ultimately votes 
by resolution to adopt a budget for the upcoming fiscal year.43 
 
III. HISTORY OF STRONG-MAYOR 
 
A. Strong-Mayor Government in Other Cities 
 
 Many city government structures were originally based on the executive and legislative 
branches of the federal government, but moved toward council-manager governance in the wake 
of a number of mayoral corruption scandals in the early 1900s.44 
 
 Since the early 1990s, cities with more than 100,000 residents have steadily adopted 
strong-mayor systems.45 One reason is that growing cities have growing numbers of interest 
groups, and it is easier to have one person as a point-of-contact for those groups.46 
 
                                                 
37 2012 ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 17. 
38 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. V, § 61(a), (c), (g), (i).  
39 Id., art. V, § 62. 
40 Id., art. V, § 62(a). 
41 Id., art. V, § 63. 
42 Id., art. IX, § 111(a). 
43 Id. 
44 J.T. Long, A Short History of the Strong Mayor in California, PUBLIC CEO (Sept. 3, 2009), 
http://www.publicceo.com/2009/09/a-short-history-of-the-strong-mayor-in-california/. 
45 Structural Trends, STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, 
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structuraltrends.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
46 Lisa Nisenson, Romper Room: The Strong Mayor Versus Strong City Manager Debate, THIS WEEK IN 
SARASOTA (July 27, 2012), http://www.thisweekinsarasota.com/2012/07/romper-room-the-strong-mayor-
versus-strong-city-manager-debate/. 
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Not all cities have embraced the trend.47 Columbia, South Carolina voters defeated a 
strong-mayor initiative last year despite support from the governor, Chamber of Commerce, and 
other mayors across the state.48 Large cities like Baltimore, Dallas, Indianapolis, Phoenix, and 
San Antonio maintain their council-manager systems.49 El Paso, Texas abandoned its strong-
mayor system in 2004, while Topeka, Kansas and Cedar Rapids, Iowa chose to adopt council-
manager governance when replacing their commission governments.50 Portland retains a 
council-manager form of government because voters there think “shared leadership is better than 
centralized power.”51 
 
 In California, five cities have adopted a strong-mayor system: Fresno, Los Angeles, 
Oakland, San Diego, and San Francisco.52 Their structures vary; for example, Fresno and 
Oakland still have a city manager, while the other cities place all management decisions in the 
mayor’s hands.53 
 
There is mixed feedback regarding California’s strong-mayor systems.54 Critics of 
Oakland’s system assert the charter is vague and creates uncertainty regarding which public 
official has responsibility over certain departments.55 Former Fresno mayor Karen Humphrey 
regrets her role in that city’s adoption of a strong-mayor system.56 On the other hand, San 
Diego’s strong-mayor governance successfully made it through a five-year trial period.57 Voters 
permanently adopted the structure in 2010, but made some changes, including adding a ninth 
council seat to prevent tie votes.58 There have, however, been abuses of power in San Diego 
since that permanent adoption.59 
 
                                                 
47 Pat Lynch, Strong Mayor, EAST SACRAMENTO PRESERVATION (Sept. 22, 2014), 
http://eastsacpreservation.org/strong-mayor/. 
48 Id. 
49 STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, TOP 25 CITIES (2012) available at 
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/images/City_List_Top_25_2011_Publication.pdf. 
50 Structural Trends, STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, 
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structuraltrends.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
51 Lynch, supra note 47. 
52 J.T. Long, A Short History of the Strong Mayor in California, PUBLIC CEO (Sept. 3, 2009), 
http://www.publicceo.com/2009/09/a-short-history-of-the-strong-mayor-in-california/. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., J. Douglas Allen-Taylor, Undercurrents: Oakland’s ‘Strong-Mayor’ Charter Ambiguous as to 
Mayor’s Duties, BERKELEY DAILY PLANET (Feb. 11, 2010, 9:46 AM), 
http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2010-02-11/article/34636?headline=Undercurrents-Oakland-s-
Strong-Mayor-Charter-Ambiguous-As-to-Mayor-s-Duties--By-J.-Douglas-Allen-Taylor- (voicing 
concerns that the mayor’s power is unclear). 
55 Id. 
56 Forum, supra note 11 (statement of council member Steve Hansen). 
57 A History of San Diego Government, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, http://www.sandiego.gov/city-
clerk/aboutus/history.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
58 Id. 
59 Monica Garske, R. Stickney, and Gene Cubbison, Former San Diego Mayor Bob Filner Sentenced, 
NBC SAN DIEGO (Dec. 9, 2013, 8:17 PM), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Former-Mayor-Bob-
Filner-to-Be-Sentenced-Monday-234905381.html. 
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Despite the opinions on each side regarding the effectiveness of a strong-mayor structure 
in other California cities, research has shown the system to be equally as effective as council-
manager governance.60 Both forms of government generally champion citizens’ needs in equal 
ways.61 No form of government is perfect, but both can be successful as long as those elected put 
the needs of the people first.62 
 
B. Sacramento’s Prior Strong-Mayor Governments 
 
In 1849, the electorate of the soon-to-be formed City of Sacramento voted to adopt the 
Sacramento City Charter, thereby establishing Sacramento as a municipality.63 The charter 
reflected voters’ desires to move away from the alcalde court system, which the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo established, and to implement a form of governance more reflective of the 
democratic process in the local governments of the eastern states from which they had 
emigrated.64 The form of government created was analogous to today’s strong-mayor form of 
government.65 Borrowing from the Spanish tradition, the 1849 charter created a “council-
alcalde” system.66 An “alcalde” is a traditional municipal magistrate who had both judicial and 
administrative functions.67 In the modern Spanish language, alcalde is the equivalent of the 
English word mayor.68  
 
The council-alcalde form of government in Sacramento was brief; the Legislature passed 
a law in 1858 that consolidated city and county governments into one municipal system.69 In 
                                                 
60 Sam Sturgis, Strong Mayor, Weak Mayor, No Mayor—In Terms of Policy, It May Not Matter Much, 
CITY LAB (July 31, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/07/strong-mayor-weak-mayor-no-
mayorin-terms-of-policy-it-may-not-matter-much/375347/. 
61 Id. 
62 Lisa Nisenson, Romper Room: The Strong Mayor versus Strong City Manager Debate, THIS WEEK IN 
SARASOTA (July 27, 2012), http://www.thisweekinsarasota.com/2012/07/romper-room-the-strong-mayor-
versus-strong-city-manager-debate/. 
63 Kathryn Gaeddert, Introduction, For the Record: Catalog of the Public Records, City of Sacramento 
1849–1982, Sacramento County, 1848–1982, CENTER FOR SACRAMENTO HISTORY, at 3 (Mar. 1, 1982), 
available at http://pdf.oac.cdlib.org/pdf/samcc/forrecor.pdf. 
64 Id. 
65 Interview with Phil Isenberg, former mayor, City of Sacramento, in Sacramento, Cal. (Oct. 2, 2014) 
[“Isenberg interview”] (notes on file with the California Initiative Review); Your City in Action! The City 
of Sacramento Charter Revision, LIBRARY BUZZ (Aug. 20, 2009), 
http://apps.lib.csus.edu/blogs/blog/2009/08/20/your-city-in-action-the-city-of-sacramento-charter-
revision/. 
66 Isenberg interview, supra note 65; Your City in Action! The City of Sacramento Charter Revision, 
LIBRARY BUZZ (Aug. 20, 2009), http://apps.lib.csus.edu/blogs/blog/2009/08/20/your-city-in-action-the-
city-of-sacramento-charter-revision/. 
67 Alcalde, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/13206/alcalde (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
68 Id. 
69 Isenberg interview, supra note 65; NELLIE MAY HENDERSON COLE, CONSOLIDATION OF SACRAMENTO 
CITY AND COUNTY GOVERNMENT, 1858–1863 (1958). 
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1863, that radical change was overturned, and Sacramento returned to a mayor-council form of 
governance, which lasted until 1911.70  
 
Although the city governance change several times throughout the century, it took until 
1989 for a citizen commission to recommend a strong-mayor system in Sacramento, along with a 
return to a consolidated city and county government.71 Thus, the “new” concept of a strong-
mayor system in Sacramento is actually not new at all, but rather reflects the ebb and flow of 
ideas regarding forms of governance.72 
 
C. Recent Sacramento Strong-Mayor Proposals 
 
 Prior to Measure L, there were three strong-mayor proposals, beginning with a version 
Sacramento Mayor Kevin Johnson advocated for shortly after taking office in 2008.73  
 
1. 2009 Citizen Initiative 
 
In 2009, the city council voted to support a citizen-proposed strong-mayor initiative if 
enough citizen support was gathered through petition circulation to place it on the June 2010 
ballot.74 The measure would have given the mayor power akin to that of a chief executive 
officer. The mayor would have taken on the duties of the city manager, including preparing 
budgets and appointing and removing the city manager, clerk, treasurer, and attorney, as well as 
most other city employees.75 The mayor no longer would have been a member of the city 
council, but would have been able to veto council decisions.76 To ensure that there would not be 
a tie vote in city council decisions, a ninth district would have been added.77  
 
At the same time that the council voiced its support for the initiative, the council 
recognized that the measure, as drafted, could have been unconstitutional.78 The initiative would 
have altered nine articles of the Sacramento City Charter.79 The breadth of these changes would 
                                                 
70 Isenberg interview, supra note 65; Your City in Action! The City of Sacramento Charter Revision, 
LIBRARY BUZZ (Aug. 20, 2009), http://apps.lib.csus.edu/blogs/blog/2009/08/20/your-city-in-action-the-
city-of-sacramento-charter-revision/. 
71 Ed Salzman, Mayors Move to Power in California City Halls, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 1989), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-07-23/opinion/op-115_1_city-council-member. 
72 Isenberg interview, supra note 65. 
73 Craig Powell, Welcome Back, Strong Mayor, INSIDE PUBLICATIONS (Nov. 30, 2013), 
http://www.insidepublications.org/index.php/inside-city-hall/522-welcome-back-strong-mayor [“Powell”]  
Mayor Kevin Johnson, CITY OF SACRAMENTO, http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/Mayor-
Council/Districts/Mayor (last visited Sept. 1, 2014). 
74 EILEEN TEICHERT, STRONG MAYOR INITIATIVE LEGAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS 3 (2009), available at 
http://sacramento.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=22&clip_id=2085&meta_id=184461 
[“TEICHERT”]. 
75 Id. at 3–4. 
76 Id. at 4. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 3. 
79 Id. at 7. 
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have amounted to a city charter revision, rather than an amendment.80 Since the California 
Constitution does not allow a city to revise its charter through the initiative process unless its city 
council places the measure on the ballot, the proposed initiative could have been found 
unconstitutional.81 Despite a warning from the city attorney regarding the possible 
unconstitutionality of the measure, it was placed on the ballot.82 
 
 As a result, Bill Camp of the Sacramento Central Labor Council filed suit for a 
preliminary injunction to prevent a vote on the initiative before its constitutionality was 
adjudicated.83 The parties ultimately agreed that the initiative the electorate proposed was 
beyond voters’ power, so city officials removed it from the ballot, but the council did create a 
charter review committee to make recommendations for future charter revisions.84 
 
2. 2010 Council Proposal 
 
 When the citizen-driven initiative was enjoined, the city council did consider placing a 
new charter revision on the June 2010 ballot.85 That version would not have given the mayor 
power to appoint the city attorney and other employees.86 However, it would still have limited 
the number of terms to which the mayor and council members could be elected and given the 
mayor appointment power for the city manager position.87 The revisions would have had a 
“sunset,” or expiration date, without voter re-approval.88 The city council did not vote to place 
the measure on the ballot, much to Mayor Johnson’s disappointment, because members said the 
mayor had not presented any evidence that the existing council-manager system was not 
working.89  
 
                                                 
80 Id. at 5, 7–10. 
81 Id. at 5, 10. 
82 Camp v. Sacramento, No. 34-2009-00065404, at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento Jan. 21, 2010) (order 
granting preliminary injunction). 
83 Id. 
84 Camp v. Sacramento, No. 34-2009-00065404 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento filed Dec. 15, 2010) 
(stipulated judgment); WILLIAM EDGAR ET AL., SACRAMENTO CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL 
REPORT 24 (2009), http://www.cityofsacramento.org/charter/documents/CRC_Final_Report.pdf 
[“EDGAR”]. 
85 KUNAL MERCHANT, REPORT BACK: CHARTER REFORM PACKAGE 2 (2010), available at 
http://sacramento.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=22&clip_id=2205&meta_id=191740. 
86 Kathleen Haley, Johnson Aims to Put Strong Mayor Plan on November Ballot, SACRAMENTO PRESS 
(Feb. 16, 2010, 2:02 PM), http://sacramentopress.com/2010/02/16/johnson-aims-to-put-strong-mayor-
plan-on-november-ballot/. 
87 Id. 
88 KUNAL MERCHANT, REPORT BACK: CHARTER REFORM PACKAGE 1 (2010), available at 
http://sacramento.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=22&clip_id=2205&meta_id=191740. 
89 Nick Miller, Sacramento City Council Approves Strong Mayor Vote for 2014 at Drama-Free Meeting 
(Boring! So Let’s Watch an Old Video of K.J. Chewing out his Colleagues), SACRAMENTO NEWS & 
REVIEW (Nov. 6, 2013, 2:34 PM), 
http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/pageburner/blogs/post?oid=11973042; Sacramento Council 
Votes Against Strong-Mayor Plan, RECORDNET.COM (June 23, 2010, 8:42 AM), 
http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100623/A_NEWS/100629945. 
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3. 2012 Expanded Council Proposal 
 
After the initial attempts to place a measure on the 2010 ballot did not move forward, 
Mayor Johnson introduced a different proposal in 2012, which similarly did not make it to the 
ballot.90 The new mayoral powers that would have been granted were largely the same, but the 
plan would have added a ninth council district and council seat, as well as created an “at-large” 
council member position, bringing the total number of council seats to ten.91 The at-large 
member would have been elected city-wide, just like the mayor, and would have cast votes on 
behalf of the entire city since the mayor would no longer be able to vote.92 Because there would 
have been an even number of council members, however, the mayor would have been able to 
cast tie-breaker votes.93  
 
4. 2014 Measure L 
 
For the latest iteration, Sacramento Tomorrow took over the movement to promote a 
strong-mayor government in the city.94 The group and its 28 advisory committee members 
worked to create a new proposal, and planned to reach out to the community for feedback.95 
Very little feedback was sought, however, and voters did not have a chance to review the group’s 
recommendations.96 
 
In November 2013, the Sacramento City Council approved a resolution to place a 
revision to the city charter on the November 2014 ballot.97 That resolution ultimately became 
Measure L.98 The resolution is very similar to Mayor Johnson’s last proposal, but with slight 
changes, including a limit of three terms for the mayor, rather than two.99 Four council 
members—Angelique Ashby, Steve Cohn, Jay Schenirer, and Allen Warren—and Mayor 
Johnson voted in support, while council members Darrell Fong, Steve Hansen, Kevin McCarty, 
and Bonnie Pannell opposed the resolution.100 Council member Hansen is now leading the 
charge against Measure L with support from former Sacramento mayors Anne Rudin and 
Heather Fargo, the League of Women Voters, and the Democratic Party of Sacramento County, 
                                                 
90 See Powell, supra note 73 (stating that the court stopped the first proposal in 2009 and the city council 
did not support proposals in 2010 and 2012). 
91 Antonio Harvey, City Council Votes Against Strong Mayor, For Charter Commission, SACRAMENTO 
OBSERVER (Feb. 8, 2012), http://sacobserver.com/2012/02/city-council-votes-against-strong-mayor-for-
charter-commission/. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Powell, supra note 73. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.; Interview with Matthew Ruyak, Assistant City Attorney, City of Sacramento, in Sacramento, Cal. 
(Sept. 3, 2014) (notes on file with the California Initiative Review). 
97 SACRAMENTO CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013–0362, at 3 (2013). 
98 Ryan Lillis, Sacramento Councilman Steve Hansen to Lead Opposition to Strong-Mayor Plan, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 19, 2014, 12:00 a.m.), 
http://www.sacbee.com/2014/08/19/6637677/sacramento-councilman-steve-hansen.html [“Lillis-
Hansen”]. 
99 Powell, supra note 73. 
100 SACRAMENTO CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013–0362, at 3 (2013). 
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while Mayor Johnson has found allies in state Senator Darrell Steinberg, former Sacramento 
mayor Phil Isenberg, former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and several unions.101 
 
IV. PROPOSED LAW 
 
 Measure L seeks to enact significant changes to the roles of the city council, mayor, and 
city manager, as well as how the budget is proposed and approved.102 
 
A. The City Council: Article III 
 
Measure L would reduce the size of the city council from nine to eight council members, 
removing the mayor as a member.103 As such, this new composition of council members has the 
potential to lead to ties on ordinances and other measures that come before the body for a vote.104 
Measure L does not provide a provision to remedy tie votes that result from a council of eight 
members.105 
The council would also be required to elect a president and vice president from amongst 
its members.106 In the mayor’s absence from the city, the president and vice president would 
serve as mayor in their respective order, and would assume all the vested rights and powers of 
the mayor with the significant exceptions of “the power of any veto or any other discretionary 
privilege that is enjoyed” by the mayor.107 
 
The enactment of Measure L would impose term limits on council members.108 
Specifically, each city council member would only be permitted to serve three, four-year 
terms.109 This change would not apply retroactively to terms already served by existing council 
members.110 
 
                                                 
101 Lillis-Hansen, supra note 98; CITY OF SACRAMENTO, ARGUMENT AGAINST MEASURE L, available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_Against.pdf 
[“AGAINST”]; CITY OF SACRAMENTO, REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT AGAINST MEASURE L, available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_Against.pdf 
[“REBUTTAL TO AGAINST”]. 
102 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf. 
103 Id. § 21 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 21 and adding SACRAMENTO, CAL. 
CHARTER, art. IV, § 47). 
104 Forum, supra note 11 (statements of council member Steve Hansen and Nancy Miller, partner, Miller 
& Owen). 
105 Id. 
106 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 21 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, 
§ 45). 
107 Id. § 19 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 45). 
108 Id. § 7 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 26). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
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In addition, Measure L seeks to add two requirements relating to community interaction 
and involvement.111 First, Measure L would require that the city council hold at least two of its 
city council meetings per year outside of its chambers.112 The purpose of this requirement is to 
“improve citizen involvement and accessibility to [council] meetings.”113 The revision would 
also require voter approval for increases in council member compensation that exceed five 
percent.114 Second, Measure L would require the city council to establish by ordinance a 
“Neighborhood Advisory Committee,” with the intended purpose of “considering the interests of 
the city’s neighborhoods.”115 The text of Measure L does not elaborate on the intended duties or 
responsibilities of this committee, and thus it is not clear what the scope of this newly-
established body would be.116 
 
B. The Mayor: Article IV 
 
Under Measure L, the position of mayor would be transformed from being a largely 
symbolic “presiding officer,” to the role of the city’s chief executive officer.117 In addition, the 
basic description of the mayor’s role would be expanded to provide that he or she “shall have the 
executive and administrative authorities, powers, and responsibilities of the city as provided 
herein, including but not limited to the power and duty to execute and enforce all laws, 
ordinances, and polices of the city.”118 Measure L would make specific changes to the mayor’s 
“authorities, powers, and responsibilities,” as they relate to the city’s annual budget, the mayor’s 
place and role within the governance structure, the mayor’s administrative powers, and the 
mayor’s interaction and community involvement.119 A mayor would be limited to three, four-
year terms.120 This limit, however, would not apply retroactively to the current mayor’s 
previously-served terms.121 
 
1. The Mayor’s Interaction with the City Council 
 
As discussed above,122 Measure L would remove the mayor as a voting member of the 
city council, thereby reducing the number of council members from nine to eight.123 In the 
mayor’s new role, he or she would retain the right, but would not be obligated, to “attend and be 
                                                 
111 Id. §§ 11, 16 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, §§ 31, 38). 
112 Id. § 11 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 31). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. § 10 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 29). 
115 Id. § 16 (adding SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 38). 
116 Id.; Interview with Steve Hansen, council member, City of Sacramento, in Sacramento, Cal. (Sept. 30, 
2014) [“Hansen interview”] (notes on file with the California Initiative Review). 
117 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 17 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, 
§ 40). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. § 18 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 43). 
121 Id. 
122 Supra Part IV.A. 
123 Id. § 21 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 21). 
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heard” at city council meetings.124 The mayor would not have a right to vote on matters before 
the council.125 Because the mayor is no longer a member of the council, the newly composed 
council of eight members presents the opportunity for tie votes on ordinances and other measures 
that come before the body.126 Measure L, however, does not provide a remedy for how tie votes 
will be broken.127 
 
2. The Annual Budget 
 
Measure L would transfer the responsibility and power to propose the city’s annual 
budget from the city manager to the mayor.128 The mayor would be required to propose an 
annual budget to the city council no later than 90 days before the start of each fiscal year.129 
Following the city council’s review, alteration of, and passage of a budget, under Measure L, the 
mayor would possess line-item veto power, which means that he or she would have the power to 
unilaterally strike specific portions of the council’s approved budget in part or in entirety.130  
 
3. New Executive Powers – The Mayoral Veto Power 
 
In addition to the mayor’s existing authority to propose ordinances and resolutions for the 
city council to consider, Measure L would give the mayor veto power over any ordinances the 
council passed.131 This mayoral veto power is akin to the veto power of other executive heads, 
such as the president and the governor.132 
 
Measure L would limit the mayor’s veto power.133 Specifically, the mayor would not 
have veto power over “urgency” ordinances—those that would either take effect immediately 
upon adoption or less than 30 days after adoption—relating to an election, an emergency, or an 
ordinance adopted pursuant to a state law.134 In addition, the mayor would lack veto power over 
                                                 
124 Id. § 17 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 40(b)(4)). 
125 Id.  
126 Forum, supra note 11 (statements of council member Steve Hansen and Nancy Miller, partner, Miller 
& Owen). 
127 Id. 
128 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 17 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, 
§ 40(b)(6)). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id.; SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 40(b)(5). 
132 AGAINST, supra note 101. 
133 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 21 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (adding SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 
47). 
134Id.; SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 32(g). 
 154 
 
ordinances adopting the recommendations of the Independent Citizens’ Redistricting 
Commission, which Measure L’s revisions would create.135 
 
The mayor would be required to review all adopted ordinances and resolutions and 
approve or veto them within ten days of the city council’s adoption.136 If the mayor were to take 
no action on a measure, it would be deemed approved.137 If the mayor were to exercise the veto 
power, however, he or she must include an explanation of the basis for that decision.138 The 
council would have 30 days to reconsider a vetoed matter, but could only override the mayor’s 
veto if the reconsidered ordinance or resolution receives at least six council votes in favor of its 
adoption.139 
 
4. City Manager Appointment 
 
A significant new authority under Measure L would be the mayor’s right to appoint the 
city manager, a power currently vested in the city council.140 While the city council’s right to 
confirm the appointee would restrict this power, the mayor’s ability to remove the city manager 
would not be subject to any outside approval and would not require good cause.141 Furthermore, 
Measure L would require the mayor to hold an open meeting at which citizens may ask questions 
regarding the qualifications of the candidates for city manager before making an appointment.142 
 
5. Community Interaction  
 
If enacted, Measure L would require that the mayor address the citizens of Sacramento on 
an annual basis through a “State of the City” address.143 Similar to the executive addresses of the 
president and governors, the mayor’s State of the City statement would not just address the 
                                                 
135 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 21 (2013), available at 
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http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, 
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general status of city government, but would also include the mayor’s policy recommendations 
for the coming year.144 Measure L would also require the mayor to host and participate in at least 
two “town hall” meetings each year as a means of receiving public input.145 Measure L does not 
indicate how the mayor should utilize such public input in formulating ordinances or policy.146 
 
C. The City Manager: Article V 
 
Measure L seeks to significantly alter the role and authorities prescribed to the city 
manager.147 No longer appointed by the city council, the city manager would be appointed by the 
mayor, with confirmation by the council.148 Specifically, the city council would have ten 
business days to either confirm or reject a mayoral city manager appointee.149 Failure to confirm 
or reject would constitute approval.150  
 
Measure L most dramatically seeks to alter the process by which the city manager may be 
removed from office.151 If approved by the voters, under Measure L the city manager would be 
subject to dismissal per the mayor, without council notification or approval.152 This proposed 
change is in stark contrast to the charter’s current procedure for removal of the city manager, 
which prohibits such action unless at least six members of the city council vote in favor of such 
removal.153 The current charter specifies that no city manager may be removed within the first 
twelve months of his or her term of office, except for cause.154 This provision would no longer 
exist if Measure L is enacted.155 
 
Functionally, the overall role of the city manager in citywide government would be 
dramatically altered from the position’s current status.156 No longer would the city manager be 
the city’s chief executive officer, but would become the city’s chief administrative officer.157 
Similarly, the charter’s overall description of the position’s purpose would be amended to read 
that the city manager is “acting on the mayor’s behalf and in furtherance of the mayor’s powers” 
when he or she carries out the position’s duties.158 
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D. The Annual Budget: Article IX 
 
In addition to transferring the power to propose the budget from the city manager to the 
mayor, Measure L would establish the Office of the Independent Budget Analyst. 159 The city 
council would be responsible for appointing the head of that office, whose duties would be “to 
assist and advise the city council in conducting budgetary inquiries and in making budgetary 
decisions.”160 The independent budget analyst would be subject to removal by the council, at any 
time with or without cause.161 
 
The city council would be required to hold a minimum of two public hearings on the 
proposed budget within a specified timeframe.162 Upon the city council’s request, the 
independent budget analyst would provide an unbiased analysis of the mayor’s proposed 
budget.163 Once these procedures are complete, the city council would be required to adopt a 
budget no less than 30 days before the start of each fiscal year.164  
 
As discussed previously, the mayor would have the ability to approve or veto the budget, 
or exercise a line-item veto.165 The only limitation placed on the mayor’s line-item veto power 
would be the restriction that he or she may not veto any portion of the proposed budget relating 
to the city council’s own internal expenditures.166 Once the mayor’s review of the budget was 
complete, any sections approved would become effective immediately.167  
 
Measure L would clarify that the city’s annual budget may be amended, revised, or 
modified at any point during the fiscal year, so long as such an amendment, revision, or 
modification follows the procedure outlined above.168 
 
E. Other Major Charter Changes 
 
Measure L would also add several significant sections to the charter related to ethics and 
government transparency.169 
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1. Reapportionment and Redistricting 
 
Measure L seeks to establish a nine-member independent redistricting commission to 
establish the boundaries of city council districts, thereby removing that power from the city 
council.170 The city council would have to pass an ordinance that establishes the commission, 
denotes qualifications required of members, and establishes a process by which members shall be 
appointed to serve on the commission no later than 180 days after voters approve Measure L.171 
The city council and the mayor would be precluded from taking part in any commission member 
appointments.172 Upon conclusion of a regular United States census, the commission would 
examine council district boundaries to ensure compliance with population regulations, and adopt 
modifications to those boundaries, if necessary.173 Under the existing charter, this is a duty the 
city council holds.174 Furthermore, any boundary modifications the commission made would be 
sent to the council, and the council would be required to adopt the commission’s findings 
without making changes to them.175  
 
2. Ethics and Transparency 
 
Measure L would require the city council to take two direct actions to ensure ethical 
conduct and transparency.176 Specifically, the city council would be required to adopt a “Code of 
Ethics and Conduct” and a “Sunshine Ordinance.”177 
 
a. Code of Ethics and Conduct 
 
If approved, Measure L would require the city council to develop and adopt a “Code of 
Ethics and Conduct,” for all city officials and appointed members of boards, commissions, and 
committees.178 The council would be required to adopt this code of conduct within 180 days of 
Measure L’s passage.179 Aside from the requirement that the code include a procedure for 
removing any elected official or appointed member from office who “substantially violates” the 
code, no other substantive details of what the code would or should contain are included in 
Measure L’s text.180 Similarly, the text of Measure L also does not stipulate any consequences if 
the council fails to adopt a code of ethics.181 
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 Measure L would also require the city council to adopt an ordinance establishing an 
ethics committee for the purpose of the ongoing review and monitoring of the “Code of Ethics 
and Conduct.”182 In creating this committee, the council would have the discretion to determine 
the required qualifications and conditions of service of future committee members, including any 
compensation for service, reimbursement for expenses, terms of office, and methods for 
appointment and removal from office, so costs are currently unknown.183 Measure L clarifies 
that this newly established ethics committee “is not a board, commission, or advisory agency for 
purposes of Article XV or § 40.”184 Article XV of the charter defines what boards, commissions, 
and advisory agencies are, and delegates powers and responsibilities.185 Section 40 delegates the 
power to appoint or remove members of boards, commissions, and advisory agencies to the 
mayor.186 Thus, Measure L’s articulation that the ethics committee is not a board, commission, 
or advisory agency seems to be have been included simply to make clear that it will not have 
substantive powers.187 
 
b. Sunshine Ordinance 
 
In addition, if Measure L is approved, the city council would be required to adopt a so-
called “Sunshine Ordinance” within 180 days of its passage.188 The stated purpose of this 
ordinance would be to “liberally provide for the public’s access to city government meetings, 
documents, and records.”189 It is not apparent how Measure L’s Sunshine Ordinance would 
differ from existing open government laws, as Measure L does not specify the precise content of 
the future ordinance.190 
 
The preeminent existing law that requires transparency in local government proceedings 
is the Ralph M. Brown Act (the Brown Act), which the Legislature approved in 1953.191 The 
Brown Act statutorily guarantees the public’s right of access to local government meetings.192 
The Brown Act also places significant restrictions on how local governments may convene to 
                                                 
182 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 15 (2013), available at 
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conduct public business as a means of ensuring the public’s right of access to such 
proceedings.193 
 
Because Measure L does not specify the exact provisions of the Sunshine Ordinance, it is 
unclear at this time if the intention is that the ordinance should exceed the requirements of 
existing law.194 It should be noted, however, that local governments do have the ability to impose 
requirements of open government and transparency that exceed the requirements of the Brown 
Act.195 
 
3. Voter Authorization Provisions 
 
Finally, Measure L also includes provisions requiring prior voter authorization for future 
changes to certain sections of the charter.196 For example, the proposed amendments related to 
reapportionment and redistricting, if passed, could only be amended if a majority of the voters 
held as such in a regular election.197 The rest of Measure L’s proposed changes would “sunset,” 
or expire, on December 31, 2020, and would be automatically repealed and removed from the 
charter.198 However, Measure L would require the council to place a measure on the ballot at an 
election no later than November 3, 2020 to allow voters to consider whether to make Measure 
L’s changes permanent.199  
 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL AND CITY CHARTER IMPLICATIONS 
 
A. Single-Subject Rule 
 
The California Constitution imposes a single-subject rule on all initiatives put before the 
electorate.200 This rule applies to all initiatives, whether they are put on the statewide ballot or a 
local ballot.201 The single-subject rule says an initiative is permissible only if “all of its parts are 
reasonably germane to each other, and to the general purpose or object of the initiative.”202 This 
rule, however, applies only to initiatives, and not to other types of ballot measures.203  
 
The California Constitution provides two ways to amend a city charter with the voters for 
approval: (1) by an initiative qualified for the ballot through the procedures outlined in the 
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California Election Code or (2) by a ballot measure sponsored by the governing body of a 
municipality.204  
 
By definition, an initiative is “the power of the electors to propose statutes and 
amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.” 205 The California Election Code 
sets forth the initiative process whereby the electorate may draft and approve laws.206 An 
initiative may only be put before the electorate for approval after satisfying various requirements, 
including having the Secretary of State certify its language and obtaining a specified number of 
signatures when the initiative is circulated for pre-ballot approval.207 
 
Similarly, the California Constitution vests power in a city’s governing body to propose 
by ballot measure ordinances and changes to a city’s charter.208 The distinctive differences 
between the power vested in the electorate and the power vested in a governing body are the 
name attributed to each proposal (‘initiative’ for the former, ‘ballot measure’ for the latter) and 
in the process by which such proposals make it to the ballot.209 
 
Thus, given the clear language of the Constitution, a ballot measure proposed by a city’s 
governing body is not, by definition, an initiative.210 Because Measure L’s origin lies with the 
city council and not the electorate, it is by definition a ballot measure, and is therefore not 
subject to the limitations of the single-subject rule.211 
 
B. Charter Revision versus Charter Amendment 
 
A city’s charter may be changed via one of two methods: by amendment or by 
revision.212 Whether a change is an amendment or a revision is determined by how substantial 
the proposed change would be.213 Furthermore, a charter amendment may be proposed by the 
electorate through the initiative process or by a ballot measure sponsored by the city’s governing 
body.214 Conversely, a charter revision may only be proposed by the city’s governing body 
through a ballot measure.215 
 
“Although the Constitution does not define the terms ‘amendment’ or ‘revision,’ the 
courts have developed some guidelines” for their interpretation.216 An amendment is a less 
substantial change; one that does not substantially alter the Constitution (or a charter) in any 
                                                 
204 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(b); Hernandez, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 21. 
205 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a). 
206 CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9255–9269 (West 2014). 
207 Id.; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b)–(c). 
208 CAL. CONST. art. XI § 3(b); CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1–2. 
209 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a) (defining the initiative power); CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(b) (vesting right to 
adopt, amend, or revise a charter).  
210 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a). 
211 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (b); Hernandez, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 21–22. 
212 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a). 
213 Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990). 
214 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(b); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a). 
215 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(b). 
216 Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 350. 
 161 
 
meaningful quantitative or qualitative fashion.217 Conversely, a revision is a more substantial, 
far-reaching change.218 The courts have developed a two-part test for determining whether a 
proposed change is simply an amendment, or if it rises to the level of a revision.219 That test 
measures both the quantitative and qualitative effects that the proposed measure would have on a 
charter, and if the effect of either category is substantial, the courts will find the proposed 
measure to be a revision.220 
 
 The same provision of the California Constitution that authorizes a city to adopt a 
charter also authorizes the governing body of a city to amend or revise the city’s charter.221 
Conversely, only the power to amend a charter, not revise it, is given to the voters.222 Thus, a 
revision to a city’s charter may only be accomplished when a city’s governing body votes to 
place the revision on the ballot, and it is subsequently approved by the voters.223 This is why the 
original attempt to place a citizen-proposed strong-mayor initiative on the ballot was deemed 
unconstitutional, because it constituted a substantial revision, not a simple amendment.224 
Because Measure L also seeks to accomplish a revision to city’s charter, it was properly placed 
on the ballot as a ballot measure sponsored by the city council, not through the initiative 
process.225 
 
VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 Measure L’s main support comes from the group “Sacramento Tomorrow,” which 
includes developer Angelo Tsakopoulos and Mayor Kevin Johnson.226 Council member Steve 
Hansen, who represents central Sacramento, Land Park, and part of Natomas, leads “Stop the 
Power Grab,” the coalition of Measure L opponents.227 Both sides are passionate about their 
arguments for and against the measure.228 Neither side, however, has undertaken a fiscal analysis 
of the measure. As a result, there are open questions regarding how much different portions of 
the revision will cost.229 
 
Proponents admit the “city is well-served by its city manager and current form of 
government,” but believe Measure L would be an improvement.230 Opponents are not swayed; 
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with recent successes under the current structure, like the development of the new Kings 
basketball arena, they seek more concrete proof that a strong-mayor system would be better able 
to accomplish similar tasks.231 This section will examine the arguments on both sides of Measure 
L.232 
 
A. The City Council: Article III 
 
 Under the strong-mayor government, the city council would continue to have eight 
members elected from districts each representing one-eighth of the city, but the mayor would no 
longer have a council seat or vote.233 Some argue the mayor could get the authority to cast a tie-
breaker vote, since there will be an even number of council members.234 Those opposing 
Measure L insist allowing the mayor to vote in the event of a tie is inappropriate.235  
 
At this time, however, there is no protocol in event of a tie under Measure L.236 A vote of 
four-to-four would mean an ordinance would not pass.237 Proponents say this probably will not 
be a problem, or will only be a minor issue, although admit both sides are speculating.238 They 
point out that five votes will be required just as in the existing system.239 But, five votes under 
the proposed system require the support of 62.5 percent of the council, rather than just over 55 
percent, which opponents say is higher than appropriate.240 It is interesting to note that if 
Sacramento already had a five-vote requirement and a non-voting mayor, Measure L would not 
be on the ballot since the five-four vote would have been a tie without the mayor’s vote .241 
 
Although each member’s representation and vote would not change, they would lose 
some of their authority.242 For example, the city council would no longer appoint the city 
manager, and the mayor would be able to veto city council-approved ordinances and budgets.243 
Because the mayor will have more power at the expense of the city council as a whole, Measure 
L opponents assert council members will have difficulty serving their constituents in the most 
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positive way.244 They decry the shift in power away from nine people to one person—the 
mayor.245 
 
There is an emphasis on interaction between the city council and community through 
Measure L’s creation of a Neighborhood Advisory Committee.246 The text of the measure, 
however, leaves the details of this committee completely open.247 Supporters insist this was to 
make Measure L more comprehendible and ensure it did not get bogged down with minor details 
as past versions did.248 Opponents are a little more cynical.249 They call the committee and other 
components of the measure that require future ordinances “sweeteners,” saying each could be 
implemented by ordinance now, without a vote on Measure L, if they were truly important.250 
They believe way the measure is written, however, makes the committee seem as if it will be 
non-substantive because it is not a “commission,” which would have the power to make 
changes.251 Still, supporters maintain that the committee will be an integral part of the city 
government because its meetings will be open to the public and the city council may take its 
suggestions under advisement.252  
 
Measure L’s opponents do not believe it is necessary to change the power structure 
because the city council and mayor have worked together to achieve so many positive things, 
including creating a budget surplus and keeping the Kings in Sacramento.253 Supporters assert, 
however, that balancing the budget, creating jobs, and reducing crime would be streamlined with 
a strong-mayor system.254 
 
B. The Mayor: Article IV 
 
In Sacramento’s current council-manager system, the mayor is a “figurehead,” attending 
ribbon cuttings and promoting the city for tourism.255 Yet, citizens expect the mayor to solve 
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251 Hansen interview, supra note 116. 
252 Forum, supra note 11 (statement of Nancy Miller, partner, Miller & Owen). 
253 REBUTTAL TO FAVOR, supra note 10. 
254 REBUTTAL TO AGAINST, supra note 101. 
255 See Ryan Lillis, Kevin Johnson Stakes Legacy on Boosting Mayor’s Clout, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 
28, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/2014/09/28/6741253/kevin-johnson-stakes-legacy-on.html 
(discussing mayor’s limited power). 
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citywide problems and take responsibility for government decisions.256 Measure L supporters, 
including former mayor Phil Isenberg, believe the measure will bring the mayor’s duties and 
abilities better in line with public expectations.257 
 
1. From Figurehead to CEO 
 
Measure L proponents decry the fact that the city manager—currently the equivalent of a 
chief executive officer—is not elected.258 That is why they want the elected mayor to take on 
CEO-type duties, including managing police and fire services.259 But, the mayor may not have 
any business or management experience, which is why cities hire professional managers.260 
Therefore, Measure L is a hybrid, where the city can benefit from the manager’s expertise and 
the mayor’s accountability, according to supporters.261 
 
Consolidation of power could also make city departments more effective, according to 
supporters, because the mayor would have a greater ability to hold them accountable than the 
city manager can while he or she is beholden to the varied interests of council members.262 
Opponents see this as an opportunity for the mayor to do whatever he or she wishes with city 
services, without any accountability until, possibly, the next election.263  
 
The term limits imposed on the mayor would, according to supporters, provide a check 
on the mayor’s power.264 The city manager is unelected, but Measure L proponents prefer 
placing that much power into the hands of someone who can be removed through an election or, 
if he or she is reelected, at the end of a set number of terms.265 Some opposed to Measure L do 
not believe a vote every four years is enough to balance the amount of power that would be 
vested in the mayor.266 Others do not like term limits because placing an artificial limit on the 
time an official can be in office “inappropriately constrains the options of the electorate.”267 
 
2. Mayoral Veto Power 
 
 Although the mayor would be able to veto city council decisions, Measure L proponents 
note that this does not give ultimate power to the mayor because the veto can be overridden.268 
                                                 
256 Isenberg interview, supra note 65. 
257 Id. 
258 IN FAVOR, supra note 9. 
259 Id. 
260 Forum, supra note 11 (statement of Heather Fargo, former mayor, City of Sacramento. 
261 Id. (statement of Daniel Conway, chief of staff, Mayor Kevin Johnson). 
262 Jeffery Cassity, Opinion: Sacramento Would be Better with a “Strong Mayor”, SACRAMENTO PRESS 
(Nov. 29, 2013, 7:47 PM), http://sacramentopress.com/2013/11/29/opinion-sacramento-would-be-better-
with-a-strong-mayor/. 
263 AGAINST, supra note 101. 
264 IN FAVOR, supra note 9. 
265 See Stu Woo, “Weak” Mayor Seeks Assist to Reshape Sacramento, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2009, 12:01 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB125997450276377729 (quoting Mayor Kevin Johnson). 
266 REBUTTAL TO FAVOR, supra note 10. 
267 EDGAR, supra note 84. 
268 IN FAVOR, supra note 9. 
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But, six members, or 75 percent of the council, would have to vote to override the veto, which 
would give the mayor more power than any Governor or the President because the supermajority 
required is larger than that at the State or Federal level.269  
 
 How a mayor may use the veto power is unknown, but supporters say it removes any 
“temporary block to council actions, or conversely, a temporary block to the mayor’s actions.”270 
Former mayor Phil Isenberg speculated that it will be reserved for fundamental issues.271 Now, 
there is an incentive for the mayor and city council to not make sweeping, and perhaps 
controversial, decisions because one would need the support of four others.272 Veto power may 
thus encourage more change.273 
 
The community may not want the mayor to have this power; a citizen-run committee 
engaged to make recommendations regarding a strong-mayor government in Sacramento voted 
overwhelmingly to condemn mayoral veto power.274 Of course, Measure L opponents also feel it 
is an inappropriate amount of power to vest in one person.275 
 
3. Appointment Power 
 
Measure L proponents emphasize the positive checks and balances that would occur if 
the mayor appointed the city manager with council concurrence and a public meeting about the 
proposed city manager’s qualifications.276 Those against Measure L, however, stress the fact that 
the mayor can remove the city manager at will can cut against these checks and balances.277  
 
The mayor’s appointment power under Measure L would be more limited than under past 
strong-mayor proposals in Sacramento.278 This revision, however, still divides city employees 
into those responsible to the mayor and those who answer to the city council, which could make 
the city’s hierarchy confusing.279 Community members who prefer the current council-manager 
government see advantages in a “unified structure…[with] a single consolidated group of 
professional staff under the direction of the city manager, who is responsible to the full city 
council,” including the mayor.280 
 
 
                                                 
269 AGAINST, supra note 101. 
270 Isenberg interview, supra note 65. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 EDGAR, supra note 84 (showing a vote of 10–1 against granting veto power). 
275 Hansen interview, supra note 116. 
276 YES ON MEASURE L, FACTS ON CHARTER REVISION, http://yesonmeasurel.org/facts-on-charter-
revision/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). 
277 STOP THE POWER GRAB, http://stopthepowergrab.org/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
278 See TEICHERT, supra note 74 (listing appointment duties that would have been granted under the 2009 
initiative). 
279 EDGAR, supra note 84. 
280 Id. 
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4. Community Interaction  
 
 Since under Measure L, the mayor would no longer be a voting member of the city 
council, opponents decry that the mayor can choose not to attend meetings.281 They assert a 
mayor could theoretically never hear the concerns of Sacramento citizens if he or she did not go 
to city council meetings, and could make decisions based solely on meetings with private 
individuals or groups.282 There could be “far less public access to the mayor.”283 This would also 
be a circumvention of the Brown Act if the mayor does not attend meetings for which public 
access is required under the act.284 Of course, even if a mayor does attend meetings, he or she is 
not required to take community comments made at those meetings under consideration when 
making decisions.285  
 
Supporters of Measure L counter criticism about the omission of Brown Act standards by 
pointing to the power of the electorate to remove the mayor if he or she is not responsive to the 
people.286 Also, the mayor and council members alike will continue to engage members of the 
public outside of meetings, which very few citizens attend.287 That engagement, coupled with 
additions to mayoral power, may actually be more productive according to proponents, since 
members of the public often comment at meetings regarding topics over which the mayor and 
city council have no power.288 “Government provides an endless number of ways to comment,” 
and proponents point to the new comment forums available under Measure L, including two 
town hall meetings each year in which the mayor must participate.289 
 
C. The City Manager: Article V 
 
 Supporters of Measure L stress that the city manager will still provide his or her expertise 
to the mayor, so Sacramento will still have professional guidance.290 They say the only issue is 
whether a voter believes the mayor should or should not direct the city manager.291 
 
                                                 
281 AGAINST, supra note 101. 
282 Id. 
283 EDGAR, supra note 84. 
284 Hansen interview, supra note 116. 
285 See Julie Murphy, Letter to the Editor, Strong Mayor: Is the Mayor’s Office for Sale, SACRAMENTO 
BEE (Sept. 6, 2014, 9:09 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/2014/09/06/6684080/is-the-mayors-office-for-
sale.html (referring to “Michelle Rhee’s statement that her husband [Mayor Kevin Johnson] really doesn’t 
base his decision-making on public testimony at city council meetings”). 
286 See IN FAVOR, supra note 9 (implying the mayor will make “superior…decisions” because of his or 
her accountability to the electorate). 
287 Forum, supra note 11 (statement of Daniel Conway, chief of staff, Mayor Kevin Johnson). 
288 Isenberg interview, supra note 65 (stating people want to comment on things the city does not manage 
and that “government in America is roughly the equivalent of public psychotherapy”). 
289 Id.; SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 7 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, 
§ 40(b)(2)). 
290 Forum, supra note 11 (statement of Daniel Conway, chief of staff, Mayor Kevin Johnson). 
291 Isenberg interview, supra note 65. 
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If the city manager is mayor-appointed, however, those against Measure L believe the 
manager will work to support only the mayor’s goals, not those of the city council or the 
electorate.292 Some have even said the city manager may become a de facto chief of staff to the 
mayor.293 Since the city manager would no longer have a one-year grace period during which he 
or she could not be removed, the person in that position could feel pressure to follow the mayor, 
regardless of the reason or outcome.294 
 
One item that has not been addressed is whether the city manager’s compensation will 
change if the position encompasses fewer duties. Former mayor Heather Fargo speculated that 
the city manager’s pay will not decrease, but the mayor would probably get a raise so that he or 
she is not making less than the manager, who would be the mayor’s subordinate.295  
 
D. The Annual Budget: Article IX 
 
 The mayor would create and present the budget if Measure L is approved, which means 
either the budget would be more voter-influenced because the mayor is elected or the budget 
would be full of favors to friends and donors, depending on which side of the debate is 
speaking.296 
  
It could be easier for special interests to influence just one person wielding budgetary 
power, rather than an entire city council.297 Since deep-pocketed donors have contributed to the 
campaign supporting Measure L—developer Angelo Tsakopoulos has donated $100,000, the 
California Association of Realtors has contributed just under $50,000, Niello Co. has backed the 
campaign with $25,000, and Mark Friedman, a Kings owner, has given more than $14,000—
perhaps the monetary influence that opponents are worried about is already taking effect.298 
“Access [to leaders] would be focused and limited to certain individuals” with a lot of money, 
according to Measure L’s opposition.299 Yet supporters insist special interests will still need to 
work with all eight council members, although they recognize the measure will streamline a 
currently “sluggish bureaucracy where…to get something done, they often have to convince at 
least five city council members, which can take a lot of time and money.”300 
 
As with any other council vote, the mayor would have veto power, and overriding that 
veto with a supermajority could prove difficult.301 The creation of an independent budget analyst 
could provide a balance against the mayor’s power.302 If the analyst makes recommendations 
                                                 
292 REBUTTAL TO FAVOR, supra note 10. 
293 Forum, supra note 11 (statement of Steve Hansen, council member, City of Sacramento). 
294 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. V, § 63. 
295 Forum, supra note 11 (statement of Heather Fargo, former mayor, City of Sacramento). 
296 IN FAVOR, supra note 9; AGAINST, supra note 101. 
297 AGAINST, supra note 101. 
298 See Ryan Lillis, Strong Mayor’s About Clout, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 5, 2014, 7:46 PM), 
http://www.sacbee.com/2014/09/05/6683295/sacramentos-power-players-line.html (quoting Andrew 
Acosta as saying, “they’d rather have one conversation than eight” regarding the top donors). 
299 Id. (quoting former Sacramento mayor Heather Fargo). 
300 Id. 
301 AGAINST, supra note 101. 
302 IN FAVOR, supra note 9. 
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that the city council adopts, the mayor may be less likely to use a line-item veto against those 
recommendations or an overall veto against the budget.303 Although Measure L creates the 
analyst position, it fails to make recommendations regarding his or her qualifications and does 
not consider the cost of hiring a new department head.304 Therefore, it is unclear if an 
independent budget analyst will actually be appointed or whether the position is financially 
feasible if Measure L passes.305 
 
E. Other Major Charter Changes 
 
Measure L will require the city council to fill in some of the details left out of its text, but 
will also allow voters to alter the provisions during future general elections.306 
 
1. Required Ordinances 
 
Several of the main Measure L charter alterations require the council to pass a separate 
ordinance within six months of the measure’s passage.307 These include the creation of 
committees for redistricting and ethics, as well as a Sunshine Ordinance.308 Proponents of 
Measure L did not prescribe the parameters of these programs in the measure because voters 
found prior versions of strong-mayor initiatives overwhelming when they included all of these 
details.309  
 
This reasoning does not comfort opponents, who say the “trust us and wait” argument 
shows a lack of substance in the reforms.310 Council member Hansen foresees a “delicate dance” 
to create ordinances substantive enough so that they have a purpose, but not too substantive so 
that they might be vetoed.311 Since the ordinances do not require a charter change, council 
member Hansen would prefer to create substantive ordinances that reform ethics, streamline 
governance, and change election rules without a measure half-heartedly commanding the city 
council to do so.312 
 
// 
// 
                                                 
303 See REBUTTAL TO AGAINST, supra note 101 (inferring “an unprecedented light of transparency” could 
mean the mayor would be less likely to not follow analyst recommendations). 
304 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 29 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IX, 
§ 111). 
305 Id. 
306 See, e.g., id. § 14 (providing for the creation on an ethics committee and Sunshine Ordinance). 
307 Id. 
308 Id. § 5 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 24(a)); Id. § 14 (adding SACRAMENTO, 
CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 36). 
309 Forum, supra note 11 (statement of Daniel Conway, chief of staff, Mayor Kevin Johnson). 
310 Hansen interview, supra note 116. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. 
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2. Amendment by Ballot 
 
Measure L’s charter changes can be amended through future initiatives or measures 
placed on the ballot, which could help to close any gaps that surface.313 For example, if the 
measure passes and tie votes in the city council become a problem, voters can solve the issue 
with a general election ballot measure.314 This was an issue that San Diego voters fixed when 
they permanently approved their city’s strong-mayor system.315 
 
If Measure L passes, voters may also choose not to keep a strong-mayor government 
when the bill sunsets in 2020.316 The provision is similar to how other cities adopted their strong-
mayor systems.317 Some feel that the sunset date provides false hope for those who dislike the 
form of governance; after all the arguments on Measure L, they say voters will be less likely to 
change the charter because they don’t want a repeat of “this agony.”318 Opponents do not want 
the next six years to be an experiment, and assert that such a major change to the charter should 
be permanent or not happen at all.319 A few cynics believe the sunset might be designed so that 
the strong-mayor system only benefits Mayor Johnson and not his successors.320 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Ultimately, the decision Sacramento voters make may not really alter the way the city 
government works.321 Researchers have found the council-manager structure and the strong-
mayor system are fairly equal in terms of ability to implement citizen-supported policies.322 Both 
forms of government generally conform to their constituents’ desires because they are equally 
responsive to their communities.323 
 
                                                 
313 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 30 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf. 
314 Id. 
315 A History of San Diego Government, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, http://www.sandiego.gov/city-
clerk/aboutus/history.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
316 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 30(C) (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf. 
317 See, e.g., A History of San Diego Government, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, 
http://www.sandiego.gov/city-clerk/aboutus/history.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2014) (showing San 
Diegans had to re-vote on the issue after five years to make the change permanent). 
318 Forum, supra note 11 (statement of Steve Hansen, council member, City of Sacramento). 
319 Hansen interview, supra note 116. 
320 Contra Isenberg interview, supra note 65 (theorizing the sunset was instead included to make the 
measure more popular). 
321 Sam Sturgis, Strong Mayor, Weak Mayor, No Mayor—In Terms of Policy, It May Not Matter Much, 
CITY LAB (July 31, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/07/strong-mayor-weak-mayor-no-
mayorin-terms-of-policy-it-may-not-matter-much/375347/. 
322 Id. 
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 Measure L’s proponents insist the revision would create a better, more modern form of 
government that will reduce “bureaucratic roadblocks.”324 Opponents recognize the popularity of 
Mayor Johnson and understand why voters would give him more governmental control, but fear 
the measure places too much power in the position, which voters may not like as much when a 
less-popular mayor is in charge.325  
 
Regardless of the way they vote, voters should bear in mind that Measure L proposes a 
substantial revision to Sacramento’s existing charter, and the breadth of the proposal warrants 
careful consideration of the specific changes.326 
                                                 
324 REBUTTAL TO AGAINST, supra note 101. 
325 REBUTTAL TO FAVOR, supra note 10; Michael Murphy, Letter to the Editor, Measure L: Developer 
Dollars Support the Power Grab, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 4, 2014, 9:09 AM), 
http://www.sacbee.com/2014/09/04/6678754/developer-dollars-support-the.html  
326 See, e.g., supra Sections IV–VI (discussing implications of the measure’s passage). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This report examines California’s repeat offender law, known as Three Strikes, by 
exploring the law’s history, passage, legality, and effects.1 The purpose of this report is to inform 
the reader on an aspect of criminal justice that has generated significant debate and discussion.  
Specifically, because Three Strikes was passed and amended by the initiative process, the report 
will examine the role that initiatives have played throughout the law’s existence.  In addition, 
this report analyzes the various legal challenges and constitutional issues raised by the different 
provisions of the law. 
 
 Section II provides a general overview of the history, passage, and structure of the 
original Three Strikes law passed in 1994.  Three Strikes was the culmination of a trend moving 
towards increasing the punishments levied against repeat offenders.  Section III analyzes the 
legality and effects of Three Strikes.  The law has generated significant legal controversy and has 
been litigated all the way to the United States Supreme Court.  
 
Section IV provides an analysis of the major effects of Three Strikes, specifically, the 
effects on crime reduction and prison operation costs.  Finally, Section V discusses Proposition 
36, which amended Three Strikes in 2012.  Proposition 36 made some slight but notable changes 
to Three Strikes, such as ensuring that individuals cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment 
based on the commission of a non-serious and non-violent felony.  Section V also discusses 
Proposition 47, which will appear on the November 4th, 2014 ballot.  Proposition 47 is limited in 
scope and its primary purpose is to redefine many non-serious and non-violent crimes as 
misdemeanors, thereby avoiding the mandatory sentence that would come with a third strike 
felony.    
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE PASSAGE OF THREE STRIKES 
 
 The historical background is critical to a clear understanding of why Three Strikes was 
passed.  Prior to 1994, California had gone through a number of sentencing reforms. Several key 
issues, such as lengthy sentences and prison conditions, emerged early in California’s history.2 
Part A discusses California’s sentencing structure prior to 1994 and the emergence of prison 
related issues.  Part B provides a general overview of criminal justice initiatives that, starting in 
1972, created a trend that Three Strikes followed.  Finally, Part C discusses the drafting and 
passage of Three Strikes in both the California state legislature and through the initiative process.   
  
A. Sentencing and Prisons Prior to 1994 
 
1. Sentencing: Early Years, Indeterminate, and Determinate 
  
 California has gone through several different sentencing variations.3  Early in 
California’s history the sentencing structure utilized total judicial discretion within statutory 
                                                 
1 The term “Three Strikes” will be used throughout the report to refer to Assembly Bill 971 (March, 1994) 
and Proposition 184 (November, 1994), collectively. 
2 Kara Dansky, Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 51–52 (2008). 
3 Id. at 45. 
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minimum and maximum terms limits.4  Criticisms of this early structure focused on the fact that 
prisoners “were suffering imprisonment under unjust or unreasonably long sentences.”5  
Furthermore, the legislature had not provided any real means of reducing a sentence once it was 
imposed, and the only remedy was the gubernatorial pardon or clemency, which governors were 
reluctant to use because of political ramifications.6  The late 19th and early 20th centuries saw 
the development of probation and parole to combat prison overcrowding and lengthy sentences.7 
 
 Major sentencing reform came in 1917 with the passage of the Indeterminate Sentencing 
Act.8 The law’s goal was “to take from the trial judge the discretion of fixing definitely the term 
of imprisonment and to vest it in the prison authorities within prescribed limits.”9 Essentially, the 
law mandated that when a person was convicted of a crime, the judge either gave that person 
probation or sent that person to jail without making a decision on how long that person would be 
incarcerated.  The length of incarceration was determined by the Board of Prison Directors, later 
known as the Adult Authority. The Board was constrained by the statutory limits.10   
 
 Finally in 1976, Governor Jerry Brown and the legislature enacted the Determinate 
Sentencing Law.11  The Determinate Sentencing Law allows judges to use discretion in imposing 
one of three different prisons terms provided by statute.12 If the court finds an aggravating 
circumstance, then the court may sentence the person to the upper, or longer, prison term.13 
California continues to utilize the determinate sentencing system, subject to compliance with 
mandatory sentencing under Three Strikes.14 
 
2. Prison Overcrowding: A Problem From the 19th Century  
  
 California prison conditions, prison costs, and prison overcrowding have been major 
problems since California became a state.15  California’s oldest prison, San Quentin State Prison, 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at n.48 (citing Governor Frederick F. Low, Governor’s Message (Dec. 4, 1865)). 
6 Id. at 55. 
7 Id. at 56–57. 
8 Paula A. Johnson, Senate Bill 42—The End of the Indeterminate Sentence, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
133, 135 (1977) available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2258&context=lawreview; Act of May 18, 
1917, ch. 527, § 1, 1917 Cal. Stat. 665 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1160). 
9  Sentencing Under Indeterminate Sentencing, 22A Cal. Jur. 3d Criminal Law: Post-Trial Proceedings § 
426, (Aug. 1, 2014). 
10 Id. 
11 Dansky, supra note 2, at 56–57. As clarification, the current Governor Jerry Brown was also governor 
in the 1970s before he became the California Attorney General and then Governor again. 
12 Sentencing Under Determinate Sentencing Law, 22A Cal. Jur. 3d Criminal Law: Post-Trial Proceedings 
§ 386, (August 1, 2014). 
13 Id. 
14 See, e.g., People v. Boyce, 59 Cal. 4th 672 (2014) (providing a discussion of California’s current 
sentencing procedure in a criminal case). 
15 Dansky, supra note 2, at 53.  
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was constructed in 1852. By 1858 there were 600 prisoners in a facility built with only 68 cells.16  
In fact, it appears that most sentencing-related concepts, such as probation and parole, were 
implemented partially in response to prison overcrowding.17 Prison overcrowding and prison 
costs have been major concerns since California became a state, and while Three Strikes plays a 
role in those two issues, they existed before Three Strikes came into being. 
 
B. Overview of Criminal Justice Initiatives from 1972 to 1994 
  
Three Strikes was not the first time that California utilized the initiative process to affect 
sentencing as it relates to violent criminals and repeat offenders.  In fact, Californians had used 
the initiative process at least once to address the issue prior to passage of Three Strikes.18  
Although the initiative process has existed in California since 1911, the most active use of the 
initiative process in the criminal justice context began in 1972, with the passage of Proposition 
17. 
 
 In 1972, the California Supreme Court held that the death penalty in California violated 
the state constitution.19 In response, the people passed Proposition 17, which amended the 
California Constitution to provide that statutes imposing the death penalty were not 
unconstitutional.20 This appears to be the first time that California utilized the initiative process 
to directly address a criminal sentence.  However, Proposition 17 appeared to lack force after the 
United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia,21 which struck down every current 
state death penalty statute in the United States. Furman was not a categorical bar to the death 
penalty.22 Instead, it was an attempt by the United States Supreme Court to regulate death 
penalty statutes to ensure that the death penalty was not imposed arbitrarily.23 Nevertheless, after 
1972, the initiative process began to play an ever-increasing role in prisons, sentencing, and 
punishment.  
 
The initiative process reasserted itself once again in 1978 with the passage of Proposition 
7.24 In an attempt to create a constitutionally permissive death penalty law, California enacted a 
statute in 1977 that provided the death penalty in a murder case if a jury found that one of twelve 
special circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt.25 Dissatisfied with what he considered 
                                                 
16 Id. Interestingly, according to the San Quentin State Prison website, during construction of the facility, 
prisoners slept on a ship called the Waban at night and labored on the prison during the day. San Quentin 
State Prison, CAL. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Facilities_Locator/SQ.html (last visited Sep. 12, 2014). 
17 Dansky, supra note 2, at 60.  
18 See Cal. Proposition 8 (1982). 
19 People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628 (1972). 
20 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 20, available at 
http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1972g.pdf [“NOVEMBER 1972 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
21 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
22 Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (1997). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 1310 
25 Id. at 1308. 
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a weak law, California State Senator John Briggs championed Proposition 7, which dramatically 
expanded the scope of California’s new death penalty statute by “increasing the penalties for first 
and second degree murder” and “expanding the list of special circumstances requiring a sentence 
of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.”26 What is striking about 
Proposition 7 is that it was a comprehensive law, which demonstrates the expanding role that 
initiatives began to have in sentencing and criminal justice.27  
 
 In 1982, Proposition 8 was passed, also known as The Victim’s Bill of Rights.28 The 
initiative was not passed without significant controversy in terms of its scope and legality.29 
Proposition 8 addressed a wide range of issues such as restrictions on bail, habitual criminals, 
use of prior convictions in criminal proceedings, and restrictions on sentencing those over the 
age of 18 to the Youth Authority.30 In fact, Proposition 8 added a number of sections to the Penal 
Code, including sections 667 and 1192.7, which would be amended and modified in 1994 by 
passage of Three Strikes.31 The habitual criminals section included enhancements for “any 
person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in 
this state.”32 Proposition 8 also flexed the muscles of the initiative process by placing restrictions 
on how the law could later be amended.33 While attaining a simple majority of both legislative 
houses allowed the legislature to lengthen enhanced sentences, amending the law required the 
two-thirds vote of both houses or an initiative approved by the electors.34  
 
There were predictions that the new bail restrictions, as well as the enhanced sentences, 
would have a direct impact on prison overcrowding and financial resources.35  In fact, the 
California Attorney General at the time, who argued in favor of Proposition 8, highlighted that 
more convictions would result in more prisoners: “There is absolutely no question that the 
passage of this proposition will result in more criminal convictions [and] more criminals being 
sentenced to state prison.”36 Opponents argued that Proposition 8 would require millions of 
dollars in new court procedures without money to pay for them.37 
 
In short, it appears that Three Strikes was not the first time that the initiative process 
tackled the repeat offender issue. Propositions 7, 8, and 17 were not the only criminal justice 
                                                 
26 Id. at 1311. 
27 See NOVEMBER 1972 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 20, at 20; CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER 
INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 7, 1978, at 32, available at 
http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1978g.pdf [“NOVEMBER 1978 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
28 George Nicholson, Victims’ Rights, Remedies, and Resources: A Maturing Presence in American 
Jurisprudence, 23 PAC. L. J. 815, 821 (1992). 
29 Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236 (1982). 
30 CAL SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, JUNE 
8, 1982, at 33, 56 available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1982p.pdf [“JUNE 1982 
VOTER GUIDE”]. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 32. 
36 Id. at 34. 
37 Id. at 35. 
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propositions passed during the 1970s and 1980s, but they were the most significant in scope and 
purpose. Those propositions are significant because they represent a relatively sudden and 
controversial entrance of the initiative process into criminal procedure. They also demonstrate 
that Three Strikes was not the first time the state grappled with sentencing reform, prison 
overcrowding, and fiscal responsibility.  Proposition 8 was a sweeping reform, and by adding 
numerous sections to the California Penal Code, it laid the foundation for the passage of Three 
Strikes in the next decade.   
 
C. Three Strikes: Creation and Passage 
 
Three Strikes can be viewed as a high water mark in the campaign to punish repeat 
offenders and sentence them to state prison. While the actual drafting of the 1994 Three Strikes 
laws appears to have its genesis in the tragic murder of a young woman and a twelve year old 
girl, the 1982 Victim’s Bill of Rights had already taken a substantial step towards punishing 
repeat offenders.38 However, it is helpful to view the passage of Three Strikes within the context 
of the times in which it was created. Therefore, this section provides a brief summary of events 
leading up to passage of the law.   
 
 The actual drafting of Three Strikes occurred because of the highly publicized murder of 
a young woman named Kimber Reynolds in 1992, who was shot in the head during an attempted 
robbery by a repeat offender.39 Kimber’s father, Mike Reynolds, approached Justice James A. 
Ardaiz, presiding justice for the Fifth District Court of Appeal, to enlist his help in drafting a law 
to reduce serious and violent crime.40 A legislative committee rejected this first attempt, but 
Mike Reynolds shifted his focus and took the campaign to the people in the form of Proposition 
184.41   
 
 Around the same time that Mike Reynolds was building support for Proposition 184 in 
1993, tragedy struck again when another repeat offender kidnapped and murdered a twelve year 
old girl named Polly Klaas.42 Polly’s death spurred overwhelming support for Mike Reynolds’ 
initiative, which made it onto the November ballot in 1994.43  
 
The initiative process was not the only vehicle for a major law targeting repeat offenders. 
In fact, the text of Proposition 184 was virtually identical to the text of Assembly Bill 971, 
developed by the California legislature in the wake of Polly Klaas’ murder.44 Despite alternative 
                                                 
38 Id. at 33, 56. 
39 Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 
410 (1996). 
40 James A. Ardaiz, California’s Three Strikes Law: History, Expectations, Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 1, 1 (2000). 
41 Vitiello, supra note 39, at 411. 
42 Marc Klass, About the KlaasKids Foundation For Children, KLAAS KIDS FOUNDATION (Sep. 11, 
2014), http://klaaskids.org/about/. 
43 Vitiello, supra note 39, at 418. 
44 David Esparza, The “Three Strikes and You’re Out” Law - A preliminary Assessment, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (Sep. 11, 2014), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/1995/010695_three_strikes/sc010695.html. 
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bills and “an atmosphere of political distrust,”45 Assembly Bill 971 passed and became law in 
March of 1994.46  In November of 1994, Proposition 184 passed, and both laws became known 
collectively as “Three Strikes.” 
 
The deaths of Kimber Reynolds and Polly Klaas were not the only reasons that Three 
Strikes became law. Justice Ardaiz argued that Three Strikes was an attempt to prevent the 
commission of crime and deter the repetition of crime through reform in sentencing.47 Basically, 
Three Strikes would serve as a powerful deterrent by sending the message that “further criminal 
behavior will result in severe consequences; disregard this message at your peril.”48 Furthermore, 
Justice Ardaiz argued that the rate of recidivism49 in California was well over 50 percent, the 
second highest rate in the nation.50 Indeed, proponents of Proposition 184 argued that Three 
Strikes “keeps career criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children and commit murder, 
behind bars where they belong.”51  
 
Ultimately, political realities probably contributed significantly to the passage of Three 
Strikes both in the legislature and by the people. Governor Pete Wilson, up for reelection, was a 
major supporter of Three Strikes and spoke at Polly Klaas’ funeral, advocating for the new law.52 
Additionally, the legal scholar Michael Vitiello argued that Mike Reynolds’ ability to sway the 
public and use the press silenced those who may have opposed Three Strikes or attempted to 
modify it.53 Looking at California history, Three Strikes appears to be exactly the type of 
situation that paralyzed sentencing reform in the early years of statehood: elected politicians are 
reluctant to be viewed as soft on crime.54 
 
The 1994 debate surrounding Three Strikes was perhaps best described in the November 
1994 Voter Guide. The analysis by the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) states that passage of 
Three Strikes would result in additional state operating costs, reaching an annual cost of $6 
billion by 2026.55 Furthermore, the state would incur a one-time $20 billion dollar expense to 
build and expand prison facilities to accommodate the anticipated increase in prison 
populations.56 Proponents argued that Three Strikes would save lives and taxpayer dollars by 
keeping violent prisoners in jail, and would relieve Californians of having to “pay the outrageous 
                                                 
45 Vitiello, supra note 39, at 418.  Professor Vitiello explains that “[f]ew in the legislature were willing to 
take on Reynolds or  [Governor] Wilson who would have portrayed opponents as soft on crime, a tough 
label to wear in 1994.” Id. 
46 Id. at 418. 
47 Ardaiz, supra note 40, at 3. 
48 Id. 
49 Recidivism occurs when criminals return to society after prior convictions and then commit more 
crimes. 
50 Ardaiz, supra note 40, at 5. 
51 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
NOVEMBER 8, 1994, at 36 available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1994g.pdf 
[“NOVEMBER 1994 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
52 Vitiello, supra note 39, at 414. 
53 Id. at 418. 
54 Dansky, supra note 2, at 61. 
55 NOVEMBER 1994 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 51, at 34.  
56 Id. at 36. 
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costs of running career criminals through the judicial system’s revolving door over and over 
again.”57 Opponents countered by stating that the prison system would be overwhelmed by non-
violent offenders and the state would incur billions of dollars in increased expenses.58  
 
1. Two Laws? 
  
 As previously discussed, Three Strikes passed in both the legislature and through the 
initiative process.  Why two laws?  Functionally, there is not any textual difference between 
Assembly Bill 971 and Proposition 184.59  The major difference is that Assembly Bill 971 
amended Penal Code Section 667.5, whereas Proposition 184 created Penal Code Section 
1170.12.60  Importantly, both laws provided the same method for amendment: a two-thirds vote 
in both houses of the legislature or by a statute approved by the voters.61  Then what would 
happen if the legislature tried to amend section 667 of the Penal Code and not section 1170.12?  
Which law has priority? The legal answer to that question is beyond the scope of this report, and 
it does not appear that the issue has presented itself. Furthermore, given the fact that both 
amendment clauses in each law are identical, the legislature or the people would presumably 
amend both at the same time, which is exactly what happened with the passage of Proposition 36 
in 2012.62 
 
2. How Does Three Strikes Work? 
 
 Three Strikes applies “strikes”—think baseball—to individuals who are convicted of 
serious or violent felonies.63 Some well-known examples of serious or violent felonies are 
murder, robbery, and rape, but the total list is more expansive. If a person, who has one strike for 
having been previously convicted of a serious or violent felony, is subsequently convicted of any 
felony, whether or not it is serious or violent, that person receives double the required sentence 
for the new conviction, and receives a second strike.64  If the same person, who now has two 
strikes, is convicted for any new felony, then that person receives a mandatory minimum term of 
25 years, or three times the term otherwise required by law for the third conviction, whichever is 
longer—think “out.”65 Keep in mind that a person can receive more than one strike arising out of 
a single criminal case. This occurs when a person is convicted of multiple felonies arising from 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 37. 
59 See id. at 64-65; see also Official California Legislative Information Assembly Bill 971 (Sept. 11, 
2014), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/asm/ab_0951-
1000/ab_971_bill_940307_chaptered. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. There may be a constitutional issue with a law passed by a simple majority binding future 
legislatures with a supermajority provision.  However, because Proposition 184 contains identical 
amendment restrictions, the question is probably moot.   
62 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
NOVEMBER 6, 2012, at 105, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/complete-vig-v2.pdf 
[“NOVEMBER 2012 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
63 NOVEMBER 1994 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 51, at 33, 36. 
64 Id. 
65 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A). Prior to the passage of Proposition 36 in 2012, a third strike could 
result in a life sentence. 
 179 
 
the same set of facts.66 Furthermore, those people with at least one strike must be sent to state 
prison and cannot be sentenced to probation or an alternative treatment program.  Finally, a 
person serving time in state prison under the Three Strikes must serve out the minimum sentence 
without the possibility of early release.67 
 
 As will be discussed later in this report, the initiative process has been used to amend 
portions of the 1994 Three Strikes laws. However, the basic Three Strikes methodology persists 
today. 
 
III. THE LEGALITY OF THREE STRIKES   
 
 Despite the broad support received for Three Strikes, there were several attacks to its 
constitutionality. This section outlines the key court decisions that upheld the law and interpreted 
the extent of judicial control over sentencing after Three Strikes. Part A discusses the U.S. 
Supreme Court cases that decided Three Strikes sentencing does not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment. Part B outlines the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the judge’s ability 
to reduce sentences even after a third strike felony conviction.   
 
A. Constitutional Challenges: Cruel and Unusual Punishment  
   
 Some opponents of Three Strikes believed that the law constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.68 Based on the severity of the 
mandatory sentencing,69 even for non-violent third strikes, these opponents argued that the 
punishment was “grossly disproportionate” to many of the crimes that constituted the “third 
strike.”70 In 2003, the opponents got their chance to challenge the constitutionality of Three 
Strikes before the U.S. Supreme Court in Ewing v. California71 and Lockyer v. Andrade.72 
 
1. Ewing v. Andrade: Non-Serious and Non-Violent Third Strikes 
  
 In Ewing, the Supreme Court considered the case of Gary Ewing, who stole three golf 
clubs from a golf course pro shop in 2000.73 Priced at $399 each, the value of the golf clubs 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., People v. Benson, 18 Cal. 4th 24 (1998) (considering a case where the defendant was 
convicted of two felonies arising out of the same occurrence when defendant gained entry to the victim’s 
apartment and repeatedly stabbed her with a knife). 
67 NOVEMBER 1994 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 51, at 56. 
68 See Michel Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores Democracy, 
30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1647 (1997). 
69 Section 667(e)(2)(A) of the California Penal Code states that upon receiving a third felony conviction, 
defendants are required to serve at least twenty-five years and up to a life sentence. 
70 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003). 
71 See id. The original trial court chose not to reduce the grand theft charge to a misdemeanor and also did 
not vacate Ewing’s four prior felony convictions. As such, “Ewing was sentenced under the three strikes 
law to 25 years to life.” Id. at 21. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, and the California 
Supreme Court denied review of the decision. Id.  
72 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
73 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17–18. 
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totaled less than $1,200 dollars.74 Mr. Ewing was convicted of felony grand theft, which would 
have resulted in a sentence of 10 years or less,75 except that he had four prior serious felony 
convictions.76 Those prior felony convictions subjected him to the Three Strikes sentencing 
requirement of 25 years to life for this new, non-violent and non-serious felony conviction.77   
 
 The Court held that “recidivism” statutes like the Three Strikes law in California did not 
sentence violators out of proportion to their “third strike” crime, and, therefore, are not 
unconstitutional.78 Rather, from the Court’s perspective, these laws are “nothing more than a 
societal decision that when such a person commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to 
the admittedly serious penalty of incarceration for life, subject only to the State’s judgment as to 
whether to grant him parole.”79 The Court further described how state legislatures needed 
discretion in making sentencing decisions, instead of being impeded by the federal courts.80 
Indeed, although the Court noted the criticism of the Three Strikes law,81 it ultimately stated, 
“[t]his criticism is appropriately directed at the legislature, which has primary responsibility for 
making the difficult policy choices that underlie any criminal sentencing scheme.”82  
 
 Finally, it is notable that the Court found that the rationale for the Three Strikes law was 
justifiable and that the outcomes of the law were impressive.83 The Court stated that 
“[r]ecidivism is a serious public safety concern in California and throughout the Nation” and that 
after four years of the Three Strikes law in California, “the recidivism rate of parolees returned to 
prison for the commission of a new crime dropped by nearly 25 percent.”84 Additionally, the 
Court seemed to consider evidence that parolees were leaving California because of the Three 
Strikes law to be a sign of its efficacy.85  
                                                 
74 Id. at 18. 
75 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer notes that before the Three Strikes law, “no one like Ewing 
could have served more than 10 years in prison. We know that for certain because the maximum sentence 
for Ewing’s crime of conviction, grand theft, was for most of that period 10 years . . . We also know that 
the time that any offender actually served was likely far less than 10 years. This is because statistical data 
show that the median time actually served for grand theft (other than auto theft) was about two years, and 
90 percent of all those convicted of that crime served less than three or four years.” Ewing, 538 U.S. at 44 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
76 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18. Ewing had four prior serious and/or violent felony convictions: three 
burglaries and a robbery. Id. at 19. 
77 Id. at 18, 20.  
78 Id. at 21.  
79 Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 278, (1980)). 
80 Id. at 25 (“Selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state 
legislatures, not federal courts.”).  
81 Id. at 27–28 (citing FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET. AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES 
AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001); Vitiello, supra note 39, at 423).  
82 Id. at 28 (“We do not sit as a ‘superlegislature’ to second-guess these policy choices.”).  
83 See id. at 26–27. 
84 Id. (citations omitted). 
85 Id. at 27 (referencing a report that found that “more than 1,000 net parolees left California” in the three 
years following the enactment of Three Strikes) (citing California Dept. of Justice, Office of the Attorney 
General, ‘‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’’—Its Impact on the California Criminal Justice System After 
Four Years, p. 10 (1998)).  
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 In summary, the Court held that in determining whether a sentence was 
“unconstitutionally disproportionate” to a crime, the court must look to both the “offense of 
conviction, or the ‘triggering’ offense” along with the prior felony convictions.86 As such, 
Ewing’s sentence of 25 years to life was held to not be “grossly disproportionate to his 
conviction for felony grand theft and his prior serious felony offenses.”87 With its decision, the 
Court not only upheld the constitutionality of three strikes laws similar to California’s, but it also 
broadened the boundaries of what constituted proportional sentencing under the Eighth 
Amendment.88 Instead of considering only the crime of conviction in relation to the imposed 
sentence, now courts could consider a defendant’s “entire criminal history on the proportionality 
scales.”89  
 
2. Lockyer v. Andrade: Habeas Corpus Context  
 
 The same day that Ewing was decided, the Supreme Court issued a similar opinion in 
Lockyer v. Andrade.90 In Lockyer, the respondent Mr. Andrade had been convicted of two counts 
of felony petty theft for stealing “approximately $150 worth of videotapes from two different 
[Kmart] stores.”91 Mr. Andrade had at least three prior felony convictions that were either 
serious or violent, and, as such, these new felony convictions subjected him to the mandatory 
sentence of 25 years to life.92 In a somewhat unexpected application of the Three Strikes law, he 
was sentenced to “two consecutive terms of 25 years to life” instead of merely one term “because 
each of his petty theft convictions [] triggered a separate application of the three strikes law.”93  
  
 Although Mr. Andrade was successful with his habeas corpus petition94 in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was 
erroneous since Mr. Andrade’s sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment and that the 
California appellate court’s decision was not “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, this 
Court’s clearly established law.”95 In its decision, the Court gave little indication of what 
constitutes “clearly established Federal law” under the Eighth Amendment; it stated only that the 
                                                 
86 Id. at 29.  
87 Id. at 30.  
88 Sara J. Lewis, Comment, The Cruel and Unusual Reality of California’s Three Strikes Law: Ewing v. 
California and the Narrowing of the Eighth Amendment’s Proportionality Principle, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 
519, 532 (2003). 
89 Id. at 532. 
90 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 63.  
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 A habeas corpus petition is brought by detained individuals who argue that their detention is unlawful. 
For example, in Lockyer v. Andrade, the prisoner petitioner argued that he was being unlawfully detained 
because his sentence violated the U.S. Constitution. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 63. 
95 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 63. Under section 2254(d)(1) of the United States Code, a federal court can issue a 
writ of habeas corpus (determining that the person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws 
or treaties of the United States”) in cases where the state court proceedings “resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  
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grossly disproportionate test is applied in determining whether sentencing is unconstitutional.96 
The Court warned that this determination of “grossly disproportionate” sentencing would only be 
made in those cases that are “exceedingly rare and extreme.”97  
 
B. California Constitutional Challenge: Judicial Discretion  
 
 Judicial discretion in sentencing was a major issue that emerged after the passage of 
Three Strikes. While formally judges had broad power to reduce sentencing, the Three Strikes 
bill seemed to alter that power by allowing only prosecutors, and not judges, to “dismiss or 
strike” a prior felony conviction if it was “in the furtherance of justice.”98 However, section 
667(f) of the Penal Code—the provision that appeared to strip judicial discretion in sentencing—
was worded in such a way as to make it unclear whether judges retained the ability to strike prior 
felony convictions on their own motion.99  
 
 As a result of the ambiguity in the statutory language, some judges continued to act on 
their own to strike prior felony convictions. The Romero case, described below, confirmed that 
trial court judges maintain some judicial control over sentencing in California in spite of the 
Three Strikes law.  
 
1. Judicial Discretion: People v. Superior Court (Romero) 
 
 In Romero, the California Supreme Court considered the authority of a San Diego trial 
court judge to strike two prior felony convictions for a defendant who was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance (0.13 grams of cocaine base).100 The defendant had two 
prior serious felonies (burglary and attempted burglary – both close to a decade old) that could 
have increased his punishment to a life sentence, rather than the one to six years for the current 
charge and prior drug convictions.101 But the judge decided to strike the prior serious felonies, 
reasoning that judges retained the authority to do so without the prosecutor’s motion since it 
would otherwise be a violation of the state’s doctrine of separation of powers.102  
 
 The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court judge and held that judges do not 
have the authority to strike prior felony allegations on their own motion based on the Three 
Strikes law.103 The California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
finding that the legislature could curtail the judiciary’s role in sentencing but that it would violate 
the state constitution to “subject to prosecutorial approval the court’s discretion to dispose of a 
                                                 
96 Id. at 72–73. 
97 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
98 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(2).  
99 People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (1995). 
100 Id. at 631.  
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 632. Under the California Constitution, the legislature reserves the “legislative power,” and the 
“people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.” The judicial branch’s power, on 
the other hand, is “vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and superior courts.” CAL. CONST. art. 
IV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.  
103 Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632. 
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criminal charge.”104 The court’s decision addressed the interpretation of the Three Strikes bill, 
but it also affected the interpretation of the Three Strikes initiative since it held that restricting a 
judge’s authority in striking prior felony convictions would be unconstitutional.105   
 
2. Discretion in Sentencing After Three Strikes and Romero  
 
 After the affirmation of the Romero decision, there are two possible scenarios in which 
discretion can be exercised over sentencing in the case of a third strike felony charge.106 First, 
the prosecution can decide to charge “wobbler” crimes—those crimes that could be considered 
either misdemeanors or felonies—as misdemeanors, thereby avoiding the “third strike felony” 
conviction.107 Second, supported by the Romero decision, the prosecution or the judges 
themselves have the power to strike prior serious or violent felony convictions from 
consideration in the trial at issue.108  
 
 The courts are still required to take into account the defendant’s “present felonies and 
prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, 
and prospects” in determining if “the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in 
whole or in part.”109 Thus, judges continue to retain some authority to decide if a particular 
defendant should be subject to the mandatory sentencing of Three Strikes. But that sentencing is 
still obligatory if a prior strike is not vacated or if the prosecution does not reduce a “wobbler” 
felony to a misdemeanor. 
 
IV. ERA OF STRICTER SENTENCING: OUTCOMES AND CRITICISM   
 
 The slogan of the Three Strikes campaign was to “keep[ ] career criminals, who rape 
women, molest innocent children and commit murder, behind bars where they belong.”110 It 
further promised that it would “save[] lives and taxpayer dollars.”111 The rationale for these last 
two outcomes was based on the idea that fewer crimes would be committed because “career 
criminals” would be locked-up and unable to commit crimes.112 Additionally, proponents 
reasoned that stricter sentencing would cause would-be criminals to reconsider involvement in 
criminal activity.113  
 
 What have been the consequences of Three Strikes over the past two decades?  
This section provides some insight into that question. Yet, it is important to recognize that Three 
Strikes is a piece (albeit a large piece) of a larger criminal justice puzzle within California. In 
                                                 
104 Id. at 640.  
105 See id. at 647. 
106 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17.   
107 Id. 
108 Romero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647–48. 
109 People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148, 161 (1998). 
110 NOVEMBER 1994 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 51. 
111 Id. 
112 See Vitiello, supra note 68, at 1678 (citation omitted). 
113 See id. at 1679 (citing Phil Wyman & John G. Schmidt, Jr., Three Strikes You're Out (It's About Time), 
26 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 249, 257 (1995)). 
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addition to Three Strikes, there have been other significant changes to how criminals are 
prosecuted and sentenced in California: other sentencing enhancements, shifts in the parole 
system, and loosening of California evidence laws.114 Therefore, it is difficult to determine an 
exact causal link between Three Strikes and crime reduction and/or rising costs of California’s 
prison population.115  
 
 Part A of this section examines the relation between crime reduction and Three Strikes. 
Next, Part B looks at the fiscal effects of an increased and aging prisoner population. Finally, 
Part C outlines the criticism against Three Strikes based on the treatment of juveniles and 
criminals with non-serious and non-violent three strikes.   
 
A. Safer Streets as a Result of Stricter Sentences? 
 
 If the effectiveness of Three Strikes is judged based on the number of convicted criminals 
that were sentenced under the law, then it has been an overwhelming success.116 The dilemma 
arises in attempting to evaluate the reduction in crime attributable to Three Strikes. In 2004, 
Mike Reynolds, the primary proponent of Three Strikes, co-wrote a report that applauded the 
results of Three Strikes and cited a decrease in violent and property crimes as an indication of the 
law’s positive results.117 Without a doubt, crime rates went down at a steady pace after Three 
Strikes went into effect; until 2011, when violent crime increased “slightly,” and in 2012, when 
property crime increased “noticeably.”118 However, legal scholars highlight the fact that crime 
rates began to drop before Three Strikes was passed, and they reason that the crime reduction 
after Three Strikes is merely a coincidence.119 
 
 At least one legal scholar contends that Three Strikes not only deters individuals from 
committing crimes that would constitute a third strike, but it also deters people from committing 
                                                 
114 James Austin, The Effect of “Three Strikes and You're Out” on Corrections, in THREE STRIKES AND 
YOU'RE OUT: VENGEANCE AS PUBLIC POLICY 155, 170–71 (David Shichor & Dale K. Sechrest eds., 
1997). 
115 See David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of “Three Strike” Laws on State and 
Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime Control,” 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 580 
(2000).  
116 See CAL. STATE AUDITOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION: 
INMATES SENTENCED UNDER THE THREE STRIKES LAW AND A SMALL NUMBER OF INMATES RECEIVING 
SPECIALTY HEALTH CARE REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT COSTS 21 (2010), available at 
http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2009-107.2.pdf (stating that 25 percent of the California prison 
population is comprised of individuals sentenced under Three Strikes) [“CAL. STATE AUDITOR 2009 
REPORT”]. By 2000, “4,468 offenders ha[d] been sentenced under the third strike provision and over 
36,043 for a second strike offense.” Schultz, supra note 115, at 557 (citing CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFECTIVE 
CRIME POLICY, “THREE STRIKES”: FIVE YEARS LATER 6 (1999)).  
117 3-Strikes 1994 to 2004, A Decade of Difference, THREESTRIKES.ORG (Mar. 31, 2004), 
http://www.threestrikes.org/tenyearstudy_pg3.html. 
118 Magnus Lofstrom & Brandon Martin, Crime Trends in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. (Dec., 
2013), available at http://www.ppic.org/main/publication_show.asp?i=1036. 
119 See Schultz, supra note 115, at 573; Michael Vitiello, A Proposal for a Wholesale Reform of 
California’s Sentencing Practice and Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903, 904–08, n.4 (citations omitted).  
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crimes that count as a first or second strike (i.e., violent or serious felonies).120 Critics, on the 
other hand, argue that people do not engage in a rational, cost-benefit analysis before committing 
crimes, but that they instead “make choices based on their own reference levels.”121 The premise 
behind this argument is that people who commit criminal acts often have “less than perfect 
information” about the repercussions for those crimes, have a limited view of their own future, 
and make decisions based on “their present desires and needs.”122 
 
B. Fiscal Effects: Cost of Incarceration 
 
 A 2004 RAND Corporation study predicted that the Three Strikes law would reduce 
crime, but that the law would nevertheless increase the prison population and bring with it the 
increased cost of $5.5 billion per year.123 A similar study found that more funds would be needed 
to handle the additional “capacity, health care costs for geriatric prisoners, and prison 
construction.”124 This sub-section describes the actual costs to California of Three Strikes, 
including the costs associated with more prisoners and higher healthcare costs.  
 
1. Prisoner Population 
 
 In 2009, the California State Auditor estimated that prisoners sentenced under Three 
Strikes will have increased costs to California by approximately $19.2 billion by the end of their 
sentences, and that 25 percent of the prison population was made-up of individuals sentenced by 
the Three Strikes law (43,500 out of the total 171,500 prisoners).125 Notably, $7.5 billion of 
those increased costs will have been spent on prisoners who were convicted with a strike that 
was neither violent nor serious.126 
 
 The issue with long mandatory sentencing is that even if fewer people end up committing 
crimes, there are still more people within the prison system over time.127 As legal scholars have 
explained, the impact of sentencing one person to a minimum of 25 years is similar to sentencing 
                                                 
120 Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California's Two-and 
Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 161–62 (2002). 
121 Michael Vitiello, California's Three Strikes and We're Out: Was Judicial Activism California's Best 
Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025, 1090–92 (2004) (citations omitted). 
122 Id. at (citing Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal 
Deterrence, 34 CONN. L. REV. 55, 63 (2001)). 
123 See Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did “Three Strikes” Cause the Recent Drop in California 
Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General's Report, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 131 n.81 
(1998) (citing PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., RAND CORP., THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: 
ESTIMATED BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MANDATORY SENTENCING LAW 25–30 
(1994)); See Vitiello, supra note 68, at 1686 (citing PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., RAND CORP., THREE 
STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: ESTIMATED BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MANDATORY- 
SENTENCING LAW, n.137, at xi (1994)). 
124 Schultz, supra note 115, at 579 (citing CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFECTIVE CRIME POLICY, IMPACT OF 
"THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT" LAWS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 8 (1996)). 
125 CAL. STATE AUDITOR 2009 REPORT, supra note 116, at 21. 
126 Id. 
127 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET. AL., THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA: PUNISHMENT AND 
DEMOCRACY 18 (2001).   
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five offenders to a 5-year sentence, which creates large-scale impacts overtime.128 However, an 
alternative argument is that the “three striker” recidivists would be in and out of the prison 
system regardless of whether the Three Strikes law was in effect.129 The logic of this argument is 
that any additional costs or increases in the prisoner population are not necessarily tied to Three 
Strikes, since many of these individuals would still have contributed to prison costs without 
Three Strikes.130 Yet, the California State Auditor estimates that the individuals convicted under 
Three Strikes receive an average of nine years more to their sentence than they would otherwise, 
indicating that the overall time spent in prison by these individuals is longer under Three 
Strikes.131   
 
 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a decision by a Three-Judge Court that 
California prisons were so overcrowded that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment.132 The decision mandated that California reduce its inmate population to 
137.5 percent of design capacity by June 27, 2013.133 The California legislature has since passed 
several laws as part of a comprehensive “realignment” effort to meet the judicial mandate.134 
Yet, the state has not been able to sufficiently reduce its prisoner population, and, as a result, the 
deadline has been extended several times with the most recent extension giving the state until the 
beginning of 2016.135 California officials will need to continue to make reforms to the state 
prison system in order to comply with the mandate, but any changes to Three Strikes would be 
extremely difficult. The Three Strikes initiative and legislation both imposed amendment 
restrictions on the law, and, therefore, it is impossible to touch Three Strikes without a voter-
approved initiative or by a statute passed by two-thirds of both houses of the legislature.136  
 
// 
// 
// 
                                                 
128 Id. 
129 A Primer: Three Strikes After More Than a Decade, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (Oct. 2005), 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm. 
130 Id. 
131 See CAL. STATE AUDITOR 2009 REPORT, supra note 116, at 1; see also Michael Vitiello, Reforming 
Three Strikes’ Excesses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 16 (2004) (“[T]he impact of third-strike offenders began 
when, but for Three Strikes, the offenders would have been released, and the impact of prisoners 
sentenced under the Three-Strikes Law will culminate between 2009 and 2014 when the system will 
contain 20 years’ worth of sentenced offenders.”).  
132 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011). 
133 Id. 
134 The Cornerstone of California’s Solution to Reduce Overcrowding, Costs, and Recidivism, CAL. 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/ (last visited 
Sep. 12, 2014).  
135 Bob Egelko, Court Gives California 2 Years to Lower Prison Population, SF GATE (Feb. 11, 2014), 
http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Court-gives-California-2-years-to-lower-prison-5221828.php. By 
February 28, 2016, California must reduce its population from the current 117,500 individuals to 112,100. 
Id. 
136 See CAL. CONST. art II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature . . . may amend or repeal an initiative statute by 
another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute 
permits amendment or repeal without their approval.”).  
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2. Aging Prisoner Population 
  
 Not surprisingly, older prisoners require more medical care, which increases the cost per 
year spent on these “aging” prisoners.137 The annual medical care of older prisoners ranges from 
approximately $14,000 to $44,000 more than their younger incarcerated counterparts.138 The 
largest age group of individuals serving sentences under Three Strikes is in the age-range of 45 
to 49 years old,139 compared to the remaining prison population whose largest age group is in the 
range between 25 to 29 years old.140 Indeed, 53 percent of the prisoner population convicted 
under Three Strikes is over the age of 40 years old.141 Still, as of 2011, less than 4 percent of 
prisoners in the Three Strikes category are over the age of 60 years old (the time at which 
medical care costs, on average, are greatest).142 But, some data predicts that by 2025 California 
will have to spend more than $4 billion on prisoners who are over 60 years old.143  
 
 Critics of Three Strikes also argue that aging prisoners should not be subject to the 
mandatory sentencing because they pose “a low risk of violence” to the community.144 However, 
the California Supreme Court has held that Three Strikes prisoners are prohibited from being 
released early, even with “good-time credits,” meaning they must serve their entire sentence 
despite their potential old age or frailty.145    
 
C. Punishment for Low-Level Crime and Juvenile Convictions 
  
           Three Strikes has been criticized for its impact on individuals whose third strike is a non-
                                                 
137 Vitiello, supra note 131, at 16–17 (citing California's Aging Prison Population, Hearing Before the 
Senate Select Comm. on the California Correctional System of the California Senate Comm. on Public 
Safety 12 (written statement of professor Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, 
George Washington University Law School)). 
138 Id.  
139 DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, TABLE 6: SECOND AND THIRD 
STRIKERS IN THE ADULT INSTITUTION POPULATION (Apr. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/offender_information_services_branch/Quarterly/Strike1/STRI
KE1d1103.pdf [“DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION DATA”].  
140 CAL. STATE AUDITOR 2009 REPORT, supra note 116, at 39. 
141 Id. 
142 DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION DATA, supra note 139; see CAL. STATE AUDITOR 2009 
REPORT, supra note 116, at 39 (showing that specialty medical care is the most expensive for those 
“striker” inmates over the age of 60 years old).  
143 See Vitiello, supra note 131, at n.116 (2004) (citing California's Aging Prison Population, Hearing 
Before the Senate Select Comm. on the California Correctional System of the California Senate Comm. 
on Public Safety 11,13 (written statement of professor Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public 
Interest Law, George Washington University Law School)). 
144 Id. (citations omitted). 
145 In re Cervera, 16 P.3d 176, 179–81 (Cal. 2001) (holding that 25-year sentences under Three Strikes 
cannot be reduced based on the 20 percent good time credits rule in California). Proposition 36 in 2012 
made slight changes to the law, and now judges are allowed to provide early release to third strike 
offenders serving life sentences, as long as their third strike was non-violent and non-serious and they do 
not pose a threat to society. 
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violent and non-serious crime,146 and for those individuals whose prior strikes were committed 
when they were juveniles.147 Under Three Strikes, certain serious or violent felonies committed 
as juveniles are considered first or second strikes.148 Additionally, although felonies that are non-
serious or non-violent do not count as first strikes, they do constitute a second or third strike and 
subject a third strike offender to mandatory sentencing.149  
 
 A 2009 report found that 53 percent of all prisoners serving time under Three Strikes had 
been convicted for non-serious and non-violent felonies.150 As described above, third strike 
crimes include crimes like grand theft where the total value of stolen items is $1,200 or less.151 
The original proponents of Three Strikes claimed that the law would put murderers and rapists 
behind bars.152 But the fact that the majority of prisoners sentenced under the law have been 
convicted for non-violent crimes raises skepticism of the actual scope and efficacy of the law in 
deterring and incarcerating violent criminals.  
 
 Another five percent of all the “striker” prisoners were subject to Three Strikes because 
they had one or more juvenile offenses that counted as a felony strike.153 Part of the concern in 
counting juvenile crimes as strikes is due to the fact that minors in California do not always have 
the benefit of jury trials and bail, and, therefore, they are not protected by the same procedural 
safeguards available to adults.154 Additionally, the juvenile system tends to focus more on 
rehabilitation rather than punishment, which critics have found to be contradictory to the rigid 
punitive nature of Three Strikes.155 In response to these concerns, Three Strikes proponents 
would likely point to the fact that juvenile crimes only count against an offender if they were 
committed when the juvenile was 16 years or older, and that at such an age the juveniles should 
be more responsible for their crimes.156 
 
V. INITIATIVE RESPONSE TO THREE STRIKES  
  
 After Three Strikes passed in 1994, the initiative process attempted to address a wide 
range of criminal justice issues.  Between 1994 and 2004, the initiative process addressed issues 
relating to sentencing, the definition of murder, and non-violent drug possession offenses.   
                                                 
146 See e.g. Lisa E. Cowart, Comment, Legislative Prerogative vs. Judicial Discretion: California’s Three 
Strikes Law Takes a Hit, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 615, 638–29 (1998).  
147 Schultz, supra note 115, at 579.  
148 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3). 
149 Id. § 667(e)(2)(A). 
150 CAL. STATE AUDITOR 2009 REPORT, supra note 116, at 23.  
151 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18 (grand theft of $1,200 in golf clubs); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 63 
(2003) (petty theft of $150 in videotapes). 
152 NOVEMBER 1994 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 51. 
153 CAL. STATE AUDITOR 2009 REPORT, supra note 116, at 23.  
154 Schultz, supra note 115, at 579; Amanda K. Packel, Juvenile Justice and the Punishment of Recidivists 
Under California’s Three Strikes Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1157, 1179 (“[T]he California Supreme Court 
[has] upheld the use of juvenile adjudications as strikes without any acknowledgement that it was 
attaching permanent criminal consequences to a nonjury proceeding.”). 
155 Packel, supra note 154, at 1179. 
156 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (requiring that a juvenile be at least 16 years or older for their 
crimes to count as a strike). 
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A. Limited Reform and a Failed Attempt at Reform 
 
Proposition 36, passed in the year 2000 (not to be confused with a different and distinct 
Proposition 36 passed in 2012), actively discussed reducing the prison population by removing 
non-violent drug possession offenders and placing them in treatment programs.157 However, the 
text of Proposition 36 clearly indicated that the law did not apply to people sentenced under 
Three Strikes, except in a limited number of circumstances.158 Furthermore, the law restricted its 
treatment provisions to those who had remained out of custody for a number of years and were 
basically convicted only of simple non-violent drug possession.159 One of the justifications of 
taking non-violent drug offenders out of prison was to make room for serious or violent 
criminals.160 
 
Proposition 66, which was on the ballot in 2004, would have made major changes to 
Three Strikes by requiring a second and third strike felony to be serious or violent in order to 
make Three Strikes applicable to the person convicted.161  However, Proposition 66 failed to 
pass, and a similar initiative was not presented until 2012. 
   
B. Amending Three Strikes and Reducing Prison Populations 
 
 Three Strikes underwent modest reform in 2012.  Proposition 36, the Three Strikes 
Reform Act of 2012, amended numerous sections of the Penal Code, including sections 667 and 
1170.12.162 Under Proposition 36, the indeterminate life sentence for a non-violent and non-
serious third strike is now only imposed on those who committed certain crimes with firearms 
and/or those with a prior conviction for a sexually violent  
offense, child molestation, homicide, solicitation to commit homicide, specific murder of a 
police officer, or possession of a weapon of mass destruction.163 Further changes give judges 
discretion to release prisoners serving a life sentence for non-violent and non-serious third 
strikes, as long as the judge determines they are not a threat to society.164 
 
 Thus, Proposition 36, while making significant changes to the imposition of a life 
sentence, does not alter the basic structure of Three Strikes, and 25-year sentences are still 
                                                 
157 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
NOVEMBER 7, 2000, available at http://vote2000.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/pdf/ballotpamphlet.pdf  
[“NOVEMBER 2000 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
158 Id. at 23-24. 
159 Id.  
160 Id. at 26. 
161 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
NOVEMBER 2, 2004, available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2004g.pdf [“November 
2004 Voter Guide”]. 
162 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
NOVEMBER 6, 2012, at 105–10, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/complete-vig- 
v2.pdf. [“NOVEMBER 2012 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
163 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667. 
164 Russell Cooper & Erica Scott, Proposition 36: Three Strikes law. Repeat Felony Offenders. Penalties., 
11 CAL. INIT. REV. 11, 103 (Fall 2012). 
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imposed for a wide range of non-violent and non-serious felony third strikes. The findings and 
declarations of Proposition 36 state that murderers, rapists, and child molesters will still serve 
their full sentences, but certain offenders with a third strike for crimes like shoplifting or simple 
drug possession will not receive mandatory life sentences.165 
 
 The arguments put forth by proponents and opponents of Proposition 36 echoed the 
issues raised in 1994.  The LAO portion of the voter guide claimed that Proposition 36 would 
save the state money by reducing prison populations and reducing parole expenses, totaling up to 
$90 million annually.166 Proponents argued several main points: make the punishment fit the 
crime; save California millions of dollars each year; and make room in prison for dangerous 
felons.167 Opponents stated that dangerous felons would be summarily released from prison and 
that law enforcement overwhelmingly rejects Three Strikes reform.168   
 
 It may take a number of years for the positive or negative effects of Proposition 36 to 
fully develop. One concrete change that has taken place is demonstrated by the Stanford Three 
Strikes Project, which claims that over 1,000 persons have been resentenced and released under 
Proposition 36 since its implementation.169 
  
C. Proposition 47: Reduced Penalties for Some Crimes Initiative 
 
 Proposition 47, on the 2014 ballot, is not an attempt to comprehensively reform Three 
Strikes, but rather to prevent low-level criminals from being subject to a mandatory 25-year 
sentence. In keeping with Three Strikes and Proposition 36, those individuals who have been 
convicted for murder, rape, some sex offenses, or some gun crimes will not be eligible for a 
reduced sentence under Proposition 47.170  
 
 Proposition 47’s main aim is to redefine many non-serious and non-violent crimes as 
misdemeanors, thereby avoiding the mandatory sentence that would come with a third strike 
felony.171 Indeed, in a 2009 report, it was found that 53 percent of all prisoners serving time 
under Three Strikes had been convicted for non-serious and non-violent felonies.172 For critics, 
these statistics confirm that Three Strikes disproportionately punishes low-level criminals, rather 
than targeting the reduction of violent crime. For supporters, these numbers only show that the 
law is working by imprisoning repeat offenders that cannot control their criminal urges.  
 
                                                 
165 NOVEMBER 2012 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 162, at 50. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 52. 
168 Id. at 53. 
169 Stanford Three Strikes Project, STANFORD L. SCH., 
https://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-and-centers/stanford-three-strikes-project (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
170 CAL SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, 
NOVEMBER 4, 2014, at 34, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/complete-
vig.pdf#page=70 [“NOVEMBER 2014 VOTER GUIDE”]. 
171 Id.  
172 CAL. STATE AUDITOR 2009 REPORT, supra note 116, at 23.  
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 If Proposition 47 passes, low-level crimes—such as the theft of $150 in videotapes at 
issue in Lockyer173—would be considered misdemeanors and no longer carry the 25-year 
mandatory penalty required if they were third strike felonies.174 However, the initiative places a 
$950 cap on the amount of money that can be involved if the crime is to be classified as a 
misdemeanor instead of a felony.175 Therefore, the theft of $1,200 in golf clubs at issue in 
Ewing176 would still constitute a felony under the law proposed by Proposition 47. According to 
the LAO, there would be “several thousand” current inmates whose sentences would be reduced 
by Proposition 47, but they do not provide an estimate of the exact number of inmates who 
would be effected by the new law.177  
 
 Although Proposition 47 is not proposing comprehensive reform, it is notable that 
Proposition 47 appears to be part of a growing trend to reshape and reduce the current prison 
population. Proposition 47 is discussed in detail under that section of this volume of the 
California Initiative Review.178 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
 In the last two decades, Three Strikes has made a significant impact on California’s 
criminal justice system.179 The enhanced sentencing structure is the culmination of a series of 
laws aimed at punishing repeat offenders.180 In 1994, the passage of Three Strikes was secured 
by the political realities and public support for harsher punishments after the tragic murders of a 
young woman and a twelve-year old girl.181 While Three Strikes’ supporters claim credit for the 
general trend of crime reduction in California,182 critics remain skeptical that Three Strikes has 
actually deterred criminals or reduced crime.183 Additionally, the fiscal impact of Three Strikes 
has been substantial, with an estimated $19.2 billion additional funds needed to operate 
California prisons.184  
 
 Despite attempts to reform or overturn the law through legal challenges and the initiative 
process, Three Strikes weathered the storm for eighteen years until 2012 with the approval of 
Proposition 36.185  However, Proposition 36 did not provide wholesale reform or invalidation of 
                                                 
173 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 63. 
174 CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS, http://safetyandschools.com/ (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2014). 
175 Id. 
176 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18. 
177 Proposition 47, Criminal Sentences. Misdemeanor Penalties. Initiative Statute, LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE  (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2014/prop-47-110414.aspx. 
178 Emily Reynolds & Selena Farnesi, Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2014). 
179 See CAL. STATE AUDITOR 2009 REPORT, supra note 116, at 21 (2010) (stating that 25 percent of the 
California prison population is comprised of individuals sentenced under Three Strikes). 
180 Infra Section III. 
181 Infra Section III. 
182 3-Strikes 1994 to 2004, A Decade of Difference, THREESTRIKES.ORG (Mar. 31, 2004), 
http://www.threestrikes.org/tenyearstudy_pg3.html. 
183 See Schultz, supra note 117, at 573; Vitiello, supra note 121, at 904-908, n.4 (citations omitted). 
184 CAL. STATE AUDITOR 2009 REPORT, supra note 116, at 21.  
185 Infra Section V. 
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Three Strikes, and the law is still very much alive and well in the California criminal justice 
system today.186  
 
 Now, Proposition 47 seeks to address the issue of long-term, mandatory sentencing under 
Three Strikes for non-serious and non-violent third strike felonies. If Proposition 47 passes, 
many low-level crimes would be considered misdemeanors and no longer carry the 25-year 
mandatory penalty required if they were third strike felonies.187 However, there is a $950 
maximum crime amount that delineates a “felony” from a “misdemeanor.” 
 
 For the time being, the future of Three Strikes appears secure. Three Strikes supporters 
dislike the recent changes under Proposition 36 and reject the premise that any further 
modifications are needed through Proposition 47. But the fundamental nature of Three Strikes—
lengthy, mandatory sentences for repeat offenders—remains intact.  
                                                 
186 Infra Section V. 
187 CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS, http://safetyandschools.com/ (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2014). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This report examines the distinct mechanisms of direct democracy practiced in various 
foreign countries. The discussion will begin with a brief definition of direct democracy followed 
by the terminology used to describe the various mechanisms. After setting forth a definitional 
framework for the discussion, the report will focus on the electoral initiative and referendum as 
practiced in Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia, with an emphasis on comparison 
to the California model. Finally, this report will provide recommendations for improving the 
California initiative system by adopting mechanisms employed by the countries surveyed in this 
report.  
 
A. Direct Democracy 
 
In order to properly examine and compare the direct democracy mechanisms in different 
countries, it is important to begin with a threshold question: what is direct democracy? Direct 
democracy is a system of governance in which citizens make decisions regarding laws and 
policies through direct votes rather than delegate the decision-making process solely to elected 
representatives.1  
 
In practice, the direct democracy mechanisms which increase citizen involvement in 
policy decisions are mandated “by the constitution or by individual governments through 
legislation and through the choice and design of the electoral system.”2 As such, the mechanisms 
of direct democracy vary from country to country. However, this report will focus on two 
distinct mechanisms: initiative and referendum.3  
 
B. Definitions: Initiatives and Referendums 
 
The initiative and referendum are two distinct mechanisms of direct democracy, and the 
terminology used to describe these mechanisms may also vary between countries.  In addition, 
there are various forms of initiatives and referendums. Thus, for the purposes of this report, the 
definitions of certain forms of initiatives and referendums are provided below: 
Table 1.1 Forms of Initiatives 
Initiative (Citizen’s Initiative)4 
• A mechanism of direct democracy by which voters suggest a new statute or 
constitutional amendment by gathering signatures to demand a popular vote 
• Can be operated Directly or Indirectly 
                                                 
1 See INT’L  INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE 
INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 19 (2008), 
http://www.idea.int/publications/direct_democracy/upload/DDH_inlay_low.pdf [“IDEA”]. 
2 Id. at iv. 
3 Please note: this is not an exhaustive study on initiative and referendum mechanisms. As such, the 
power of the recall will not be discussed in this report. 
4 Initiative, Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/ elections-
and-campaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-overview.aspx (last visited September 13, 2014).   
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Direct Initiative5 Agenda (Indirect) Initiative6  
• Citizen proposals are placed directly 
onto the ballot and decided by voters 
• Citizen proposals are first considered 
by the legislature 
• May receive a popular vote later in 
some systems 
 
Table 1.2 Forms of Referendums 
Referendum7 
 
• A direct democracy procedure that gives the electorate a direct vote on a specific 
political, constitutional or legislative issue.  
Forms of Referendums Definitions 
Mandatory Referendum8 A direct democracy procedure that is required 
for certain government actions; often for 
constitutional amendments suggested by the 
legislature; used for bond acts in California. 
Optional Referendum (Popular Veto)9  A direct democracy procedure in which the 
electorate demands a popular vote on a piece 
of legislation. 
Advisory Referendum (Plebiscites)10  A direct democracy procedure in which the 
legislature initiates a nonbinding popular vote 
on an issue of public policy. 
 
The scope of this report is limited to the terminology and the definitions provided in Tables 1.1 
and 1.2.    
 
II. CALIFORNIA’S DIRECT DEMOCRACY SYSTEM 
 
California’s use of direct democracy dates back to 1911, when progressive Governor 
Hiram Johnson persuaded the legislature to adopt a system of statewide initiatives and 
referendums.11  This report will examine three particular forms of direct democracy practiced in 
California. The initiative process allows citizens to propose statutes or constitutional 
                                                 
5 Direct Democracy: Referendums, THE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, http://aceproject.org/ace-
en/focus/direct-democracy/citizen-initiatives (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).  
6 Id.  
7 IDEA, supra note 1, at 84. 
8 Direct Democracy: Referendums, THE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, http://aceproject.org/ace-
en/focus/direct-democracy/citizen-initiatives (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
9 Id.  
10 Types of Referendums, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/referendums/types.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
11 California, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, http://iandrinstitute.org/California.htm (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2014).  
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amendments.12 Mandatory referendums are a popular vote held to decide on constitutional 
amendments originating in the legislature.13 The optional referendum endows voters with a veto 
power by which they can reject a law passed by the legislature.14 Though this report will not 
discuss it, California also uses a system of legislatively referred acts, whereby certain types of 
statutes that originate in the legislature must be passed by a popular vote in order to become law. 
Any statute that incurs a public debt of $300,000 or greater must be approved in this manner.15 
Most commonly, this method is used to pass water and school bonds, including Proposition 1 on 
the November 2014 ballot.16 Californians also have the power to recall state officials, as 
evidenced by the recall of Governor Gray Davis in 2003.17 These methods of direct democracy 
exist for the limited purposes of restricting the legislature’s ability to accrue debts and allowing 
voters to remove state officials. Because this report focusses on methods of enacting policy 
through law creation, it will not discuss legislatively referred acts or recall elections 
 
A. Legal Framework 
 
The Constitution of California sets forth the steps involved in the initiative process. First, 
proponents of an initiative must submit the measure’s text to the California Attorney General, 
who will give the initiative an official name and summary.18 Second, proponents must circulate a 
petition requesting that the initiative appear on the statewide ballot. The number of signatures 
required to qualify an initiative is based upon the number of votes cast in the last gubernatorial 
election: ballot measures that initiate constitutional amendments require eight percent of the most 
recent gubernatorial election, whereas initiative statutes or veto referendums require only five 
percent.19 Finally, if an initiative qualifies for the ballot, it will pass with a simple majority of 
votes.20  
 
Moreover, initiatives may not “embrac[e] more than one subject,” and courts are willing 
to invalidate initiatives that violate this rule.21 However, the California Supreme Court has 
consistently interpreted the single-subject rule to allow a multi-part initiative, so long as its 
provisions are “reasonably germane to a single theme or purpose.”22 Consequently, extensive 
statutory schemes have become law through the initiative process, including the Victims’ Bill of 
                                                 
12 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.  
13 Id. art. XVIII, § 4. 
14 Id. art. II, § 9.  
15 Id. art. XVI, § 1. 
16Sean Creadick & Patrick Lewis, Proposition 1: Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement 
Act of 2014, CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2014).  
17 CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 13–19.   
18 Id. art. II, § 10(d).  
19 Id. art. II, § 8(b).   
20 Id. art. II, § 10(a).  
21 Id. art. II, § 8(d); Senate of State of Cal. v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142, 1168–1169, 988 P.2d 1089, 1105–
1106 (1999) (invalidating an initiative which affected electoral redistricting and the salaries of 
legislators).  
22 Senate of State of Cal., 21 Cal. 4th at 1163.   
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Rights in 1982 (Prop 8) and the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Prop 9).23 Critics have questioned 
the value of allowing such large bodies of law to become effective through a popular vote.24 
  
B. Criticism of California’s Initiative Process 
 
California’s initiative process has been subject to intense criticism. For example, critics 
argue that it is too easy to amend the California constitution since only a simple majority of votes 
is required to pass an amendment.25 Because of this low threshold, commentators claim that the 
California constitution has become a “bloated mishmash.”26  
 
Another area of concern is the sheer number of initiatives on the ballot.27 A large number 
of initiatives can lead to voter fatigue, which affects a measure’s outcome based on its position 
on the ballot.28 Similarly, commentators worry that voters who are not well educated about the 
content of initiatives are largely casting votes based on the content of paid advertising and 
limited news coverage.29 This is attributable to the fact that many initiatives are complex and 
difficult to comprehend. One study found that seventy-eight percent of voters believe that “some 
or only a few of the propositions are understandable to most voters.”30 
  
Critics also point to consistently low voter turnout as a major weakness of California’s 
direct democracy system.31 Initiatives and referendums are intended to represent the will of the 
voting public, but this purpose is subverted when only a small percentage of voter actually 
participate.32 Turnout in the June 2014 primary election was only twenty-five percent, and two 
ballot initiatives were passed.33 Arguably, these measures did not receive a strong mandate from 
the state’s voters when so few of them actually voted.  
 
Perhaps most disconcerting to critics is the significant role that money plays in the 
initiative process.34 Statistically, the outcome of an initiative campaign is often correlated with 
                                                 
23 California Crime Victims’ Rights, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION PROGRAM, 
http://vcgcb.ca.gov/victims/rights.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 2014); Political Reform Division, CAL. 
SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).  
24 Op-Ed Edward L. Lascher et al., It’s Too Easy to Amend California’s Constitution, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/04/opinion/oe-hodson4. 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Jessica Levinson, Ballot Initiatives Have Harmed California, KCET (Jan. 23, 2012, 10:15 AM), 
http://www.kcet.org/ updaily/socal_focus/commentary/would-you-like-to-save-california.html.  
28 CHARLENE WEAR SIMMONS, CALIFORNIA’S STATEWIDE INITIATIVE PROCESS 11 (California State 
Library 1997) available at https://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/06/97006.pdf.  
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
31 LEDUC, supra note 31, at 151. 
32 Id.  
33 Press Release, Cal. Sec’y of State, June Primary Results Certified, Showing Record-Low Turnout and 
Record-High Vote-by-Mail Rate (July 11, 2014), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/press-
releases/2014/db14-057.htm.  
34 See generally DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF 
MONEY (2000) (detailing the significant influence of special interests upon the initiative process).  
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the amount of money spent by the measure’s proponents and opponents.35 In particular, a well-
funded opposition can severely limit a proposition’s chances of passing.36 This inevitably drives 
up the cost of a successful campaign in support of a ballot initiative.  For instance, even before 
an initiative campaign truly begins, the expense of gathering hundreds of thousands of signatures 
sets a high price of admission for citizens who want to propose an initiative. One study found 
that during the 2012 election, the cost of gathering signatures ranged from $584,126 to 
$8,773,490.37 From the outset, this cost limits the use of the “citizens’ initiative” to well-funded 
interests. Despite the criticisms leveled against California’s initiative process, it continues to be 
popular with voters.38 
 
III. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM MECHANISMS: A GLOBAL 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
This section of the report provides a global comparative study of selected countries with 
an aim towards proposing solutions to improve California’s initiative and referendum system. 
This comparative study focuses on Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia, 
respectively. While there are numerous other countries that authorize direct democracy 
mechanisms, these countries provide a diverse cross section of how direct democracy 
mechanisms can be used to engage citizens.39  
  
A. Direct Democracy in Switzerland 
 
1. Legal Framework 
 
The Swiss constitution established four separate mechanisms of direct democracy: 
(1) mandatory referendums, where the Swiss parliament seeks permission from the voters to 
amend the constitution; (2) initiative constitutional amendment referendums, where the voters 
request that a change be made to the constitution; (3) optional referendums, where the voters 
decide on a piece of legislation passed by the parliament; and (4) referendums, where the voters 
decide whether to ratify an international treaty.40 Swiss citizens regularly participate in their 
                                                 
35 SIMMONS, supra note 28, at 12.  
36 Id.  
37 2012 Ballot Measure Petition Signature Costs, California, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/2012_ballot_measure_petition_signature_costs#California (last visited Sept. 13, 
2014).  
38 PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS–HOW DEMOCRATIC IS IT? 2, 
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_202XXOP.pdf. A study in 2000 found that seventy 
percent of voters approved of the initiative process, with fifty-six percent believing that it is a better way 
of making policy decisions than is using the legislature.   
39 This report is not an exhaustive study, but rather highlights four countries that have mechanisms of 
direct democracy that encompass the initiative and referendum systems as defined in Section I of this 
report. See supra Table 1.1 and 1.2. 
40 BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 138–42. This paper will focus 
on the first three types of referendums because they have the most relevance to the system of initiatives 
and referendums that exists in California.  
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nation’s system of direct democracy. Elections take place between two and four times every 
year, with a small number of referendums appearing on the ballot in every election.41 
 
Under the Swiss constitution, all constitutional amendments must be approved by a 
popular vote.42 An amendment will only take effect if it is approved with a double majority.43 A 
double majority requires that a simple majority of all Swiss voters approve the amendment, as 
well as a majority of voters in a majority of the Swiss states (called cantons).44 This requirement 
makes it more difficult for constitutional amendments to become law, and it allows the small 
states to place a check on the power of the large states.45  
 
2. The Agenda Initiative and Referendum Process 
 
The Swiss utilize an agenda initiative system, also known as indirect initiative.46 Citizens 
must collect 100,000 signatures to qualify a constitutional amendment for the ballot.47 Voter 
initiatives come immediately before the legislative body instead of going directly onto the ballot, 
and parliament reviews the amendment to ensure that it complies with the law.48 If the 
amendment is defective, it will be disqualified. Otherwise, the legislature may either accept it 
and pass it into law or propose an alternative amendment to appear alongside the voter-initiated 
amendment on the ballot.49 After parliament has acted on the amendment, proponents can 
abandon the amendment if they are satisfied with parliament’s response or continue to advocate 
for the measure if they disagree with parliament.50 Parliament opposes most constitutional 
amendments that originate from the voters. Nevertheless, commentators estimate that about forty 
percent of all voter-initiated constitutional amendments result in some type of change to the law, 
which is often made through a compromise on the part of the legislature.51 In this sense, the 
Swiss parliament is officially involved in the referendum process.  
 
                                                 
41 LEDUC, supra note 31, at 154–58.  
42 BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 140, para. 1(a).  
43 Id. at art. 142, para. 1–4.  
44 Id.  
45 RENÉ SCHWOK, SWITZERLAND – EUROPEAN UNION: AN IMPOSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP? 105 (2006), 
available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=L8HZoBv4_MAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:%22Ren%C3%
A9+Schwok%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=-
eIVVIXDAabRiwKsiYCYDQ&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false.  
46 PHILIP L. DUBOIS, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 49–50 (1998), 
available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=Rq18JkGtj6IC&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:%22Philip+L.+Du
bois%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=n9kVVPLDAtbjoASTgYH4Bg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=f
alse. 
47 BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 138, para. 1.  
48 Id. at art. 139, para. 3. 
49 Id. at art. 139, para. 4–5. When a parliamentary counterproposal appears on the ballot, Swiss voters will 
vote on both the initiative amendment and the counterproposal, and they also indicate which measure they 
would prefer, should both measures pass. Id. at art. 139(b), para. 2.  
50 DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 51.  
51 Id. at 52. 
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The Swiss initiative and referendum process is similar, in many respects, to the system in 
California.52 Both California and Switzerland require a popular vote to affirm legislative 
amendments to the constitution, both allow an optional referendum on statutes passed by the 
legislature, and both permit citizens to pass their own constitutional amendments through the 
initiative process.  
 
The systems of direct democracy in Switzerland and California diverge in several ways, 
perhaps most notably in the use of the agenda initiative. In Switzerland, all voter-initiated 
constitutional amendments must go through the parliament before they appear on the ballot. On 
the other hand, California uses only the direct system of initiative wherein measures are placed 
on the ballot without any useful exposure to the legislative branch.53 Although the agenda 
initiative (indirect initiative) process existed in California until 1966, it was abolished that year 
by Proposition 1A.54  
 
B. Direct Democracy in the Philippines 
 
1. Legal Framework 
 
Article XVII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines authorizes 
constitutional amendments or revisions through the initiative process. Article XVII, Section 2, 
states the following: 
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people 
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number 
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at 
least three per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this 
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this 
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall 
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.55 
In 1989, the Eighth Congress of the Philippines passed implementing legislation which 
set forth a system of initiative and referendum.  Republic Act No. 6735, titled “The Initiative and 
Referendum Act,” enables the electorate “to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole 
or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body.”56  
 
Section 3 of the Initiative and Referendum Act codifies three distinct forms of direct 
democracy. The direct initiative grants “power . . . [to] the people to propose amendments to the 
                                                 
52 Id. at 49.  
53 See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Statewide Initiative Guide, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-
measures/initiative-guide.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (describing each step of the California initiative 
process, which does not require the legislature to consider initiatives); see infra Part IV.B.  
54 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: GENERAL ELECTION 
TUESDAY, NOV. 8, 1966, available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1966g.pdf. 
Proposition 1A was a legislative constitutional amendment which was submitted to voters through a 
mandatory referendum. Id.   
55  Id.  
56 Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 3. 
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Constitutions or to propose and enact legislation through an election.”57  Under the agenda 
initiative, the electorate sends a proposition to “Congress or the local legislative body for 
action.”58 Finally, the optional referendum empowers “the electorate to approve or reject 
legislation through an election called for that purpose.”59 Thus, the Philippine statutory scheme 
embodies three distinct forms of direct democracy.  
 
2. The Agenda Initiative  
 
Out of the three forms of direct democracy, the agenda initiative is the most divergent 
from California’s system of initiative. This form of direct democracy allows the citizens to 
submit a proposal that will be considered by Congress or the local legislative body for action as 
opposed to a vote by the electorate. California’s initiative system, on the other hand, only permits 
initiatives to be placed directly onto the ballot  
 
3. Signature and Distribution Requirements 
 
In the Philippines, the number of signatures required to invoke the power of initiative or 
referendum takes into consideration the national and local process by imposing signature and 
distribution requirements. For instance, an initiative affecting the 1987 Constitution requires the 
signature of at least 12 percent of registered voters of which “every legislative district must be 
represented by at least 3 percent of the registered voters.”60 However, the percentage of 
registered voters is reduced by two percentage points when the initiative or referendum is 
affecting a law, ordinance, or resolution passed by a legislative assembly of an autonomous 
region, province, municipality, or city. In that case, the requirement is 10 percent of registered 
voters “of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3 percent of the 
registered voters.”61 But, “if the city or province is composed of only one legislative district, then 
at least each municipality in a province or each barangay62 in a city should be represented by at 
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.”63 In a barangay, the signatures of at 
the least 10 percent of registered voters is required.64 Conversely, in California, the signature 
requirement is based upon the number of votes cast during the most recent gubernatorial election 
which must be equal to 8 percent of the votes cast.65 A statute or veto referendum only requires 5 
percent of the votes cast.66 
 
                                                 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. § 3. 
60 Id. § 5(b). 
61 Id. § 5(d). 
62 “A unit of administration in Philippine Society consisting of from 50 to 100 families under a headman.” 
Barangay Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/barangay (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2014).  
63 Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 5(d). 
64 Id. § 5(f). 
65 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b). 
66 Id.  
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Furthermore, the local initiative system imposes a minimum signature requirement that is 
different for each of the local government units.67 Autonomous regions require the signatures of 
two thousand registered voters; provinces and cities require the signatures of one thousand 
registered voters; municipalities require the signatures of one hundred registered voters; and 
barangays require the signatures of fifty registered voters.68  
 
In order to make comparisons between the local initiative process in the Philippines and 
the local initiative process in California, it is important to first compare the Philippine local 
system of government to California’s system. The State of California, as a unit of government, is 
most comparable to the provinces69 of the Philippines.70  The provinces are within regions, 
which could be loosely compared to the geographical references used when discussing the 
Midwest or Northeast in the United States.71 On the other hand, autonomous regions are 
comparable to US territories and therefore not relevant for comparison.72  
 
To further compare, within every province there are municipalities and cities.73 The 
municipalities and cities are two distinct units of government.74 A municipality is a corporate 
body acting as a subsidiary of the province within its territorial boundaries, whereas there are 
three classifications of cities.75 The highly urbanized and the independent component cities are 
comparable to the concept of chartered cities76 in California because they function independently 
of the province.77 In contrast, component cities are analogous to general law cities78 in California 
because they are subject to the administrative supervision of the province.79 Lastly, California 
does not have a government unit that is the functional equivalent to a barangay.80  
 
After outlining a few similarities in the local government structures of the Philippines and 
California, there are a few specific comparisons that can be made in regards to the local initiative 
process. For example, the local initiative and referendum system in the Philippines can only be 
                                                 
67 Local government units is a term of art that “refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.” 
Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 3. 
68 Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 13(a). 
69 There are 81 provinces in total. Philippines Has a New Province, LOC. GOV’T ACAD. (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.lga.gov.ph/update/philippines-has-new-province.  
70 Id. 
71 Concepts and Definitions: Local Government Units, PHIL. STATS. AUTHORITY (2014), 
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/articles/con_lgu.asp.  
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 A charter city has supreme authority over municipal affairs which means it overrides a state law 
governing the same topic. LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, CHARTER CITIES: A QUICK SUMMARY FOR THE PRESS 
AND RESEARCHERS, available at http://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Resources-
Section/Charter-Cities/Charter-Cities-A-Quick-Summary-for-the-Press-and-R.  
77 See supra note 71. 
78 See supra note 76. 
79 See supra note 71. 
80 See supra note 62.  
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exercised once a year,81 whereas the California system tracks regularly scheduled elections or a 
special election can be held.82  In California, procedural requirements for local initiatives vary 
among general law cities, charter cities, and counties.83 In general-law cites, proponents “must 
obtain signatures of 10 percent of registered voters for a measure to appear on the ballot in the 
next regularly scheduled election.”84 The requirement is 15 percent if a special election is 
called.85 However, charter cities have a wide latitude in setting their procedures. As such, 
signature requirements range from 5 to 30 percent of registered voters or votes cast in the last 
mayoral election.86 Still, counties require signatures from 10 percent of registered voters or 20 
percent if it is a special election.87 In summary, in California, signature requirements differ for 
local measures and initiatives so there are some similarities here. These similarities demonstrate 
how the initiative process operates on a local level irrespective of the terms used to describe local 
government units.  
 
4. Frequency of Initiatives Amending the Constitution  
 
Along with signature requirements, the Philippine system limits the frequency in which 
citizens can exercise the power of initiative as it relates to the 1987 Constitution of the 
Philippines.88 An initiative on the Constitution can only be exercised once every five years.89 
This is not the case in California. The statutory scheme in California does not regulate the 
frequency where with an initiative may be put forth to amend the constitution.  
 
C. Kenya 
 
1. Legal Framework 
 
Article 257 of the Constitution of Kenya incorporates several forms of direct democracy. 
However, Kenya’s statutory scheme conceptualizes the agenda initiative and referendum system 
on an escalating scale from local government, to the national government, and then to the people. 
For example, Article 257(1) provides that citizens may propose an amendment to the 
Constitution through the initiative process.90 After the Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
reviews the initiative to determine if it satisfies the requirements under Article 257, the 
“Commission submits the draft Bill to each county assembly for consideration within three 
months.”91 If the Bill receives approval from the county assemblies it will be submitted to the 
Speakers of the two houses of Parliament: the Senate and the National Assembly.92 The Bill is 
                                                 
81 Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 15(a). 
82 TRACY M. GORDON, THE LOCAL INITIATIVE IN CALIFORNIA 9–10 (Public Policy Institute of California 
2004), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_904TGR.pdf. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 9. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 10. 
87 Id.  
88 Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 5(b). 
89 Id. 
90 CONSTITUTION, art. 257(1) (2010) (Kenya).  
91 Id. art. 257(5). 
92 Id. art. 257(6). 
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passed into law if it is approved by the majority in both houses of Parliament.93 But, “if either 
House of Parliament fails to pass the Bill, . . . the proposed amendment must be submitted to the 
people in a referendum.”94 Twenty percent of registered voters in at least half of the counties 
must vote and a simple majority of citizens must vote in favor of the referendum in order to pass 
the proposed amendment.95 To summarize, the initial stage in the process is illustrative of the 
agenda initiative forms of democracy. In Kenya’s statutory scheme, the mandatory referendum 
ensures that the proposed amendment does not die in the Houses of Parliament.  
 
Table 3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Signature Requirements and Distribution Requirements 
 
Kenya’s signature requirements also differ in comparison to the signature requirements 
under California’s initiative system.  In Kenya, the proposed amendment must be signed by one 
million registered voters, regardless of changes to the population or voter registration.96  With an 
estimated 14.3 million registered voters,97 this is roughly seven percent of the electorate. On the 
other hand, signature requirements in CA are expressed as a percentage of the number of votes 
cast in the most recent gubernatorial election, with five percent required for initiative statutes and 
eight percent required for initiative constitutional amendments.98 This results in a much smaller 
number of signatures being required in California than in Kenya. Since roughly ten million votes 
were cast in the 2010 gubernatorial election, the number of signatures required to qualify 
initiatives in 2014 were 504,760 and 807,615 for statutes and amendments, respectively.99 This is 
much less than Kenya’s flat-rate requirements of one million signatures.100 When viewed as a 
percentage of registered voters, rather than as a percentage of votes cast for governor, 
                                                 
93 Id. art. 257(8). 
94 Id. art. 257(10). 
95 Id. art. 255(2)(1)(a). 
96 Id. art. 257(1). 
97 Voter Register – (Provisional) 2012, DEEP COGITATION BLOG, http://deepcogitation.com/elections-
watch/voter-register-2012/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
98 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).  
99 State Ballot Initiative Guide , CAL. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-
measures/how-to-qualify-an-initiative.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).   
100 CONSTITUTION, art. 257(1) (2010) (Kenya). 
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California’s requirements appear even less demanding. The 504,760 signatures required to 
qualify an initiative statute make up less than three percent of California’s roughly seventeen 
million registered voters.101 This is a stark contrast to the seven percent of all registered voters 
who must sign ballots to qualify an initiative statute in Kenya.102 On the other hand, a flat-rate 
does have the long-term benefit with population growth of possibly becoming a much lower 
threshold.  
 
3. Initiatives and Referendums: Updates and Obstacles 
 
Nevertheless, Kenya may be facing challenges to its system of direct democracy. 
Currently, Amendment Bill 2014 seeks to amend provisions governing the referendum.103 The 
Bill proposes to change the threshold required to pass the proposed amendment from twenty 
percent of registered voters to forty percent.104 Moreover, the Bill will now require a 
participation quorum, in that at east fifty percent of registered voters must cast their votes in the 
referendum.105 Lastly, the Bill will require that referendums be held only during a general 
election of members of parliament.106  
 
D. Direct Democracy in Australia  
 
1. Legal Framework 
  
The Australian constitution authorizes direct democracy for the sole purpose of 
approving constitutional amendments.107 Australian voters do not have the power to suggest 
amendments through the initiative process.108 In the past, Australia has held national, non-
binding advisory referendums, or plebiscites, on controversial matters.109 Certain states in 
Australia continue to use the advisory referendum today.110 Only the legislature may initiate an 
advisory referendum, and the outcome of these referendums influences the government’s 
                                                 
101 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REGISTRATION BY COUNTY SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICT, available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/60day-general-2014/county.pdf.   
102 Voter Register – (Provisional) 2012, DEEP COGITATION BLOG, http://deepcogitation.com/elections-
watch/voter-register-2012/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
103 Compare Shitemi Khamadi, Analysis of (Amendment Bill) 2014, OLE-SHITEMI, 
http://www.shitemi.com/politics/analysis-of-constitution-amendment-bill-2014/ (last visited September 5, 
2014), with CONST. art. 255(a)(1).   
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Id. 
107 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128 (authorizing a popular referendum only on matters of 
constitutional amendment).  
108 Referendums and Plebiscites, PARLIAMENTARY EDUC. OFF., http://www.peo.gov.au/learning/fact-
sheets/referendums-and-plebiscites.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).  
109 AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, supra note 10. 
110 See, e.g., Notice of Plebiscites on Council Amalgamations, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/elections/referendums/Advisory_Referendums/qld_council_2007/index.htm (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014) (announcing a plebiscite vote in the state of Queensland).  
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policies.111  Though Australian voters do not have the ability to initiate an advisory referendum, 
it is still an opportunity for them to affect government decision-making. Legislatures are likely to 
follow the results of an advisory referendum because it can appear arrogant to defy the outcome 
of a popular vote.112  
 
2. Voting and the Referendum Process 
  
The Australian referendum system is unique in that voting is mandatory in all 
referendums for citizens over the age of eighteen.113 Any adult who fails to vote in a national 
referendum must present a valid reason for not voting or else pay a small fine.114 Not 
surprisingly, Australia has one of the world’s highest levels of voter turnout, with over ninety-
three percent of voters participating in the 2013 parliamentary election.115  
  
Australian mandatory referendums are also noteworthy because of their relatively low 
rate of passage. Of the forty-four national referendums held to decide constitutional amendments, 
only eight have passed, which is a success rate of roughly eighteen percent.116 One reason for 
this low rate of passage is Australia’s double majority requirement, which operates on the same 
principle as the Swiss model. Any constitutional amendment must receive a simple majority of 
the national vote as well as a majority vote in at least four of Australia’s six states.117  
  
When comparing the systems of direct democracy in Australia and California, the differences 
outnumber the similarities. Australians cannot circulate petitions to create new statutes or make 
constitutional amendments,118 which is the cornerstone of the California model. Further, 
Australians employ the non-binding referendum, a concept relatively unknown to California 
voters.119 Voting is required in Australia and nearly all adults participate in elections. In contrast, 
voting is encouraged in California, but usually less than half of all registered voters cast 
ballots.120 The main similarity between the systems in Australia and California is the use of a 
                                                 
111 AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, supra note 110.  
112 Id. 
113 Voting Within Australia-Frequently Asked Questions, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/faqs/voting_australia.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).  
114 Id.  
115 Voter Turnout Data for Australia, INT’L  INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, 
http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=AU (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).  
116 Referendum Dates and Results, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/referendums/Referendum_Dates_and_Results.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 
2014). There have been five constitutional amendments which captured a simple majority of the national 
vote, but failed to pass in at least four states. Without the double majority requirement, these amendments 
would have passed, raising the passage rate to over thirty percent.   
117 AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128.  
118 See id. (including no provisions that authorize popular initiatives).  
119 For a discussion of advisory questions in California, see Brandon Bjerke & Meryl Balalis, 
Legislatively Referred Advisory Questions on the Ballot: The Struggle for Proposition 49 CAL. INIT. 
REV., (Fall 2014). 
120 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, HISTORICAL VOTER REGISTRATION AND PARTICIPATION IN STATEWIDE 
GENERAL ELECTIONS (1910–2012), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2012-general/04-
historical-voter-reg-participation.pdf. 
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mandatory referendum to amend the constitution. However, even this process is notably 
different, with Australia requiring a double majority for amendments to pass.  
 
IV. LESSONS FROM ABROAD 
 
Sections II and III provide a survey of the electoral initiative and referendum mechanisms 
employed by California and select foreign countries. Table 4.1 highlights the various 
mechanisms used by each country. 
 
Table 4.1  
 
Country/State Agenda 
Initiative  
Direct 
Initiative  
Mandatory 
Referendum 
Optional 
Referendum 
Advisory 
Referendum 
California  X X X  
Switzerland X*  X X  
Philippine X X  X  
Kenya X  X   
Australia   X  X 
* The Swiss system only permits constitutional, as opposed to statutory, initiatives.  
 
The foregoing sections suggest that there are as many ways to implement a system of 
direct democracy as there are nations that have such a system. Each of the four nations discussed 
has developed mechanisms to effect citizen participation. Consideration of the forms of direct 
democracy instituted by other countries can inform a discussion on how California could 
improve its own initiative and referendum system. What follows are a few proposals derived 
from Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia that California could adopt to address 
some of the criticisms raised concerning its initiative and referendum system. 
 
A. Signature and Distribution Requirements 
 
In order to blunt the criticism that the low threshold required to pass a constitutional 
amendment results in a constitution that is a “bloated mishmash,”121 implementing a distribution 
requirement may make it more difficult to pass a constitutional amendment. Mirroring the 
Philippines’ system would require a specified percentage of signatures from each county in 
California in order for the initiative to appear on the ballot. This would ensure proportional 
representation, thereby making it more arduous to amend the constitution.122 In addition, 
Kenya’s model, which requires approval from county assemblies, could provide further 
assurance that the measure has support throughout the state. 
                                                 
121 See supra note 20.  
122 For a more in depth treatment of proportional representation, see Initiative Petition Signature 
Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (last updated Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/signature-requirements.aspx.  
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B. Agenda Initiatives (Indirect Initiatives) 
 
A reintroduction of the agenda initiative could help curb the expense of signature 
gathering in California’s initiative process.123 An often cited disadvantage of California’s 
initiative process is the exorbitant costs to carry an initiative from the signature gathering phase 
to statewide approval.124 Modeled after the Swiss system, the agenda initiative could be a cost-
effective alternative to the direct initiative because it requires fewer signatures. As soon as an 
initiative garners a sufficient number of signatures, the legislature would be required to consider 
the proposal. For some initiatives, this could result in a purely legislative solution, sparing 
proponents the costs of a full-scale campaign. However, if dissatisfied with the legislature’s 
response, the proponents of the initiative would still have the option to take the measure to a 
statewide vote. 
 
In addition, the agenda initiative may result in a more educated electorate.125 
Comparatively, when Swiss voters propose a constitutional amendment through the agenda 
initiative process, the Federal Assembly must formally consider the initiative before it can be 
placed on the ballot. This aspect of the Swiss system can result in a more in-depth conversation 
between the government and the people. When the parliament makes a counterproposal, Swiss 
voters often prefer the parliament’s counterproposal to the original initiative.126 This indicates 
that the agenda initiative process can yield legislative solutions that are satisfactory to Swiss 
voters. Both the increased flexibility of the Swiss initiative process and the wider array of 
proposals from which voters may choose seem to justify the use of the agenda initiative. While 
the California legislature is required to convene “informational hearings” about the propositions 
that will appear on the ballot, these hearings are not widely covered by the media, and thus have 
little effect on the public debate.127 As such, reintroducing the agenda initiative could spur 
dialogue between the legislature and the electorate.  
 
Another feature of the agenda initiative that could also help to increase statewide 
representation of the electorate is demonstrated by the system implemented in Kenya. This 
system incorporates a multi-layered-legislative participation. In other words, county assemblies 
must approve the initiative before it goes to both Houses of Parliament. If this system were 
implemented in California, presumably, the initiative process would require understanding of 
local needs rather than a statewide focus.  
 
Nevertheless, a reintroduction of the agenda initiative could meet political resistance 
because the initiative process has taken on the distinctive character of “California’s fourth branch 
                                                 
123 See supra note 22. 
124 LEDUC, supra note 31, at 150. 
125 See supra note 23. 
126 DUBOIS, supra note. 46, at 51. The Swiss parliament made twenty-six counterproposals to initiative 
constitutional amendments between 1891 and 1991. Of these, Swiss voters adopted seventeen into law. 
Id.   
127 SIMMONS, supra note 28, at 11. 
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of government.”128 The notion of the legislature participating in the initiative process could strike 
voters as a power grab, contravening the original purpose of the initiative as a route around a 
legislative body beholden to special interests.129 Even though any proposal rejected by the 
legislature would necessarily be subjected to a popular vote, voters may be hesitant to include the 
legislature in a method of lawmaking that historically has been the exclusive domain of the 
people.  
  
C. The Double Majority Requirement 
 
The Double Majority Requirement, as exercised in Switzerland and Australia, could also 
help to address the concern that it is too easy to amend the California constitution.130 Under the 
Swiss and Australian constitutions, all amendments must be passed in a national referendum by a 
double majority. This is not the case in California, where a statewide simple majority is 
sufficient to pass legislative and initiative constitutional amendments.  
 
 Implementing the double majority rule in California would require all amendments to be 
passed by a majority of voters in the state, as well as by voters in a majority of California’s 
counties. Again, this would make it more difficult for constitutional amendments to pass. 
Further, in order to pass an amendment, it would have to garner wide support across the state, not 
merely a strong voting base in one region. Thus, the double majority requirement would have the 
dual effect of insulating the constitution from excessive amendments while mandating a more 
widespread consensus on proposed amendments.  
 
 
D. Shorter and More Concise Initiatives 
 
In answer to the criticism that initiatives are difficult to comprehend,131 California could 
mandate that initiatives be shorter and more concise. By comparison, Swiss initiatives are 
usually shorter in length than those that exist in California.132 The primary reason for this 
difference is that the Swiss enforce a strict single-subject rule that applies to all initiatives.133 
Though California has a similar rule, courts have interpreted it to allow large statutory schemes 
to qualify as a single subject.134  
 
To make initiatives more understandable, California could adopt a strict limit on the 
length of ballot initiatives. Though Switzerland does not have any such limitation, the rule would 
bring California’s initiatives more in line with the shorter proposals that appear on Swiss ballots. 
Alternatively, voters could pass an initiative that redefines the single subject rule, making it 
                                                 
128 See CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA’S 
FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 71–74 (1992) (detailing various reasons advanced for using the 
initiative system, the first of which is providing a method for citizens to go around the legislature).  
129 See BRODER, supra note 34, at 21.  
130 See supra note 19. 
131 See supra note 24. 
132 DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 58. 
133 Id. 
134 Senate of State of Cal., 21 Cal. 4th at 1163.  
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much narrower. This could force initiative proponents to focus their proposal on one statute or 
constitutional provision, which would make it much easier for voters to comprehend the effect of 
the initiative by reading its text.  
 
E. Advisory Referendums (Non-binding) 
 
The introduction of a non-binding referendum would allow voters to weigh in on a 
greater number of important issues, while at the same time addressing the concern that there is an 
excessive number of initiatives on the ballot.135 If the legislature were able to call a non-binding 
vote on specific policy matters, it could have the effect of reducing the number of initiative 
campaigns brought by voters. The political cover provided by a popular vote would encourage 
the legislature to address “hot-button issues.”  
 
The advisory referendum could also be adapted to the initiative process, whereby citizens 
could gather signatures to request a statewide advisory vote on a particular issue.136 Since the 
results of such a vote would be non-binding, it would be more acceptable to lower the number of 
signatures required to qualify the measure for the ballot. This would enable citizens to call a vote 
on important policy matters without incurring the full financial burden of gathering the 400,000 
signatures required to qualify a legislative initiative.137 Also, there is no danger of voters passing 
unconstitutional or ambiguous laws. The results of a non-binding initiative would merely serve 
as a mandate to legislators to take action on a particular issue. 
 
Proponents of Proposition 49 in 2014 attempted to call an advisory vote to denounce the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The California 
Supreme Court removed Proposition 49 from the ballot, holding that, under current law, it is 
unclear whether advisory questions may be the subject of popular initiatives.138 In order for 
advisory referendums to become part of California’s system of direct democracy, voters would 
need to amend the state constitution to explicitly allow for such a vote.  
 
F. Improving Voter Turnout 
 
Low voter turnout is often cited as a concern for the California initiative process.139 
California could improve its initiative process by implementing methods to increase voter 
turnout. An initiative statute, which is supposedly the will of California voters, loses legitimacy 
                                                 
135 See supra note 22. 
136 Proponents of Proposition 49 in 2014 attempted to call an advisory vote to denounce the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The California Supreme Court rejected 
Proposition 49, holding that, under current law, advisory questions may not be the subject of popular 
initiatives. The report on Proposition 49 contained in this volume details the failure of the proposition.  
137 In the last ten years, there has been a significant rise in the percentage of initiatives that are given 
official titles but fail to qualify for the ballot. This indicates that there are many issues that voters feel are 
important but that failed to reach a statewide vote. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, INITIATIVE TOTALS BY 
SUMMARY YEAR 1912–JANUARY 2013, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-
measures/pdf/initiative-totals-summary-year.pdf.  
138 Brandon Bjerke & Meryl Balalis, Legislatively Referred Advisory Questions on the Ballot: The 
Struggle for Proposition 49 CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2014). 
139 LEDUC, supra note 31, at 151.  
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when it is passed by just a small segment of the state’s voters. For example, the 2014 primary 
election saw only twenty-five percent of California’s registered voters participate.140 This figure 
contrasts sharply with the high rate of turnout in Australia, which has not fallen below ninety 
percent voter turnout since mandatory voting was instituted in 1924.141 Thus, it is arguable that 
referendums in Australia better represent public sentiment since they are decided by a much 
wider segment of voters.  
 
Mandatory voting is not a palatable solution to voter-turnout problems in California or 
any other state in America. However, a more realistic method to increase voter turnout would be 
to set a minimum level of voter participation, or participation quorum, required for a proposition 
to take effect.142  As discussed, Kenya is currently considering the implementation of a quorum 
requirement that would prevent any referendum from taking effect unless fifty percent of eligible 
voters cast a vote in the referendum. It is important to note that 55 percent of eligible California 
voters participated in the 2012 presidential election, and 59 percent in 2008.143 Thus, a 50 
percent participation requirement would not banish propositions from California politics. It 
would, however, pressure proponents to campaign for initiatives only in presidential election 
years. Consequently, more voters would be deciding the outcomes of initiatives and referendums 
which could have profound effects on the state. 
  
G. Frequency of Initiatives  
 
Yet another solution to the criticism that the constitution of California is amended too 
often is to reduce the frequency with which citizens may initiate a constitutional amendment. 
Similar to the Philippines, California could regulate the initiative process to limit citizen-initiated 
amendments to once every four years. This could have the effect of decreasing the number of 
initiatives and fostering a more deliberative democracy, in that citizens would be required to live 
with their proposed amendments for a longer period of time before voting on them. In addition, if 
initiatives only appeared in presidential elections, the initiative process would benefit from the 
considerably higher levels of voter turnout seen in these elections.144   
 
 
 
                                                 
140 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 33.  
141 Who Voted in Previous Referendums and Elections, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 
http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/australian_electoral_history/Voter_Turnout.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 
2014).  
142 Several European nations, including Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia, require at least fifty 
percent of all eligible voters to cast ballots in order for any proposition to pass. LUÍS AGUILAR-CONRARIA 
& PEDRO MAGALHÃES, REFERENDUM DESIGN, QUORUM RULES AND TURNOUT 15 (2008), available at 
http://portal.uam.es/portal/page/portal/UAM_ORGANIZATIVO/Departamentos/CienciaPoliticaRelacion
esInternacionales/publicaciones%20en%20red/working_papers/10%20Pedro%20Magalhaes%20WP%20
95_08.pdf.  
143 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 22. 
144 See Voter Turnout, CENTER FOR VOTING & DEMOCRACY, http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-
analysis/voter-turnout/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (indicating that voter turnout in presidential elections is 
usually ten to twenty percent higher than in midterm elections).  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
There are numerous systems of direct democracy implemented throughout the world. The 
initiative and referendum, as practiced in Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia, 
offer useful comparisons to California’s initiative and referendum system because they encounter 
some of the same problems faced in California. Helpful techniques that are already used abroad, 
such as the double majority requirement, advisory and indirect initiatives, frequency limitations, 
and signature distribution requirements, could be put to constructive use in California. By 
learning how others have approached similar problems, California voters can carry on a more 
informed discussion of how to improve their own system of direct democracy.  
 
 
 
 
